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This Article tests the limits of private contracting by examining what it means to 
contract about bankmptcy. Bankmptcy law is governed by a statutory code that defines 
the relationship between debtors and creditors when a debtor enters the bankmptcy 
regulatory scheme. May debtors and creditors contract in advance to change that 
relationship? Or would these contracts be "Faustian" bargains that the state should 
not enforce? Both courts and scholars are in conflict, yet the answer is critical 
because it affects not only bankmptcy costs but also the stmcturing of corporate 
reorganizations and securitization transactions. I maintain that the threshold 
question-what freedom should parties have to contractually override a statutory 
schemel-has not yet been adequately addressed in this context. lfirst examine the 
principles by which parties should or should not be allowed to contractually alter 
statutory schemes. I then apply those principles to a model of prebankmptcy 
contracting by taking into account the policies underlying the bankmptcy code and 
also by analyzing the extent to which, under contract law, externalities should render 
a contract unenforceable. I conclude that, within defined limits, bankmptcy law 
should be viewed as default provisions and not as mandatory mles. Finally, I show 
that my modelofprebankmptcy contracting can have important applications, not only 
to making corporate reorganizations and securitization transactions more efficient but 
also to understanding when parties should be allowed to contract about statutory 
schemes generally and when externalities should override freedom of contract. 
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In recent years, bankruptcy courts have given conflicting answers to 
the question: May a prepetition debtor3 contractually waive bankruptcy 
protections?4 More recently, scholars have entered this debate by asking 
3. By prepetition, I mean a debtor or company that is not subject to a bankruptcy case at the time 
of contracting. If the prepetition debtor and the debtor's estate in bankruptcy are completely separate 
legal entities, then one could not contractually bind the other. That "separate entity~ theory, however, 
has been largely discredited. See infra note 59 and accompanying text. Furthennore, this Article 
advances arguments as to what the law should be and is not limited to the current state of the law. 
4. Compare In re Atrium High Point Ltd. Partnership, 189 B.R. 599, 607 (Bankr. M.D.N.C. 
1995), In re Jenkins Court Assocs. Ltd. Partnership, 181 B.R. 33, 36 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1995), In re 
Powers, 170 B.R. 480, 482-83 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1994), In re Cheeks, 167 B.R. 817, 818-19 (Bankr. 
D.S.C. 1994), III re Club TowerL.P., 138 B.R. 307, 311 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. 1991), alld In re Citadel 
Properties, Inc., 86 B.R. 275, 276 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1988) (all recognizing, in dicta or in the holding, 
that a prepetition debtor may waive the automatic stay), with In re Pease, 195 B.R. 431, 433 (Bankr. 
D. Neb. 1996), Fann Credit, ACA v. Polk, 160 B.R. 870, 873-74 (M.D. Fla. 1993), alld In re Sky 
Group Int'l, Inc., 108 B.R. 86, 88 (Bankr. W.D. Pa. 1989) (all refusing to enforce the waiver of the 
automatic stay). 
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not only whether debtors should be allowed to waive these protections but 
also whether parties should be allowed to contract for bankruptcy proce-
dures that are different from those supplied by the state.5 Some scholars 
argue that bankruptcy law should not be a mandatory regime because a 
single set of rules cannot meet the requirements of all the parties affected 
by a bankruptcy. Depending on the circumstances of a given bankruptcy 
case, some parties will profit and others will be harmed.6 The ability to 
structure their private arrangements in the bankruptcy process more cre-
atively therefore may benefit the parties. 
The debate also is important because its outcome will affect the way 
that debtors and creditors act in debt negotiations and workouts that always 
precede, and often can circumvent, the costly bankruptcy process.7 The 
National Bankruptcy Review Commission, for example, recently observed 
that "lenders increasingly include contingencies in loan documents, 
indentures, and workout, forbearance, and settlement agreements that 
waive certain [bankruptcy] rights of the borrower upon filing for 
bankruptcy. The possible enforceability of prebankruptcy waivers 
pervasively effects a wide range of private negotiations between lenders 
5. See, e.g., Edward S. Adams & James L. Baillie, A Privatization Solution to the Legitimacy of 
Pre petition Waivers of the Automatic Stay, 38 ARIZ. L. REv. 1 (1996); Daniel B. Bogart, Games 
Lawyers Play: Waivers of the Automatic Stay in Bankruptcy and the Single Asset Laan Workout, 43 
UCLA L. REv. 1117 (1996); Rafael Efrat, The Case for Limited Enforceability of a Pre-Petition Waiver 
of the Automatic Stay, 32 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 1133 (1995); Robert K. Rasmussen, Free Contracting 
in Bankruptcy at Home and Abroad, in THE FALL AND RISE OF FREEDOM OF CONTRACT (Francis 
Buckley ed., forthcoming 1999) [hereinafter Rasmussen, Free Contracting in Bankruptcy]; Robert K. 
Rasmussen, Debtor'S Choice: A Menu Approach to Corporate Bankruptcy, 71 TEXAS L. REV. 51 (1992) 
[hereinafter Rasmussen, Debtor's Choice]; Robert K. Rasmussen & David A. Skeel, Jr., The Economic 
Analysis of Corporate Bankruptcy Law, 3 AM. BANKR. INSf. L. REv. 85, 97-101 (1995); Alan 
Schwartz, A Contract Theory Approach to Business Bankruptcy, 107 YALE L.J. 1807 (1998) 
[hereinafter Schwartz, Contract Theory Approach]; Alan Schwartz, Contracting About Bankruptcy, 13 
J.L. ECON. & ORG. 127 (1997) [hereinafter Schwartz, Contracting About Bankruptcy]; Marshall E. 
Tracht, Contractual Bankruptcy Waivers:Reconciling Theory, Practice, andLaw, 82 CORNELLL. REv. 
301 (1997); see also Michael St. Patrick Baxter, Pre petition Waivers of the Automatic Stay: A Secured 
Lender's Guide, 52 Bus. LAW. 577 (1997) (offering guidance to secured lenders in the use of 
prepetition waivers of the automatic stay); Bruce H. White, The Enforceability of Pre-Petition Waivers 
of the Automatic Stay, AM. BANKR. INSf. J., Jan. 1997, at 26,26 (summarizing the arguments for not 
enforcing prepetition waivers of the automatic stay). 
6. See Rasmussen, Debtor's Choice, supra note 5, at 52-53. 
7. Bankruptcy costs can be considerable. See Barry E. Adler, Bankruptcy and Risk Allocation, 
77 CORNELL L. REV. 439, 464 (1992). See generally VICTOR BRUDNEY & WILLIAM W. BRATION, 
BRUDNEY & CHIRELSfEIN'S CASES AND MATERIALS ON CORPORATE FINANCE 491-92 (4th ed. 1993) 
(describing "direct bankruptcy costs" as legal and professional fees and indirect bankruptcy costs as 
"opportunity costs including lost sales and decline in value of inventory, increased operating costs and 
a reduction in competitiveness"). Bogart noted that "'[pJractically every loan modification or business 
workout agreement drafted today contains a series of boilerplate "bankruptcy waiver" provisions.'" 
Bogart, supra note 5, at 1128 n.21 (quoting Jeffrey W. Warren & Wendy V.E. England, Pre-Petition 
Waiver of the Automatic Stay Is Not PerSe Enforceable, AM. BANKR. INSf. J., Mar. 1994, at 22, 22). 
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and borrowers .... "8 In addition, the outcome of the debate is critical 
to the structuring of hundreds of billions of dollars of securitization9 
transactions each year, which focus primarily on whether the parties have 
achieved a "bankruptcy remote" structure; \0 and it also may influence 
choice of law issues in transnational bankruptcy cases. II 
Moreover, the debate also raises issues that, I argue, go well beyond 
bankruptcy to the very essence of freedom of contract. To that extent, I 
use prebankruptcy contracting as a model for exploring those broader 
issues. 
Although the debate is complex, its essence is easy to grasp by 
example. A troubled debtor, not yet in bankruptcy,12 may want relief 
from a default on its loan agreement or may need additional credit to 
survive a market downturn. The lender agrees to waive the default, or to 
extend the credit, but in return demands that the debtor contractually waive 
one or more of its rights under bankruptcy law, such as its right to the 
automatic stay. 13 If bankruptcy later occurs, the lender will be able to 
enforce its claim notwithstanding that the debtor's other creditors 
("nonconsenting creditors") will be stayed from enforcing their claims 
because they are not parties to the contract. Preferential enforcement thus 
may prejudice nonconsenting creditors by permitting the lender to recover 
first from the debtor's assets. If those assets are essential to the debtor's 
8. 1 NATIONAL BANKR. REVIEW COMM'N, BANKRUPTCY: THE NEXT TWENTY YEARS 484-85 
(1997) (footnote omitted). 
9. See TAMAR FRANKEL, SECURITIZATION: STRUCTURED FINANCING FINANCIAL ASSET POOLS, 
AND AssET-BACKED SECURITIES § 21.20.1 (1991); STEVEN L. SCHWARCZ, STRUCTURED FINANCE: A 
GUIDE TO THE PRINCIPLES OF ASSET SECURITIZATION 16-17 (2d ed. 1993); Claire A. Hill, 
Securitization: A Low-Cost Sweetener for Lemons, 74 WASH. U. L.Q. 1061, 1062 (1996) (noting that 
by the end of 1994, $1.9 trillion in securitization securities were outstanding); Steven L. Schwarcz, The 
Alchemy of Asset Securitization, 1 STAN. J.L. BUS. & FIN. 133, 133 (1994) [hereinafter Schwarcz, 
Alchemy] (observing that asset securitization is one of the most important means of capital formation 
in the United States). 
10. A structure is bankruptcy remote if an issuer of securities and the financial assets transferred 
from the debtor to that issuer are unlikely to be adversely affected by the debtor's bankruptcy. See 
Schwarcz, Alchemy, supra note· 9, at 135 (claiming that the issuer "must be structured as 'bankruptcy 
remote' to gain acceptance as an issuer of capital market securities"). I discuss the application of pre-
bankruptcy contracting to securitization transactions infra subpart IV(C). 
11. See Robert K. Rasmussen, A New Approach to Transnational Insolvencies, 19 MICH. J. INT'L 
L. 1, 19-26 (1997) (arguing that multinational firms should be allowed to select their own insolvency 
rules from a menu of options). 
12. The federal Bankruptcy Code (Code) governs bankruptcy law in the United States. See 
Bankruptcy Code, 11 U.S.C. §§ 101-1330 (1994 & Supp. II 1996). 
13. The automatic stay provides, in relevant part, that "a petition filed under [the Code] ... 
operates as a stay, applicable to all entities, of ... any act to obtain possession of property of the 
[bankrupt debtor's] estate or of property from the estate or to exercise control over property of the 
estate." Id. § 362(a)(3) (1994). The lender may ask the debtor for other bankruptcy law waivers, but 
waiver of the stay is the most common. 
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business, preferential enforcement also may impair the debtor's ability 
under bankruptcy law to reorganize as a viable company. The idea that 
parties can override bankruptcy law by contract, which I refer to as a 
"prebankruptcy contract," 14 therefore conflicts with the traditional view 
that bankruptcy law is a form of public law, imposing mandatory rules to 
preserve distributional and rehabilitative interests. 15 
But bankruptcy law today is not composed entirely of mandatory rules: 
a certain type of prebankruptcy contract, unrecognized as such, has long 
been a permissible private law exception. Whenever a company gives col-
lateral to a creditor, it enters into a prebankruptcy contract in the form of 
a security agreement, which prefers that creditor at the risk of prejudicing 
nonconsenting creditors and impairing the company's ability to 
reorganize. 16 Of course, the existence of this exception to bankruptcy's 
mandatory rules neither validates the expansion of that exception nor 
proves that the exception was justified in the first place. I will show, 
however, that the theoretical basis for enforcing security agreements would 
appear to be the same as that for enforcing prebankruptcy contracts. 17 
A fundamental normative question will arise in the analysis: When 
should the law enforce contracts, such as waiver contracts, that may, and 
in fact sometimes do, harm third parties? This question cannot be 
answered without addressing the "major conceptual" problem of 
14. The tenn prebankruptcy contract, which refers to a contract made in advance of bankruptcy 
with the intention of overriding a portion of the bankruptcy statutory scheme, differs from the tenn 
"prepetition contract," which could refer to any contract made in advance of bankruptcy, irrespective 
of the contract's purpose. 
15. In this context, public law compares to commercial law, which provides that "[t]he effect of 
provisions of [the Unifonn Commercial Code] may be varied by agreement, except as otherwise 
provided in this Act." U.C.C. § 1-102(3) (1995). Nonetheless, even U.C.C. rules may not be con-
tracted around in ways that adversely impact third parties. See, e.g., id. § 1-102 cmt. 2 ("The rights 
of third parties under Section 9-301 when a security interest is unperfected, for example, cannot be 
destroyed by a clause in the security agreement."). The U.C.C. also articulates caution for 
amendments entered into by distressed debtors: "The default situation offers great scope for 
overreaching; the suspicious attitude of the courts has been grounded in common sense." Id. § 9-501 
cmt. 4 (explaining the rationale for U.C.C. § 9-501(3)'s limitation on waiving the state-law rights of 
a debtor in default). Prebankruptcy contracting raises these same cautions to the extent that it adversely 
impacts third parties (the nonconsenting creditors) and affects distressed debtors. 
16. See infra notes 325-30 and accompanying text. Security agreements are recognized by the 
Code. See, e.g., 11 U.S.C. §§ 101(37), 101(50)-(51), 506(b). Therefore, how can I refer to a security 
agreement as a type of prebankruptcy contract that is made with the "intention of overriding a portion 
of the bankruptcy statutory scheme"? The answer is that the bankruptcy statutory scheme fundamen-
tally provides for pari passu payment of claims, and security agreements override that scheme only with 
implicit Code approval. They are not even mentioned, for example, in 11 U .S.C. § 726(a), the Code's 
central provision ordering the priority of distribution of a debtor's estate, but that section nonetheless 
is interpreted to give distributional priority to secured creditors. Moreover, I am only making an anal-
ogy between security agreements and prebankruptcy contracts. 
17. See infra note 329. 
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"[d]etermining which [externalities] are to count in constraining the ability 
of parties to contract with each other." 18 A significant portion of the 
analysis concerns solving this problem in the context of prebankruptcy 
contracting. 19 
Scope and methodology 
I examine what I believe are the two representative kinds of prebank-
ruptcy contracts that are likely to be encountered: contracts, such as 
waivers, desired by creditors to limit the debtor's bankruptcy protections 
("waiver contracts"); and contracts desired by debtors to seek alternatives 
to bankruptcy procedures or even to the bankruptcy process itself 
("procedure contracts").20 In a typical waiver contract, the debtor waives 
its protection under the automatic stay in bankruptcy21 against a particular 
creditor's debt-collection actions.22 In exchange, that creditor gives the 
debtor new credit or waives the debtor's default under a loan agreement. 23 
When both the debtor and that creditor are waiving rights, the creditor is 
merely waiving a contract right, whereas the debtor is waiving a right 
under bankruptcy law. 
In a procedure contract, on the other hand, the debtor, on its own 
initiative, attempts to negotiate with its creditors to contractually change the 
statutory procedures that would apply in the event the debtor subsequently 
goes bankrupt.24 Under existing law, contracts bind only their parties. 
Therefore, a procedure contract cannot bind creditors that fail to sign the 
contract, and those nonsigning creditors potentially can force the debtor to 
use the statutory bankruptcy procedure. Thus, a debtor wants all of its 
creditors to agree to the procedure contract. Rarely, however, can a debtor 
obtain unanimous creditor agreement. Some creditors may refuse to agree, 
18. MICHAEL J. TREBILCOCK, THE LIMITS OF FREEDOM OF CONTRACf 20 (1993). The word 
"externalities" as used in the quotation above and in this Article refers to negative externalities. 
19. See infra section III(B)(I). 
20. Procedure contracts, like waiver contracts, therefore entail the waiver of rights, but they arise 
in a different context. 
21. See 11 U.S.C. § 362(a). 
22. Although the debtor conceivably could waive its protection under the automatic stay in bank-
ruptcy against the debt·collection actions of all of its creditors, I later argue that such a broad waiver 
could thwart the fundamental bankruptcy policy of debtor rehabilitation and therefore should be pre-
sumed to be invalid. See infra note 353. Accordingly, I focus on waivers in favor of one, or at most 
a limited number, of a debtor's creditors. 
23. I refer to defaults that are sufficiently material to enable the lender, as a matter of law, to 
accelerate payment of its loan. 
24. The different procedures may be less costly than the statutory bankruptcy procedures. For 
examples of procedure contracts, see Rasmussen, Free Contracting in Bankmptcy, supra note 5, at 14 
and Schwartz, Contracting About Bankruptcy, supra note 5, at 134-40. 
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and other creditors, such as involuntary tort claimants, may not even be 
known to the debtor. Therefore, without implementing legislation, 
procedure contracts are less likely than waiver contracts to have practical 
application.25 Accordingly, my analysis focuses more heavily on waiver 
contracts. 
I also limit the analysis to business bankruptcies in which the contract-
ing parties are sophisticated and represented by bankruptcy counseU6 
These limitations, however, should not significantly limit the practical 
scope of this Article. Most prebankruptcy contracts can be expected to be 
negotiated in a business context; indeed, all of the decided cases on pre-
bankruptcy contracting have involved business bankruptcies.27 Moreover, 
business entities generally are presumed to be sophisticated28 and typically 
are represented by counsel. My analysis makes no assumptions, however, 
as to the sophistication or legal representation of noncontracting parties 
(most importantly, nonconsenting creditors).29 
Finally, this Article generally takes a normative approach, examining 
not merely what the law is but what it ought to be. For example, there is 
little question that bankruptcy law can trump a freely entered-into contract. 
Chief Justice Hughes concluded, for example, that "when contracts deal 
with a subject matter which lies within the control of Congress, they have 
a congenital infirmity. Parties cannot remove their transactions from the 
reach of dominant constitutional power by making contracts about 
25. See infra subpart IV(D) (arguing that statutory implementing legislation, perhaps inspired by 
prepackaged bankruptcies under § 1126(b) of the Code, may be necessary to make procedure contracts 
practical); Schwartz, Contracting AboUT Bankruptcy, supra note 5, at 143 (illustrating that procedural 
bankruptcy contracts have practical applications only if the law binds nonsigning creditors to contracts 
agreed to by a majority of creditors). Of course, one of the main drawbacks of waiver contracts-their 
potential negative effect on creditors of the debtor that are not parties to the contract-would not arise 
if all of a debtor's creditors are parties to a procedure contract. See infra text accompanying note 108. 
26. Nonbusiness bankruptcies, such as those involving consumer-debtors, could raise issues that 
would fundamentally distort the analysis. For example, consumer-debtors may be unable to afford 
counsel to advise them on prebankruptcy contracts. And even if a consumer-debtor does retain counsel, 
the fee paid may not motivate the lawyer to devote as much time to the client as in a business context, 
when larger amounts of money are likely to be at stake. 
27. See supra note 4 (listing cases). 
28. Consumer protection laws do not, for example, protect unsophisticated businesses. A pre-
sumption of sophistication minimizes the cost of adjudicating the issue of sophistication. See, e.g., 
Steven L. Schwarcz, A Fundamental Inquiry into the Statutory Rulemaking Process of Private 
Legislatures, 29 GA. L. REV. 909, 939 n.107 (1995) (noting the difficulty and impracticality of dis tin-
guishing between small and large businesses as to their sophistication). But if. LYlm M. LoPucki, The 
Unsecured Creditor's Bargain, 80 VA. L. REv. 1887,1949-58 (1994) (exposing flaws in the common 
justifications for imputing sophisticated knowledge to small-business debtors). This Article does not 
attempt to address whether small-business debtors always should be deemed to be sophisticated for the 
purpose of prebankruptcy contracting. 
29. Those matters are irrelevant to the analysis of externalities suffered by those parties. See infra 
section I1I(B)(1); subsection III(A)(2)(a) (both analyzing externalities). 
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them. "30 This Article is about whether bankruptcy law should trump a 
freely entered-into contract. 
A normative approach to prebankruptcy contracting nonetheless faces 
the quandary that "[b ]ankruptcy scholars are profoundly divided over the 
proper direction of bankruptcy law. "31 Some scholars, referred to as "free 
marketers," claim that bankruptcy should pursue only the goal of economic 
efficiency; others, referred to as "traditionalists," respond that the Code in 
fact pursues other goals.32 I combine these perspectives by acting as both 
a free marketer in inquiring whether prebankruptcy contracting can make 
the bankruptcy system more efficient and as a traditionalist in recognizing 
that political realities constrain the extent to which prebankruptcy 
contracting may be allowed to impinge on the Code's fundamental policies. 
This hybrid approach to examining economic efficiency within a tradition-
alist framework has respectable antecedents in bankruptcy scholarship.33 
My analysis nonetheless addresses each of these perspectives sepa-
rately before combining them. In this way, readers that are doctrinaire 
free marketers or doctrinaire traditionalists can, if they wish, focus on their 
own perspectives.34 More significantly, however, addressing these per-
spectives separately allows a reader that wishes to apply my analysis 
outside of a bankruptcy context-for example, contractually overriding a 
statute other than the Code-to do so merely by substituting another 
statute's policies for the Code's policies in my analysis.35 
30. Nonnan v. Baltimore & Ohio R.R., 294 U.S. 240, 307-08 (1935). Professor Rogers put it 
even more bluntly: "One simply cannot contract out of the bankruptcy power." James Steven Rogers, 
The Impairment of Secured Creditors' Righrs in Reorganization: A Study of the Relationship Between 
the Fifth Amendment and the Bankruptcy Clause, 96 HARV. L. REV. 973, 995 (1983). 
31. Donald R. Korobkin, The Role of Normative Theory in Bankruptcy Debates, 82 IOWA L. REv. 
75,76 (1996). 
32. See id. (contrasting "free-market critics" with "traditionalists"). Compare id. at 92, 95 
(presenting a traditionalist's distrust of nonnative theory as neither helpful nor necessary and focusing 
on what bankruptcy law actually does), with Douglas G. Baird & Thomas H. Jackson, Corporate 
Reorganizations and the Treatment of Diverse Ownership Interests: A Comment on Adequate Protection 
of Secured Creditors in Bankruptcy, 51 U. CHI. L. REV. 97, 99-101 (1984) (characterizing the focus 
of the free marketers as "what bankruptcy law should be" (emphasis omitted», and Schwartz, Contract 
Theory Approach, supra note 5, at 1814-15 (arguing that the traditionalist's response to the nonnative 
approach is faulty because "the appropriate response to an 'ought' claim is an 'ought not' claim, not 
an 'is' claim"). 
33. See, e.g., Lucian Arye Bebchuk, A New Approach to Corporate Reorganizations, 101 HARV. 
L. REV. 775, 776-77 (1988) (taking "as given the existence (and significant use) of the bankruptcy 
reorganization process and avoiding the debate whether liquidation is preferable to reorganization-
focusing instead on finding, "as long as reorganizations remain, the best method for dividing the 
reorganization pie"). 
34. I WOUld, however, regard their narrow perspectives to be incomplete. 
35. Likewise, a person that disagrees with the Code's policies (or with my description of those 
policies) could use my analysis merely by substituting her choice of policies. Cf. infra note 168 
(discussing other fonnulations of bankruptcy policies advanced by scholars). 
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Before beginning my substantive analysis, I provide a framework by 
summarizing and commenting on the current judicial and scholarly debates 
over prebankruptcy contracting. 
II. The Current Debate 
A. The Judicial Debate 
The judicial debate has been heated. Most of the decided cases have 
arisen in the context of clauses in loan agreements requiring debtors to 
waive the automatic stay in the event of their subsequent bankruptcy. Six 
courts have recognized in dicta or holding that the automatic stay may be 
waived. 36 Three courts have refused to recognize a waiver of the stay. 37 
Although arguments can be made that these judicial decisions reflect ex 
post pragmatic judgments more than a normative rationale,38 courts have 
at least attempted to justify their decisions by principles that go beyond the 
immediate case at hand. 
The cases that support waiver of the stay fall into two categories. 
Some courts reasoned that a debtor simply has bargained away its right to 
protection of the stay. In re Atrium High Point Ltd. Partnership39 repre-
sents this argument. As part of a modification agreement entered into 
between the debtor and a bank creditor in connection with the debtor's 
original bankruptcy case, the bank reduced the interest rate and extended 
the maturity of its loan in return for the debtor's promise not to "oppose 
any motion filed by Lender . . . seeking relief from or modification of the 
automatic stay ... in any subsequent [bankruptcy] case of [debtor]."4O 
A year later, the debtor filed for bankruptcy again and the bank moved for 
relief from the automatic stay.41 The court reasoned that 
[a]lthough an order of this court granting relief from stay may 
debilitate the Debtor somewhat, the Debtor accepted that risk when 
it agreed to the prepetition waiver of the automatic stay. . .. The 
[waiver] was bargained for under. " this Debtor's first confirmed 
36. See supra note 4 (listing cases). 
37. See supra note 4 (listing cases). 
38. See, e.g., Baxter, supra note 5, at 579 (arguing that "if one looks past the judicial rhetoric to 
the facts of each case, it becomes apparent that the results of the cases are reconcilable on the basis of 
the [bankrupt] debtor's likelihood of reorganization"). Irrespective of whether the cases could be 
reconciled by an ex post examination of the effect of prebankruptcy contracting, I argue that the 
enforceability of such contracting should be determinable ex ante. See infra notes 358-59 and accom-
panying text. 
39. 189 B.R. 599 (Bankr. M.D.N.C. 1995). 
40. ld. at 603. The automatic stay is codified in the Bankruptcy Code, 11 U .S.C. § 362(a) (1994). 
41. In re Atrium High Point, 189 B.R. at 603. 
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plan of reorganization.42 The Debtor received a lower interest rate 
and a five-year extension of the loan. . .. Enforcing the Debtor's 
agreement under these conditions does not violate public policy 
concerns.43 
525 
Other courts asserted that permitting parties to contract about 
bankruptcy promotes the public policy of debtor rehabilitation by 
encouraging out-of-court restructurings. In re Club Tower L.P.,44 for 
example, involved a forbearance agreement entered into between a debtor 
and its single creditor after the debtor had defaulted on a loan agreement. 
The creditor agreed to forbear exercising its rights and remedies as a 
secured creditor for a period of time in return for which the debtor, among 
other things, agreed to waive the stay in the event of a subsequent 
bankruptcy. The debtor, which had no employees and only a few unse-
cured creditors, each holding de minimis claims, later filed for 
bankruptcy. 45 The court ruled that "[p]re-petition agreements regarding 
relief from stay are enforceable in bankruptcy, ,,46 reasoning that 
"enforcing pre-petition settlement agreements furthers the legitimate public 
policy of encouraging out of court restructuring and settlements. ,,47 
The cases opposing waiver of the stay fall into several categories. 
Some courts simply concluded that waiving the automatic stay violates the 
policies underlying bankruptcy law.48 For example, in Farm Credit, ACA 
v. Polk,49 the lender agreed to extend the date of a foreclosure sale in 
exchange for an agreement by the debtor not to contest a motion for relief 
from the stay in the event that the debtor filed for bankruptcy. The debtor 
42. Although one technically can distinguish this case on the ground that the waiver of stay was 
included in a confirmed plan of reorganization, the reasoning of the court does not appear to depend 
on that fact. 
43. In re Atrium High Point, 189 B.R. at 607 (dictum); accord In re Powers, 170 B.R. 480, 483 
(Bankr. D. Mass. 1994) ("[P]re-petition agreements waiving opposition to relieffrom the automatic stay 
may be enforceable in appropriate cases .... "). The court in In re Atrium High Point, however, was 
"not convinced that [the bank's] arguments concerning the Debtor's waiver ... can overcome the 
legitimate objections of the other creditors in the case" and therefore denied the motion for relief from 
the stay. In re Atrium High Point, 189 B.R. at 608. 
44. 138 B.R. 307 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. 1991). 
45. Id. at 308-10. 
46. Id. at 311. The court alternatively held that "because the Debtor filed this bankruptcy case in 
bad faith, [the creditor] is entitled to relief from the automatic stay to exercise its rights and remedies 
as a secured creditor." Id. at 310. 
47. Id. at 312. Although the court noted that this reasoning "particularly" applies in single asset 
cases, the court's rationale is not limited to those cases: "To hold otherwise [i.e., not enforce the 
pre bankruptcy contract] could make lenders more reticent in attempting workouts with borrowers 
outside of bankruptcy." Id. at 312; accord In re Cheeks, 167 B.R. 817, 819 (Bankr. D.S.C. 1994) 
("Perhaps the most compelling reason for enforcement of the forbearance agreement is to further the 
public policy in favor of encouraging out of court restructuring and settlements. "). 
48. I later argue that prebankruptcy contracts do not always violate such policies. See infra section 
II(B)(2). 
49. 160 B.R. 870 (M.D. Fla. 1993). 
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subsequently filed for bankruptcy, and the bankruptcy court refused to 
enforce the waiver. 50 On appeal, the federal district court, which viewed 
"the automatic stay [as] a key component of federal bankruptcy law, "51 
affirmed that ruling, observing that "the Bankruptcy Court's holding that 
prepetition agreements providing for the lifting of the stay are 'not per se 
binding on the debtor, as a public policy position, '52 is consistent with the 
purposes of the automatic stay to protect the debtor's assets, provide 
temporary relief from creditors and promote equality of distribution among 
the creditors by forestalling a race to the courthouse. "53 
Courts also have reasoned that the debtor, acting on its own, may not 
waive the automatic stay because the stay protects creditors as well as the 
debtor. For example, in In re Sky Group International, Inc., 54 a debtor 
had acquired a hotel in part by assuming the debt of its prior owner, a 
bankrupt company. As part of the assumption agreement, the new debtor 
consented to relief from the automatic stay in any future bankruptcy. After 
bankruptcy, however, the court refused to enforce the waiver, stating that 
"[t]he legislative history makes it clear that the automatic stay has a dual 
purpose of protecting the debtor and all creditors alike. ,,55 In particular, 
the legislative history to which the court referred finds that 
[w]ithout [the automatic stay], certain creditors would be able to 
pursue their own remedies against the debtor's property. Those who 
acted first would obtain payment of the claims in preference to and 
the detriment of other creditors. Bankruptcy is designed to provide 
an orderly liquidation procedure under which all creditors are treated 
equally. 56 ' 
Relying on that finding by Congress, the court determined that routinely 
granting relief from the stay based on the debtor's waiver would ignore the 
purpose of protection and equal treatment of creditors. 57 
50. Id. at 872. 
51. Id. at 873. 
52. Of course, that does not mean such waivers are per se invalid either. 
53. Farm Credit, ACA, 160 B.R. at 873. The court distinguished existing case-law precedent by 
asserting that, unlike the facts in the case before it, "[a] review of the underlying facts of ... [court] 
cases [upholding stay waivers] ... does confinn that in each case the Bankruptcy Court, expressly or 
impliedly, detennined that the debtor could not effectively reorganize" irrespective of whether the stay 
was waived. Id. at 872. 
54. 108 B.R. 86 (Bankr. W.D. Pa. 1989). 
55. Id. at 88. 
56. H.R. REP. NO. 95-595, at 340 (1977), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5963, 6296-97, 
quoted in In re Sky Group, 108 B.R. at 89. 
57. See In re Sky Group, 108 B.R. at 89; if. In re Atrium High Point Ltd. Partnership, 189 B.R. 
599,607,607-08 (Bankr. M.D.N.C. 1995) (deciding that a debtor may waive the automatic stay, but 
that "[a] waiver by the debtor cannot bind third part[y]" creditors and prevent them from opposing a 
lifting of the stay); see also supra note 43. 
1999] Rethinking Freedom of Contract 527 
Finally, at least one court held that waivers are per se unenforceable 
for both technical and policy reasons. 58 From a technical standpoint, the 
court argued that a prepetition debtor is a separate and distinct legal entity 
from a postpetition "debtor in possession"59 and therefore has no capacity 
to bind it.6O From a policy standpoint, the court reasoned that "the 
comprehensive nature of the Bankruptcy Code and its underlying purpose 
of providing a nationally uniform collective remedy to debtor and 
creditors" shows that "the Bankruptcy Code extinguishes the private right 
of freedom to contract around its essential provisions. "61 State debtor-
creditor law, said the court, is based on the notion of "first in time is first 
58. See In re Pease, 195 B.R. 431, 432-33 (Bankr. D. Neb. 1996) ("The apparent trend in 
decisional law , particularly in the context of single asset cases, is to enforce contractual waivers of the 
automatic stay. With due respect for existing decisional law , I conclude that the pre-bankruptcy waiver 
of the automatic stay is unenforceable, per se .... " (citations omitted». 
59. Id. at 433. The court observed: 
Upon the commencement of a Chapter 11 bankruptcy case, the debtor becomes a "debtor 
in possession" with a fiduciary duty to creditors and rights and obligations under federal 
law. Those rights include the enforcement of the automatic stay, which protects the 
debtor in possession and property of the bankruptcy estate. In this sense, the Chapter 11 
debtor is a separate and distinct entity from the pre-bankruptcy debtor. 
Id. (citations omitted). This argument is weak, having been discredited by the Supreme Court, other 
courts, and most commentators. See, e.g., NLRB v. Bildisco & Bildisco, 465 U.S. 513, 528 (1984) 
(rejecting the "new entity" characterization); In re Allen, 135 B.R. 856, 868 (Bankr. N.D. Iowa 1992) 
("[T]he language of Bildisco is unambiguous and intended to put a stop to the rather artificial and 
fictitious distinctions between the debtor-in-possession and the debtor. "); In re Ontario Locomotive & 
Indus. Ry. Supplies (U.S.), 126 B.R. 146, 147 (Bankr. W.D.N.Y. 1991) ("In [Bildisco], the Court 
would appear to have laid to rest the 'separate entity' doctrine for all time. "); Thomas G. Kelch, The 
Phantom Fiduciary: The Debtor in Possession in Chapter 11, 38 WAYNE L. REv. 1323, 1334 (1992) 
(observing that the new entity theory "is near death and is being replaced by a less occult conceptual 
model of the debtor in possession"); Stephen McJohn, Person or Property? On the Legal Nature of the 
Bankruptcy Estate, 10 BANKR. DEV. J. 465, 466 (1994) (reviewing the decline of the separate entity 
doctrine); Jay Lawrence Westbrook, A Functional Analysis of Executory Contracts, 74 MINN. L. REv. 
227, 235-36 (1989) (asserting that judicial wariness of the new entity theory "is likely correct because 
the notion of a 'new entity' not bound by the contract conflicts with the trustee's duty to pay damages 
for rejecting the contract"); see also, e.g., United States v. Gerth, 991 F.2d 1428, 1435 (8th Cir. 1993) 
("Whether the 'different entity' theory is still viable in any context is questionable. "). Nonetheless, 
some courts still appear to follow the new entity doctrine. See, e.g., In re West Elecs. Inc., 852 F.2d 
79, 83 (3d Cir. 1988) ("[I]n the context of the assumption and assignment of executory contracts, a 
solvent contractor and an insolvent debtor in possession going through bankruptcy are materially 
distinct entities."); In re DeLuca, 142 B.R. 687, 691 (Bankr. D.N.J. 1992) ("The filing of a 
bankruptcy petition creates the bankruptcy estate which is a new and different entity from the debtor. "); 
United States, Small Bus. Admin. v. Gore (In re Gore), 124 B.R. 75, 78 (Bankr. E.D. Ark. 1990) 
(holding that, in defeating a setoff, "a distinction must be made between a prepetition debtor and a 
debtor-in-possession, the separate entity that is created after the filing of [the bankruptcy] petition"). 
60. See In re Pease, 195 B.R. at 433 ("I conclude that the pre-bankruptcy debtor simply does not 
have the capacity to waive rights bestowed by the Bankruptcy Code upon a debtor in possession, 
particularly where those rights are as fundamental as the automatic stay. "). 
61. Id. at 434. The court also cautioned that upholding the waiver "would encourage institutional 
lenders to adopt standardized waiver terms in form loan agreements," which "would substantially 
undercut the relief Congress intended to provide debtors under the Bankruptcy Code." Id. at 435. I 
discuss the transactional application of prebankruptcy contracting to loan agreements infra subpart 
IV(B). 
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in right"62 and therefore both "rewards the belligerent liquidator and 
provides a disincentive to forbearance. ,,63 As a result, "[t]he resolution 
of disputes between a debtor and creditors under state law often involves 
a multiplicity of lawsuits and high transactional costS.,,64 But," [t]he 
Bankruptcy Code substantively alters the rights and remedies of both 
debtors and creditors in a most fundamental way. "65 
The cases are therefore split on the fundamental issue of whether 
prebankruptcy contracts are ever permitted, much less whether waivers of 
the stay are permitted.66 Although cases acknowledge that prebankruptcy 
contracting can enhance public policy by promoting out-of-court 
restructuring, judges also are concerned that debtors or creditors may be 
prejudiced or that bankruptcy policies may be violated.67 The following 
discussion, which describes and critiques the scholarly debate, shows that 
scholars are also divided. 
62. In re Pease, 195 B.R. at 434. For example, the first creditor to obtain a judgment and levy 
on the debtor's assets is the first that obtains a judicial lien. See id. The Uniform Commercial Code 
priority scheme also is based on first in time, first in right. See U.C.C. § 9-312(5) (1995) (stating that 
the order of priority of secured creditors ordinarily is determined by the order in which they file a 
financing statement or perfect). 
63. In re Pease, 195 B.R. at 434. 
64. Id. 
65. Id. Virtually the only other cases addressing freedom of contract are those holding that a 
debtor's right to file a bankruptcy petition is absolute. See, e.g., Fallick v. Kehr, 369 F.2d 899, 904 
(2d Cir. 1966); In re Madison, 184 B.R. 686, 690-91 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1995); Artinian v. Peli (In re 
Peli), 31 B.R. 952, 956 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 1983); Johnson v. Kriger (In re Kriger), 2 B.R. 19, 23 
(Bankr. D. Or. 1979); In re Weitzen, 3 F. Supp. 698, 698 (S.D.N.Y. 1933). But see United States 
v. Royal Business Funds Corp., 724 F .2d 12 (2d Cir. 1983), in which a company licensed by the Small 
Business Administration (SBA) appealed the stay of its Chapter 11 bankruptcy filing. The SBA, as con-
sideration for a new loan to the troubled business which was already in default under an existing SBA 
loan, had obtained a stipUlation granting the SBA "exclusive power" to collect and administer the 
company's assets under nonbankruptcy court supervision. Id. at 14. The court dismissed the Chapter 
11 filing, reasoning that if the SBA could not rely on the agreement, it "will never again provide new 
loans to a company in . • . financial straits and [thus] receivership designed to resuscitate financially 
troubled [small business investment companies] will be much less feasible." Id. at 15; see also In re 
NBI, Inc., 129 B.R. 212 (Bankr. D. Colo. 1991), in which the court held void a prebankruptcy agree-
ment granting to a debtor'S bankruptcy counsel a substantial nonrefundable fee retainer covering post-
petition legal services because the agreement "impermissibly circumvent[ed] the explicit and implicit 
requirements of the Bankruptcy Code and Rules [authorizing the] compensation of professionals ... 
only for actual and necessary legal services and related costs." Id. at 222 (emphasis omitted). 
Although the court felt that the provisions of the Code governing fee arrangements are meant to 
"protect against the danger that a prospective debtor, willing to do whatever necessary to secure the 
counsel of its choice, may bargain away more than is reasonable," id. at 222, that logic suggests a dis-
tinction on which I later focus. Once a debtor retains and is advised by bankruptcy counsel, its naivety 
may be compensated for by its counsel's sophistication and experience. See infra notes 153-54, 190-
191 and accompanying text. This Article is limited to situations in which the contracting debtors are 
sophisticated and represented by bankruptcy counsel. See supra text accompanying note 26. 
66. Indeed, it could be argued that those cases which enforced waivers found facts sympathetic 
to enforcement, but those which refused to enforce waivers faced less sympathetic facts. Each court 
could have narrowed its holding by focusing on particular facts. 
67. I later address these concerns. See infra subpart III(B). 
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B. The Scholarly Debate 
The scholarly debate appears to have started when Professor Robert 
Rasmussen, after pointing out the "increasing uneasiness in the academy" 
over Chapter 11, suggested that the "failure to reach a consensus [on 
Chapter 11] stems from a basic flaw contained in all of the theories of 
corporate-reorganization law offered to date. "68 The flaw is the assump-
tion that bankruptcy law must be a mandatory rule. 69 Rasmussen 
suggested that viewing bankruptcy law as inherently a set of mandatory 
rules is anomalous because most rules in contract law are default rules. 70 
Arguing that "one must provide a justification for invoking mandatory 
rules,"7) Rasmussen proposed that "it is time for bankruptcy scholarship 
to address the question of who should decide whether a firm is eligible for 
corporate reorganization under the auspices of the Bankruptcy Code.,,72 
Rasmussen's arguments have generated a lively debate. Agreeing that 
prebankruptcy contracting is an important subject for scholarly inquiry,73 
Professor Alan Schwartz examined a model in which, similar to current 
68. Rasmussen, Debtor's Choice, supra note 5, at 52. 
69. A mandatory rule is a rule that a government imposes and parties are not free to change; in 
contrast, a default rule is a rule that government imposes but parties are free to change by agreement. 
See id. at 53 ("[AlII theorists assume that bankruptcy law is a mandatory rule; it is a rule set in place 
by the government that cannot be altered by those whom it affects."). Given that assumption, 
Rasmussen argued that scholars inevitably will reach "differing assessments of the impact of the 
bankruptcy regime on the groups-creditors, shareholders, workers, or members of the community at 
large-in whom the [particular] scholar is interested." Id. at 52-53. 
70. See id. at 53, 61-62. Rasmussen argued that because the interest rate on a loan will depend 
in part on the anticipated recovery in bankruptcy, "bankruptcy law is an implied term of the contract 
between a creditor and the firm" and therefore "at a fundamental level [is] no different from the myriad 
of rules that the law implies to flesh out the bargain between contracting parties." Id. at 58-59. Of 
course, that a statutory provision affects the bargain between parties does not necessarily tum the statute 
itself into contract law. Even presuming that some of bankruptcy law's normative foundations may be 
contractarian, see Douglas G. Baird & Thomas H. Jackson, Bargaining After the Fall and the Contours 
of the Absolute Priority Rule, 55 U. CHI. L. REV. 738, 747-49 (1988) (noting that bankruptcy law 
serves to "check opportunistic behavior" in debt renegotiation, much in the same manner that "ordinary 
rules of contract" limit the ability of a party to renegotiate contract terms), bankruptcy law itself is 
neither contract law nor a subset of contract law, but an independent statutory scheme in which the 
state, not private parties, plays a dominant role. 
71. Rasmussen, Debtor's Choice, supra note 5, at 63 (citing Ian Ayres & Robert Gertner, Filling 
Gaps in Incomplete Contracts: An Economic Theory of Default Rules, 99 YALE L.J. 87, 87 (1989), for 
the proposition that mandatory rules are generally viewed as the exception and not the rule). That most 
contract rules are default rules does not, however, prove that all mandatory rules must be justified. 
72. Id. at 53. Rasmussen went on to propose a menu approach to corporate bankruptcy. The need 
for default rules increases proportionally to the number of parties and situations covered by the rule. 
Corporate bankruptcy covers a wide range of companies and creditors, making a one-size-fits-all rule 
inefficient and "strongly suggest[ing] that a default-rule approach is superior to the law's current 
prescription of a mandatory rule." Id. at 63. A menu of standardized bankruptcy options, selected by 
a firm when it is formed, would respond to this problem and reduce the transaction costs and the 
strategic-action problem of allowing unlimited options. See id. at 66. He would impose mandatory 
rules, however, to protect nonconsenting creditors. See id. at 67. The nature of those rules, however, 
is beyond the scope of his article. 
73. See Schwartz, Contracting About Bankruptcy, supra note 5, at 130-31. 
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law, an insolvent debtor can choose one of two bankruptcy procedures.74 
Although an "efficient bankruptcy procedure will maximize the sum of 
monetary returns [to creditors] and private benefits [to the debtor], "75 
neither of the two posited procedures is assumed always to do this.76 
Instead, faced with the creditors' legal entitlement to the monetary return 
when the debtor is insolvent, the debtor will prefer the bankruptcy 
procedure that maximizes its private benefits irrespective of the monetary 
return to creditors.77 Schwartz pointed out that creditors could always 
bribe the debtor to choose the more efficient procedure.78 If creditors 
believe ex ante that they may have to pay a bribe, however, that would add 
to the cost of credit and reduce investment in positive-value projects.79 
Thus, the current mandatory rule is inefficient. Schwartz then showed that 
prebankruptcy contracting could lead to an optimal bankruptcy procedure 
because the parties, in order to reach agreement, effectively would have to 
balance the debtor's private benefits with the creditors' monetary return. 80 
Nonetheless, Schwartz cautioned that disagreement among the creditors 
themselves could be an obstacle to prebankruptcy contracting.81 Senior 
creditors may prefer liquidation in order to be paid, but trade creditors may 
prefer that the debtor's business continue to operate, because they can earn 
profits by continuing to provide the debtor with goods and services.82 
74. See id. at 129 & n.5. Under the Code, a business debtor generally chooses either to 
reorganize under Chapter 11 or to liquidate under Chapter 7. 
75. [d. at 129. By private benefits, Schwartz meant benefits, such as salaries, that the debtor's 
owners and managers derive from continuing to operate the debtor. See id. at 133. 
76. For example, if a debtor has a temporary liquidity crisis but otherwise is a sound business, 
the reorganization procedure may be better economically even though creditors might prefer a quick 
liquidation to get their money and avoid risk. But if the debtor's business is inherently unsound, liqui-
dation may be better economically even though the debtor's managers may wish to preserve their jobs 
by keeping the business running at the creditors' expense. See id. at 132. 
77. See id. at 129. 
78. See id. at 130. 
79. See id. 
80. See id. at 129-30. Rasmussen referred to this as negotiating for "an ex ante bribe set in the 
contract." Rasmussen, Free Contracting in Bankruptcy, supra note 5, at 5. Schwartz dismissed the 
collective action problem as a bar to prebankruptcy contracting, observing that "[c]ollective action 
problems ... sometimes yield to contractual solutions." Schwartz, Contracting About Bankruptcy, 
supra note 5, at 128. He contemplated that a contractually chosen procedure could "best solve these 
parties' particular collective action problem." [d. The collective action problem is that absent a bank-
ruptcy procedure, creditors will act in their individual interests, increasing the risk that an inherently 
viable but temporarily troubled debtor will be liquidated. See id. 
8!. See id. at 140-43. 
82. See id. at 142-43. Trade creditors that supply goods and services postpetition usually will be 
paid during the pendency ofa Chapter 11 case. See Bankruptcy Code, 11 U.S.C. §§ 503(b), 507(a)(I) 
(1994) (allowing certain administrative expenses and placing them first in priority for payment by the 
debtor). Schwartz suggested that "[t]he appropriate legal response to this source of conflict, however 
prevalent, is to bind nonsigners to the bankruptcy contract to which a majority of the debt holders (in 
amount) agreed." Schwartz, Contracting About Bankruptcy, supra note 5, at 143. He reasoned that 
a trade creditor that dissents from a bankruptcy contract is merely attempting to redistribute wealth 
inefficiently from the majority to itself and that Chapter 11 now bans that strategic behavior by letting 
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Thus, he concluded that "there is a serious question whether contracting 
about bankruptcy issues is feasible. "83 
In a more recent article, Professor Schwartz probed more deeply into 
the meaning of mandatory bankruptcy rules and economic efficiency. 84 
He argued that a mandatory rule is justifiable for two reasons only: it is 
necessary to protect the integrity of the system itself or it enhances ex post 
efficiency when the parties themselves cannot reach the efficient outcome 
on their own.85 Because" [b ]ankruptcy systems create mechanisms to 
facilitate Coasean bargaining, ,,86 parties are able to reach efficient 
outcomes on their own, and therefore redistributional mandatory bank-
ruptcy rules are not needed. Schwartz acknowledged that certain manda-
tory rules, which he calls "structural rules," may be needed to protect the 
integrity of the bankruptcy system itself. S1 Other than structural rules, 
the majority determine the choice of a reorganization plan. See id.; if. 11 u.s.c. § 1126(b)-(d) 
(governing class acceptance of a plan and deemed acceptance or rejection of a plan in prepackaged 
bankruptcies, which are binding on all creditors under existing bankruptcy law); infra subpan IV(D) 
(analyzing the relationship between prepackaged bankruptcies and procedure contracts). 
83. Schwanz, Contracting About Bankruptcy, supra note 5, at 128. He identified three obstacles: 
"[A] firm's creditors may have different preferences over bankruptcy procedures, the firm often has 
many creditors, and the creditors usually lend at different times." ld. He later showed that having 
many creditors that lend at different times would not matter if all creditors had the same preferences. 
See id. at 140. The obstacles noted by Schwanz occur only in contracts to which all creditors must 
agree. Therefore, the type of pre bankruptcy contract that is most common, waiver by the debtor of 
a right such as the automatic stay, would not face the obstacles that Professor Schwanz identified. See 
infra text accompanying notes 108-09 (comparing the need for creditor agreement under procedure and 
waiver contracts); see also infra text accompanying notes 452-61 (arguing that, in the context of pro-
cedure contracts, prepackaged bankruptcy may be a model to overcome Professor Schwanz's 
obstacles). Schwanz ultimately made five tentative recommendations: 
First, parties should be free to contract for the bankruptcy procedure they like. Second, 
the state should create a set of bankruptcy procedures as defaults. . .. Third, every 
procedure should respect absolute priority. Founh, ... creditors who do not agree to a 
bankruptcy procedure should be required to use the bankruptcy procedure that a majority 
of the firm's [creditors] contracted to induce. Finally, because contracts seem feasible in 
bankruptcy contexts, deeper justifications are needed for the mandatory rules in the 
current Bankruptcy Code. 
Schwanz, Contracting About Bankruptcy, supra note 5, at 144. These recommendations were tentative 
because Professor Schwanz acknowledged that his analysis has two major limitations: it ignored 
involuntary creditors, and it made three "strong" assumptions-that "the managers are, or are faithful 
to, the owners; [that] creditors do not form coalitions to collude against other creditors; and [that] 
creditors are symmetrically informed about the relevant variables." ld. at 144. 
84. See Schwanz, Contract Theory Approach, supra note 5, at 1839-49. 
85. See id. at 1840. According to Schwanz, "[P]olicy analysis should be done on the assumption 
that maximizing the ex post value of insolvent firms is the only defensible goal of a business bankruptcy 
law." ld. at 1817. 
86. ld. at 1809. Under Coasean bargaining, "the initial location of a property right, as set by 
mandatory rules, is irrelevant to efficiency" in the absence of transaction costs. ld. In reality, of 
course, there always are transaction costs. 
87. ld. at 1839. He identified the automatic stay as such a rule: 
In many cases, some form of stay is essential to the existence of an efficient bankruptcy 
system. . .. If the collateral is wonh more to the firm than to the market, preventing 
foreclosure would maximize the ex post value of the estate. Hence, to let secured 
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however, mandatory rules are inefficient because parties would have to rely 
on renegotiation to induce the optimal bankruptcy choice. 88 Contracts 
dealing with bankruptcy, on the other hand, "would generate higher 
expected values for creditors, "89 and thereby permit more projects to be 
funded. 90 
Whereas Rasmussen and Schwartz focused primarily on procedure 
contracts, other scholars have expanded the scope of the debate by focusing 
on waiver contracts. Professor Marshall Tracht argued that prebankruptcy 
contractual waivers, especially of the automatic stay, should be presumed 
to be valid.91 After questioning whether some courts' refusal to enforce 
bankruptcy waivers reflects "a belief that private parties lack the 
information or ability to determine, at the time of the waiver, whether a 
subsequent bankruptcy proceeding would be worth the cost, "92 he 
countered that "firms and their creditors may be better than bankruptcy 
judges at predicting the likely costs and benefits of bankruptcy. "93 Tracht 
creditors ... foreclose before the value issue is resolved would vitiate the reorganization 
process. 
[d. at 184041. I agree with the proposition that an automatic stay is generally necessary to protect the 
value of the debtor's property. I later argue, however, that contractual waivers of the stay that, on a 
case-by-case basis are ex ante unlikely to reduce such value, actually would maximize ex post overall 
value and therefore should be allowed. See infra subpart III(B); if. Tracht, supra note 5, at 317-18 
(arguing that bankruptcy sometimes is so costly that creditors and debtors would be better off without 
it, even if bankruptcy solves a collective action problem of creditors racing to the courthouse to attach 
a debtor'S assets). 
88. See Schwartz, Contract Theory Approach, supra note 5, at 1831 & n.64. 
89. [d. at 1831. 
90. Schwartz illustrated his point by examining several mandatory rules in the Code. For 
example, ipso facto clauses, which cancel or modify a contract upon the occurrence of bankruptcy, are 
generally unenforceable. See Bankruptcy Code, 11 U.S.C. § 365(e)(1) (1994). Yet their enforcement, 
he argued, would not generally reduce ex post efficiency. Schwartz, Contract Theory Approach, supra 
note 5, at 1809, 184249; infra notes 381-83 and accompanying text (discussing ipso facto clauses as 
a type of pre bankruptcy contract). Schwartz argued based on Kaldor-Hicks efficiency, see id. at 1842-
49, which, in the context of prebankruptcy contracting, may be inappropriate. See infra notes 261-69 
and accompanying text. 
91. See Tracht, supra note 5, at 354-55 (explaining that enforcing such waivers is preferable to 
the present use of complex financial instruments to evade bankruptcy). 
92. [d. at 328. 
93. [d. at 329. In examining whether bankruptcy waivers will prejudice unsophisticated, unsecured 
creditors or tort creditors, Tracht argued that unfairness to contractual unsecured creditors could be 
mitigated by requiring disclosure of prebankruptcy waivers through a filing system, analogous to the 
U.C.C. recording system for security interests, and by efforts on the part of the contractual unsecured 
creditors to obtain covenants limiting such waivers. See id. at 338; Rasmussen & Skeel, supra note 
5, at 100 (suggesting a filing system for prebankruptcy waivers); infra note 328 (comparing U.C.C. 
and prebankruptcy filing systems). He acknowledged that involuntary creditors, such as tort creditors, 
could not require such protection but argues that "the risk to these parties is minimal" and that 
unsecured creditors would "benefit ... in part ... through a reduced risk of insolvency." Tracht, 
supra note 5, at 335-36. Although I agree that unsecured creditors, including involuntary creditors, 
could benefit through a reduced risk of bankruptcy , I later show that unrestricted bankruptcy contracting 
does not necessarily benefit unsecured creditors. See infra section III(B)(I). 
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further suggested that "waivers may play an important role in encouraging 
consensual resolutions that would otherwise fail due to information 
asymmetries."94 Specifically, he noted that "creditors may reject effective 
workout proposals because they cannot be distinguished from ineffective 
ones. Management needs a signal that will assure creditors that 
management really believes in its workout scenario. A bankruptcy waiver 
provides such a signal. "95 
Professor Daniel Bogart extended the debate to include game 
theory.96 In opposition to prebankruptcy contracting, he argued that 
although signaling is the apparent justification for waivers of the stay,97 
"[b lad borrowers are desperate to see their loans worked out, if only 
temporarily, and are often willing to signal as well. "98 Good and bad 
debtors therefore will compete to signal their success, driving up the cost 
of signaling.99 Indeed, "in actual practice," the good signal is "copied by 
bad troubled borrowers." 100 
Clearly, prebankruptcy contracting raises complex issues that divide 
scholars. Although some justify prebankruptcy contracting on signaling 
grounds,101 I agree with Professor Bogart that it cannot be so justified. 
Waivers actually may send a negative signal to noncontracting creditors, 
94. Tracht, supra note 5, at 335. 
95. Id. at 345. Tracht further argued Ihat Ihere should be a strong presumption of enforceability 
because "[i]f waivers are commonly voided, creditors will refuse to give substantial value in exchange 
for Ihem." Id. at 352-53. 
96. See Bogan, supra note 5, at 1162-65. Bogan's arguments are limited by Iheir exclusive focus 
on Ihe "small slice" of single-asset real estate loan workouts. Id. at 1119. When a debtor has only 
one asset, Ihe waiver of Ihe stay would amount to liquidation, eliminating any possibility of 
rehabilitation. Bogan's arguments Iherefore would not apply generally to typical debtors only cenain 
of whose assets are encumbered. 
97. See id. at 1182. According to Bogan: 
The waiver of stay provision might be seen as a signal Ihat Borrower is confident Ihat it 
controls a good project and is worth Ihe effon of a loan workout, presuming Ihat only a 
borrower convinced Ihat it will not need to file for bankruptcy would waive its most 
substantial protection. 
Id. To Ihis extent, Professors Bogan and Tracht agree Ihat, from Ihe perspective of asymmetric 
information, a good debtor, by agreeing to waive its right to Ihe automatic stay, can signal to its credi-
tors Ihat a proposed workout will be successful. See supra text accompanying note 95. 
Id. 
98. Bogan, supra note 5, at 1176. 
99. See id. at 1176-77. Bogan observed: 
[B]ad borrowers will grant concessions to lenders, making Ihe process of distinguishing 
between good and bad borrowers difficult. The only option available to Ihe good 
borrower, Ihen, is to adopt even more costly strategies of signaling Ihe lender .... 
. . . [Tlhis process of signaling leads to inefficient results. The constant confusion 
of signals, wilh attendant costs, is an externality forced upon good borrowers by Ihe 
behavior of bad borrowers. 
100. Id. at 1183. Bogan does not cite Ihe basis of his knowledge of "actual practice." 
101. See supra text accompanying note 95. 
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suggesting the debtor is in trouble. I02 The underlying problem is that 
only very strong, or very desperate, debtors are likely to give waivers, and 
there is often no way to distinguish them. Furthermore, even if the waiver 
signals to the contracting creditor that the debtor believes it will succeed, 
that creditor more tangibly can rely on the substantive protection provided 
by the waiver. Thus, the signal sent by the waiver may be mixed, and the 
very creditor that receives the positive signal may not need it. 
Other scholars have justified prebankruptcy contracting as maximizing 
economic efficiency. 103 I later question, however, whether economic 
efficiency alone should drive bankruptcy rulemakinglO4 and argue that 
fundamental bankruptcy policies, which foster distributional and rehabilita-
tive goals beyond mere economic efficiency, also should be taken into 
account. 105 Furthermore, I question whether the traditional tests of 
economic efficiency are suited to analyze prebankruptcy contracting and 
propose an alternative test that takes into account the impact of prebank-
ruptcy contracting on nonconsenting creditors. 106 
Finally, some scholars have flatly opposed prebankruptcy 
contracting. 107 I argue instead that limited forms of prebankruptcy con-
tracting may well be appropriate. 
III. Analysis 
I begin the analysis by asking the threshold question: what freedom 
should parties have to contractually override a statutory scheme? I attempt 
to answer this question within the context of the bankruptcy statutory 
scheme. Because the analysis is lengthy, I start by providing a summary. 
I first examine the restrictions that generally should be imposed on 
attempts to waive provisions of a federal statute such as the Code. Absent 
specific statutory prohibitions, waivers are permitted if they do not thwart 
102. See Telephone Interview with Arthur Steinberg, Bankruptcy Partner at Kaye, Scholer, 
Fierman, Hays & Handler, L.L.P. (June 10, 1997). 
103. See supra notes 75-95 and accompanying t.ext. 
104. But see Schwartz, Contract Theory Approach, supra note 5, at 1809 (arguing that bankruptcy 
systems only "function to maximize the monetary value of the estate"). Schwartz admitted that limiting 
the goals ofa bankruptcy system to maximizing the monetary value of the estate is not uncontroversiai. 
See id. at 1809-10. But see Korobkin, supra note 31, at 118 (arguing that unless we are persuaded that 
maximizing estate value "reflects some authoritative ideal-an overriding good or one of our deepest 
commitments as persons"-we stilI face the problem of normativity). 
105. See infra section III(B)(2); if. supra text accompanying note 33 (explaining that I argue as 
a free marketer in inquiring whether prebankruptcy contracting can make the bankruptcy system more 
efficient but as a traditionalist in recognizing that political realities constrain the extent to which 
prebankruptcy contracting can impinge on fundamental Code policies). 
106. See infra section III(B)(1). 
107. See supra notes 96-100 and accompanying text. 
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the legislative policies underlying the statute. I then attempt to identify the 
legislative policies underlying the Code. 
Next, I examine the restrictions that contract law additionally would 
impose: should the Code's provisions be viewed, under contract law, as 
mandatory rules that may not be changed by agreement or as default rules 
that parties may contract to change? There are two justifications for 
mandatory rules: paternalism and externalities. In the context of this 
Article's exclusive focus on sophisticated contracting parties represented by 
bankruptcy counsel, I conclude that paternalism alone would not justify 
viewing the Code's provisions as mandatory. In contrast, I show that 
externalities could well justify imposing mandatory bankruptcy rules. 
Having established a context in which to analyze the enforceability of 
prebankruptcy contracts, I first address procedure contracts. Because 
contracts generally do not bind noncontracting parties, a procedure 
contract, at least under present law, would not be binding unless the debtor 
and all of its creditors agree to it. In the case of such unanimous consent, 
there would be no externalities because no rational party would agree to be 
harmed. But because unanimous consent is usually impractical, procedure 
contracts are unlikely to have widespread use without implementing legisla-
tion that establishes a supermajority voting procedure. 108 
Waiver contracts, to which only the debtor and (typically) a single 
creditor are parties, are much more likely than procedure contracts to have 
widespread use. They are, however, also more likely to cause externalities 
and to interfere with bankruptcy policies. Waiver contracts that do not 
materially harm nonconsenting creditorslO9 should not cause externalities 
sufficient to render the contract unenforceable. In the event of a 
bankruptcy, however, waiver contracts often could harm nonconsenting 
creditors. Should they be enforced? 
I use a law and economics analysis to help answer that question. I 
argue that even though some nonconsenting creditors inadvertently may be 
harmed, waiver contracts that ex ante are unlikely to harm nonconsenting 
creditors should make those creditors as a class better offllo by providing 
liquidity to troubled debtors. Therefore, enforcing such contracts would 
be consistent with the normative basis for legislation-evaluating "the 
effects of proposed rules on classes of persons rather than on particular, 
identifiable individuals." 111 Moreover, enforcement also would be con-
sistent with the normative argument for freedom of contract-voluntary 
108. See infra subpart IV(D) (discussing a supennajority voting proposal and analyzing ilS relation 
to voting for prepackaged bankruptcies). 
109. Or, according to my tenninology, have a secondary material impact on those creditors. 
110. Or at least no worse off. 
111. Anthony T. Kronman, Contract Law and Distributive Justice, 89 YALE L.J. 472, 487 (1980). 
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assent on the part of all parties-because even creditors who, in retrospect, 
are harmed would want those contracts, viewed ex ante, to be enforceable. 
Waiver contracts that are likely to harm nonconsenting creditors, 1I2 
however, would make those creditors worse off as a class and therefore 
should not be enforced. 113 
Finally, I analyze whether otherwise enforceable waiver contracts 
would violate bankruptcy policies. 
A. What Principles Govern Whether a Person Should Have Freedom to 
Contract About a Statutory Scheme? 
This question raises two issues: what restrictions generally should be 
imposed on contracting to alter a statutory scheme, and what restrictions 
additionally should be imposed by contract law? Because the Code is 
federal law, I analyze these issues from the standpoint of the federal 
statutory scheme. 
1. What Restrictions Generally Should Be Imposed on Contracting to 
Alter a Federal Statutory Scheme?-Waivers of a federal statute generally 
are permitted unless they would thwart the legislative policies the statute 
was designed to effectuate1l4 or Congress specifically precludes them, as 
through an antiwaiver provision: 
Rather than deeming waiver presumptively unavailable absent some 
sort of express enabling clause, we [the Supreme Court] instead have 
adhered to the opposite presumption. . . . [A]bsent some affirmative 
indication of Congress' intent to preclude waiver, we have presumed 
that statutory provisions are subject to waiver by voluntary agreement 
of the parties. 115 
112. Or, more technically, waiver contracts that are not unlikely to harm nonconsenting creditors. 
113. One of my colleagues has suggested that nonenforcement versus full enforcement should not 
be the only possible outcomes. Often the law internalizes a cost by allowing a party to act but making 
that party liable for the consequences of its actions. Although cost internalization may be theoretically 
possible, I think its enforcement would be difficult because prebankruptcy contracting potentially affects 
a multitude of parties and one cannot assume that the contracting creditor has the financial wherewithal 
to satisfy those panies' claims. Neither can the debtor satisfy those claims; if the contract is ever 
tested, it will be in bankruptcy. 
114. See, e.g., Barrentine v. Arkansas-BestFreightSys., Inc., 450 U.S. 728, 740 (1981)(holding 
that rights under the Fair Labor Standards Act "cannot be abridged by contract or otherwise waived" 
if doing so would "'nullify the purposes' of the statute and thwan the legislative policies it was 
designed to effectuate"); infra subsection III(A)(1)(a). Waivers also may be precluded by "overriding 
procedural considerations." 21 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT & KENNETH W. GRAHAM, JR., FEDERAL 
PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 5039, at 208 (1977). 
115. United States v. Mezzanatto, 513 U.S. 196,200·01 (1995); accord Shutte v. Thompson, 82 
U.S. (15 Wall.) 151, 159 (1873)("A party may waive any provision, eitherofa contractorofa statute 
intended for his benefit. "). 
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Because the Code has relatively few anti waiver provisions,1I6 I focus on 
whether waivers would thwart the Code's policies, first by examining the 
case law on thwarting a statute's policies and then by identifying the 
policies that the Code was designed to effectuate. 117 
116. Most of the provisions in the Bankruptcy Code, 11 U.S.C. §§ 101-1330 (1994 & Supp. II 
1996), including the automatic stay, id. § 362 (1994), are not expressly precluded from being waived. 
Only certain bankruptcy waivers are specifically prohibited. The provisions in prepetition contracts-
called ipso facto clauses-terminating the contract in the event of the debtor's bankruptcy, insolvency, 
or financial condition are not enforceable. Id. § 365(b)(2). Similarly, contract provisions waiving 
exemptions or related avoiding powers are not enforceable. Id. § 522(e). The Code places limits on 
the right of debtors to waive their dischargeability rights. Id. § 524(c). Provisions terminating a 
debtor's interest in property in the event of a debtor's bankruptcy, insolvency, or financial condition-
another type of ipso facto provision-are not enforceable. Id. § 541(c). In addition, postpetition 
waivers by the debtor of defenses, such as statutes of limitations or fraud, usury, and other personal 
defenses, are not binding on the estate. Id. § 558. A debtor also cannot waive its one·time right to 
convert a case from Chapter 7 to Chapter 11 or 13. Id. § 706(a). The Code further grants the debtor 
an unwaivable opportunity to redeem personal property from a lien securing a dischargeable consumer 
debt. Id. § 722. Finally, a waiver of a debtor's right to convert the case to another chapter of the 
Code or to dismiss a personal bankruptcy case prior to conversion of the case to another chapter of the 
Code is not enforceable. Id. § 1307(a), (b). One bankruptcy court has refused to enforce a prebank-
ruptcy contract in analogous circumstances. See In re Howe, 78 B.R. 226,229 (Bankr. D.S.D. 1987) 
(disallowing an assignment fee in an executory contract in light oflanguage in 11 U.S.C. § 365(f) that 
a bankrupt debtor may assign an executory contract "notwithstanding a provision ... that prohibits, 
restricts, or conditions the assignment"). Nonetheless, illogical as it may appear, one could argue that 
"an express waiver clause may suggest that Congress intended to occupy the field and to preclude 
waiver under other unstated circumstances." Mezzanatto, 513 U.S. at 201. But see Johnson v. Home 
State Bank, 501 U.S. 78, 87 (1991) (holding that because Congress had expressly prohibited certain 
types of serial filings elsewhere in the Code, "[t]he absence of a like prohibition on serial filings of 
Chapter 7 and Chapter 13 petitions ... convinces us that Congress did not intend categorically to 
foreclose the benefit of Chapter 13 reorganization to a debtor who previously has filed for Chapter 7 
relieF). Because the Supreme Court has not adhered to a consistent textualist approach in interpreting 
the Code, I do not attempt to predict the significance, if any, of the existence of specific Code 
prohibitions on waiver. See, e.g., Thomas G. Kelch, An Apology for Plain-Meaning Interpretation of 
the Bankruptcy Code, 10 BANKR. DEV. J. 289, 294 (1994) (concluding that "[t]he outline of the 'plain-
meaning' rule that emerges from analysis of these [Court] cases is anything but uniform and nothing 
that can be called a 'theory'"); Charles Jordan Tabb & Robert M. Lawless, Of Commas. Gerunds, and 
Conjunctions: The Bankruptcy Jurisprudence of the Rehnquist Coun, 42 SYRACUSE L. REV. 823,879-
81 (1991) (noting that the Court's ad-hoc approach, or "textualist drift," has resulted in a lack of 
consistent jurisprudence in statutory interpretation). 
117. Recently, however, the National Bankruptcy Review Commission, a group of nine individuals 
appointed by Congress to review the Code, by a five-to-four vote recommended the adoption of a pro-
posed new § 558 providing, in relevant part, that "except as otherwise provided in title 11, a clause 
in a contract or lease or a provision in a court order or plan of reorganization executed or issued prior 
to the commencement of a bankruptcy case does not waive, terminate, restrict, condition, or otherwise 
modify any rights or defenses provided by title 11." NATIONALBANKR. REVIEW COMM'N, supra note 
8, at21 (Recommendation2.4.5). Most of the Commission's proposals have been highly controversial: 
[T]he National Bankruptcy Review Commission on Oct. 20 unveiled a 1,300-page report 
to Congress on how to fix the nation's bankruptcy laws. And its 172 proposals managed 
to please ... almost nobody. . . . 
Even within the commission, deep divisions led four of the nine members-mostly 
private lawyers and federal judges-to issue a scathing dissent. 
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a. Case law on thwarting a statute's policies.-Courts appear 
reluctant in most cases to find that a waiver thwarts a statute's policies. 
The cases in which waivers have been found not to thwart a statute's legis-
lative policies surprisingly involve waivers of constitutional rights, 118 
federal rules of criminal procedure,119 and antidiscrimination laws. 120 
In United States v. Mez:z/1natto,121 for instance, the Court upheld waivers 
of the exclusionary provisions in Rule 410 of the Federal Rules of 
Evidence and in Rule 11 (e) (6) of the Federal Rules of Criminal 
Procedure. l22 The Court reasoned that because "evidentiary stipulations 
are a valuable and integral part of everyday trial practice," and "[b]oth the 
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and the Federal Rules of Criminal 
Procedure appear to contemplate that the parties will enter into evidentiary 
agreements during a pretrial conference," congressional silence on the 
matter did not constitute an "implicit rejection of waivability. "123 
Similarly, the Court held in Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp. 124 
that the right to bring claims in federal court under the Age Discrimination 
in Employment Actl25 (ADEA) could be waived, and the claims subjected 
instead to compulsory arbitration. 126 One of the primary policies of the 
Act was "to prohibit arbitrary age discrimination in employment, ,,127 and 
Congress sought to effectuate this policy by making it unlawful to "fail or 
refuse to hire or to discharge any individual or otherwise discriminate 
against any individual ... because of such individual's age. "128 The 
Dean Foust & Debra Sparks, Bankruptcy Reform: Everybody's Mad-And That's Fine, Bus. WK., Nov. 
3, 1997, at 154, 154 (first ellipsis in original as stylistic element). 
118. See, e.g., Cohen v. Cowles Media Co., 501 U.S. 663, 665 (1991) (ruling that the First 
Amendment did not bar a promissory estoppel claim against a newspaper that breached a promise of 
confidentiality); Snepp v. United States, 444 U.S. 507, 509 n.4 (1980) (holding that a contractrequir-
ing Snepp to submit any material related to the C.I.A. for prepublication review was a reasonable 
means for protecting a compelling government interest); D.H. Overmyer Co. v. Frick Co., 405 U.S. 
174, 187 (1972) (holding that a cognovit clause is not a per se due process violation). 
119. See, e.g., Mez;zanatto, 513 U.S. at 197 (validating a waiver of plea-statement evidentiary 
exclusionary provisions). 
120. See, e.g., Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20,23 (1991) (upholding a 
waiver, obtained through an arbitration agreement, of the right to bring an age discrimination claim in 
federal court); see also Alford v. Dean Winer Reynolds, Inc., 939 F.2d 229, 230 (5th Cir. 1991) 
(holding that Title VII claims can be subjected to compulsory arbitration pursuant to an agreement in 
a securities registration application). 
121. 513 U.S. 196 (1995). 
122. [d. at 197. 
123. [d. at 203, 204. 
124. 500 U.S. 20 (1991). 
125. 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-634 (1994). 
126. Gilmer, 500 U.S. at 23. 
127. 29 U.S.C. § 621(b). 
128. [d. § 623(a)(1). 
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ADEA is to be enforced by private suits129 as well as by the Equal 
Employment Opportunity Commission. 130 The Court noted: "[S]o long 
as the prospective litigant effectively may vindicate [his or her] statutory 
cause of action in the arbitral forum, the statute will continue to serve both 
its remedial and deterrent function. "131 Because arbitration permitted an 
individual to pursue his cause of action, it was deemed an adequate 
remedy, and therefore the right to bring suit in federal court could be 
waived. 132 The upholding of waivers of constitutional rights, criminal 
procedure, and antidiscrimination legislation suggests that no statute-not 
even the Code-is too sacred to be waived. 
Nonetheless, courts sometimes do strike down waivers that are found 
to thwart the policies underlying federal laws. 133 In Alexander v. 
Gardner-Denver Co., 134 for example, the Court held that a purportedly 
exclusive arbitration procedure under a collective-bargaining agreement 
does not constitute an enforceable waiver of the right to sue under Title VII 
of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.135 The arbitrator had ruled that there 
was just cause for discharging the petitioner from his job. Petitioner 
subsequently sued under Title VII, alleging racial discrimination. Although 
the lower courts held that the petitioner was bound by the arbitral decision, 
the Supreme Court reversed. 136 It reasoned: "In submitting his grievance 
to arbitration, an employee seeks to vindicate his contractual right under 
a collective-bargaining agreement. By contrast, in filing a lawsuit under 
Title VII, an employee asserts independent statutory rights accorded by 
Congress. "137 The Court explained that although "the arbitrator's task 
is to effectuate the intent of the parties 'by interpreting' the collective-
129. Id. § 626(c). 
130. See Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(I) (1994) (granting the E.E.O.C. the 
power to remedy discrimination through civil actions); 29 U.S.C. § 626(b) (noting that the E.E.O.C. 
should attempt to gain compliance and eliminate discrimination before bringing an action). 
131. Gilmer, 500 U.S. at 28 (quoting Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 
473 U.S. 614, 637 (1985» (alterations in original). 
132. Id. at 28-29. I express no independent view on whether the Court should have found that 
the arbitration clause in Gilmer thwarted the policies underlying the ADEA. For a cogent argument 
that those policies were thwarted, see Paul D. Carrington & Paul H. Haagen, Contract and 
Jurisdiction, 1996 SUP. CT. REV. 331, 369, 369-71 ("[The Court] failed to observe the large difference 
between mandatory, binding arbitration . . . and voluntary, non-binding conciliation of the sort 
envisioned by ADEA. H). 
133. See, e.g., Barrentine v. Arkansas·Best Freight Sys., Inc., 450 U.S. 728, 740 (1981); 
Brooklyn Sav. Bank v. O'Neil, 324 U.S. 697, 704 (1945) (both addressing the Fair Labor Standards 
Act); Duncan v. Thompson, 315 U.S. 1, 4-6 (1942); Philadelphia, Baltimore & Wash. R.R. v. 
Schubert, 224 U.S. 603, 611 (1912) (both addressing the Federal Employers' Liability Act). 
134. 415 U.S. 36 (1974). 
135. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e-17 (1994 & Supp. n 1996). 
136. Alexander, 415 U.S. at 42-43. 
137. Id. at 49-50. 
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bargaining agreement ... in accordance with the 'industrial common law 
of the shop, '" the arbitrator "has no general authority to invoke public 
laws that conflict with" the contracting parties' intent. 138 Yet, the "broad 
language [of Title VII] frequently can be given meaning only by reference 
to public law concepts." 139 The Court therefore struck the waiver 
because its enforcement would have thwarted the statutory policy under 
Title VII. 140 
Similarly, in Barrentine v. Arkansas-Best Freight System, Inc., 141 the 
Court held that minimum wage claims under the Fair Labor Standards 
Act142 (FLSA) are not precluded by prior submission of the issue to a 
joint grievance committee-a form of arbitration required by the union's 
collective bargaining agreement. 143 The FLSA was passed in 
"recognition of the fact that due to the unequal bargaining power as 
between employer and employee, certain segments of the population 
required federal compulsory legislation to prevent private contracts [from 
imposing substandard wages and excessive hours] which endangered 
national health and efficiency. ,,144 The Court was concerned that 
"[b]ecause the arbitrator is required to effectuate the intent of the parties, 
rather than to enforce the statute, he may issue a ruling that is inimical to 
the public policies underlying the FLSA." 145 
These cases, however, do not necessarily create a bright line by which 
to distinguish, in the context of prebankruptcy contracting, between a 
waiver that thwarts a fundamental statutory policy and one that impairs but 
does not thwart that pOlicy.l46 Bankruptcy judges might find it equally 
difficult to distinguish these cases. 147 I therefore apply a margin of error 
138. [d. at 53. 
139. [d. at 57. 
140. [d. at 59-60. The Court thought "that the federal policy ... can best be accommodated by 
pennitting an employee to pursue ... his cause of action under Title VII, n in addition to his remedy, 
rendered nonexclusive by the Court, under the grievance-arbitration clause of a collective-bargaining 
agreement. [d. 
141. 450 U.S. 728 (1981). 
142. 29 U.S.C. §§ 201-219 (1994 & Supp. II 1996). 
143. Barrentine, 450 U.S. at 745. 
144. Brooklyn Sav. Bank v. O'Neil, 324 U.S. 697, 706 (1945). 
145. Barrentine, 450 U.S. at 744. 
146. In the two cases in which waivers were struck down, Alexander and Barrentine, the waiver 
in question would have prevented the application of an entire public law regulatory scheme. The cases 
do not reveal, however, how waivers of specific statutory provisions would be viewed. 
147. This difficulty may actually explain certain of the lower court bankruptcy decisions. See 
supra notes 48-65 and accompanying text (discussing lower court decisions that refused to enforce pre-
bankruptcy contracting because of its hann to bankruptcy policies). Impairing bankruptcy policies also 
would appear to explain the line of cases holding that the right of a debtor under 11 U .S.C. § 301 to 
voluntarily file a petition for bankruptcy cannot be waived. See supra note 65 (listing cases). 
Preventing a debtor from filing for bankruptcy protection necessarily impairs the realization of 
bankruptcy policies. 
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in my analysis by assuming that a prebankruptcy contract that significantly 
impairs a fundamental bankruptcy policy could be treated like one that 
thwarts that policy and therefore should not be enforced. 148 In order to 
analyze whether prebankruptcy contracting would significantly impair bank-
ruptcy policies, I need to identify those policies, which I do in the next 
section. 
So far, however, my analysis implicitly assumes that prebankruptcy 
contracting would satisfy the basic standards for the enforceability of any 
commercial waiver, whether or not a federal statute is implicated. I 
therefore first need to examine those standards. In the leading case of 
D.H. Overmyer Co. v. Frick Co., 149 the Supreme Court applied the stan-
dards for waiver in a criminal proceeding-that the waiver be "voluntary, 
knowing, and intelligently made" -to commercial waivers. 150 The issue 
was whether to uphold the validity of a cognovit provision under which 
Overmyer consented in advance that if it defaulted on a promissory note, 
Frick could obtain a judgment without notice or hearing. The Court 
reasoned that these standards were satisfied: the provision was voluntary 
because the parties, being business entities, had roughly equal bargaining 
power; the provision was knowing because the parties understood the signi-
ficance of the cognovit provision; and the provision was intelligently made 
because Overmyer received value-a waiver of defaults and a release of 
mechanic's liens-in exchange therefor. 151 
Waivers contained in prebankruptcy contractslS2 also would appear 
to satisfy these standards. The waiver would be "knowing" because the 
parties to a prebankruptcy contract, negotiated after defaultlS3 with the 
help of bankruptcy counsel,IS4 should be well aware of its significance. 
The waiver would be "voluntary" because business entities represented by 
148. My margin of error also compensates for the possibility that certain of the cases on waiver 
of a federal statute which arise in the arbitration context reflect a bias toward arbitration. See Jean R. 
Sternlight, Rethinking the Constitutionality of the Supreme Coun's Preference for Binding Arbitration: 
A Fresh Assessment of Jury Trial, Separation of Powers, and Due Process Concerns, 72 TUL. L. REv. 
I, 9 (1997) ("The Court, far from engaging in neutral legal analysis that simply allows parties to 
contract for arbitration that is mutually advantageous, has in recent decisions stretched and twisted 
traditional canons of construction to favor arbitration over litigation. "). 
149. 405 U.S. 174 (1972). 
150. [d. at 185. 
151. [d. at 186-87. The Court cautioned, however, that "where the contract is one of adhesion, 
where there is great disparity in bargaining power, and where the debtor receives nothing for the 
cognovit provision, other legal consequences may ensue." [d. at 188. 
152. I refer here to the types of prebankruptcy contracts that I argue should be enforceable. 
153. I later suggest that prebankruptcy waivers should be negotiated after default. See infra 
subpart IV(B). 
154. See supra text accompanying note 26 (limiting this Article to business bankruptcies in which 
the contracting parties are sophisticated and represented by bankruptcy counsel). 
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bankruptcy counsel should have roughly equal bargaining power. 155 
Finally, the waiver would be "intelligently made" because the debtor in a 
prebankruptcy contract should receive value in the form of new credit or 
a waiver of default. 156 
Prebankruptcy contracting therefore should not violate any basic 
waiver principles. I next turn to the question whether it would significantly 
impair any fundamental bankruptcy policies. 
b. Bankruptcy policies that would be implicated by prebankruptcy 
contracting.-Three fundamental policies appear to underlie bankruptcy 
law: equality of distribution among creditors; debtor rehabilitation; and, to 
a lesser extent, economical administration of the bankruptcy process. 157 
The equality of distribution criterion ensures an "equitable distribution of 
the debtor's property among his creditors. "158 It also promotes collective 
debt enforcement when collection by one creditor may not be in the inter-
ests of the creditors as a whole,159 thereby making it less likely that 
individual creditors will start a "run" on the debtor. 160 Debtor 
155. See Edward L. Rubin, Toward a General Theory o/Waiver, 28 UCLA L. REv. 478, 490 
(1981) (observing that "[w]aivers pose few dangers in such cases [of companies represented by counsel] 
because ... equal parties are likely to reach mutually acceptable agreements on their own, " as opposed 
to the troublesome situation in which "the person making the waiver is a consumer, patient, or 
employee-in other words, an amateur"); see also id. at 556 (arguing that " [t]he presence of a lawyer 
at the [waiver] negotiations is not essential, ... but it does provide strong evidence of an acceptable 
bargaining process"). 
156. See supra text accompanying note 23. Scholars appear to agree with the result in Overmyer. 
See Rubin, supra note 155, at 556-57 (discussing Overmyer with approval, but noting that "notice, 
bargaining, and the presence of counsel," explicitly relied upon by the Overmyer Court, rarely appear 
in cases involving waivers); Stemlight, supra note 148, at 57 (urging the adoption of Overmyer's civil 
waiver standard for arbitration agreements). Scholars have argued, however, that waivers should not 
be enforced unless the waiving party has obtained the functional equivalent of the right being waived. 
See Rubin, supra note 155, at 537. A prebankruptcy contract that enhances a debtor's ability to reha-
bilitate outside of bankruptcy would appear to be the functional equivalent of the automatic stay, which 
furthers a debtor's ability to rehabilitate in bankruptcy. 
157. See REPORT OF THE COMMISSION ON THE BANKRUPTCY LAWS OF THE UNITED STATES, H.R. 
Doc. No. 93-137, pt. 1, at 75 (1973). Although I act as a traditionalist in describing the policies 
underlying the Code, I am not suggesting those policies are immutable. Furthermore, my analysis can 
be adapted to any set of bankruptcy policies. See supra note 35 (observing that a person disagreeing 
with the Code's policies could use my analysis merely by substituting her choice of policies); infra note 
168 (discussing other formulations of bankruptcy policies advanced by scholars). 
158. H.R. Doc. No. 93-137, pt. 1, at 64. The equality distribution policy also "continue[s] the 
law-based orderliness of the open credit economy in the event of a debtor's inability or unwillingness 
generally to pay his debts." Id. at 71. The "open-credit" economy refers to the role of private credit 
generally in the country's economy. 
159. See THOMAS H. JACKSON, THE LOGIC AND LIMITS OF BANKRUPTCY LAW 7-19 (1986). 
160. See, e.g., In re Elcona Homes Corp., 863 F.2d 483, 484 (7th Cir. 1988). In economic 
terms, equality of distribution addresses the so-called collective action problem. Previous 
commentators, however, have not viewed this problem as fatal to prebankruptcy contracting. See supra 
notes 80, 87. 
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rehabilitation recognizes that a primary purpose of reorganization is "to 
restructure a business's finances so that it may continue to operate, provide 
its employees with jobs, pay its creditors, and produce a return for its 
stockholders. »161 
The third policy is to administer the bankruptcy process efficiently. 
Debtor rehabilitation and equality of distribution are not to be achieved at 
any cost. Efficient administration, however, does not directly oppose the 
other policies: Minimizing fees and administrative expenses will maximize 
the value of the bankruptcy estate. 162 Thus, the administration of bank-
ruptcy proceedings should, to the extent practicable, be "prompt"163 and 
"speedy."I64 Indeed, one goal of the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 
1978,165 the statute creating the Code, was to modernize the process and 
make it more efficient. 166 By promoting out-of-court settlements, 
prebankruptcy contracting would make the bankruptcy process more effi-
cient because costs would be reduced. 167 
161. H.R. REp. No. 95-595, at 220 (1977), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5963, 6179. For 
individual debtors, the equivalent policy-usually referred to as "fresh start" -recognizes that the pur-
pose of the bankruptcy laws is "to convert the assets of the bankrupt into cash for distribution among 
creditors and then to relieve the honest debtor from the weight of oppressive indebtedness and permit 
him to start afresh free from the obligations and responsibilities consequent upon business misfortunes. " 
Williams v. United States Fidelity & Guar. Co., 236 U.S. 549, 554-55 (1915). Although the first 
courts to recognize the fresh start policy applied it to individuals and not to corporations, see, e.g., 
Local Loan Co. v. Hunt, 292 U.S. 234, 244 (1934), later authorities recognize debtor rehabilitation 
as an important policy even for corporate debtors, see, e.g., Susan Block-Lieb, Fishing in Muddy 
Waters: ClariJYing the Common Pool Analogy as Applied to the Standard for Commencement of a 
Bankruptcy Case, 42 AM. U. L. REv. 337,424 & n.385 (1993) (arguing that "Congress sought to • 
• . facilitate the rehabilitation of financially troubled business debtors" and showing that Congress made 
"no distinction between individual debtors and business debtors as to who may commence chapter 11 
reorganization cases" (citing S. REp. No. 95-989, at31 (1978), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5787, 
5817; H.R. REp. No. 95-595, at 321, reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5963, 6277». This Article 
focuses on corporate, and not individual, debtors. 
162. See Otte v. United States, 419 U.S. 43, 53 (1974)(noting that there is "an overriding concern 
in the Act with keeping fees and administrative expenses at a minimum so as to preserve as much of 
the estate as possible for the creditors"). 
163. Katchen v. Landy, 382 U.S. 323, 328 (1966) (quoting Ex pane City Bank of New Orleans 
(In re Christy), 44 U.S. (3 How.) 292, 312 (1845». 
164. Ex pane Woollen, 104 U.S. 300, 301 (1881). 
165. Bankruptcy Code, 11 U.S.C. §§ 101-1330 (1994 & Supp. II 1996). 
166. See H.R. REp. No. 95-595, at 340 (asserting that "[b]ankruptcy is designed to provide an 
orderly liquidation procedure"), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5963, 6297. In reviewing bankruptcy 
law preceding the Code, the Commission on the Bankruptcy Laws of the United States was concerned 
that the cost of decision-making in many bankruptcy cases was disproportionate to the amount of money 
involved. See REpORT OF THE COMMISSION ON THE BANKRUPTCY LAWS OF THE UNITED STATES, 
H.R. Doc. No. 93-137, pt. I, at 82 (1973). 
167. Cf supra notes 44-47 and accompanying text (discussing a case that upheld a waiver because 
out-of-court restructuring promotes the policy of debtor rehabilitation). In the context of bankruptcy 
reorganization, Professor Bebchuk identified the following three goals: preserving the participants' non-
bankruptcy entitlements, maximizing the value of the reorganized company, and reducing costs of the 
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I now test these policiesl68 by examining whether they also underlie 
the Code's automatic stay provision, on which this Article significantly 
focuses. The purposes of the stay have been described as "permit[ting] the 
debtor to attempt a repayment or reorganization plan." 169 That reflects 
the policy of debtor rehabilitation. The stay also freezes the priorities 
among creditorsl70 in order to prevent creditors "who acted first [from 
obtaining] payment of the claims in preference to and to the detriment of 
other creditors. "171 "By preventing this race the stay promotes the stated 
policy of equal treatment" of creditors. 172 Thus, the stay also reflects the 
reorganization process. See Bebchuk, supra note 33, at 780·81. His first goal is effectively the same 
as equality of distribution, which attempts to preserve in bankruptcy the relative priorities of nonbank-
ruptcy entitlements. See infra text accompanying notes 170-72. His second goal, by assuming a 
company can maximize its value by reorganizing in bankruptcy, is consistent with debtor rehabilitation. 
And his third goal is identical to economical administration. 
168. Some scholars have proposed different articulations of bankruptcy's policy goals. Professor 
Warren argued that there are four principal goals of a business bankruptcy system: to enhance the value 
of the failing debtor; to provide for equality of distribution (except for deliberate deviations from 
equality); to constrain externalization of business losses to parties not dealing with the debtor; and to 
create reliance on private monitoring. See Elizabeth Warren, Bankruptcy Policymaking in an Imperfect 
World, 92 MICH. L. REv. 336, 343-73 (1993). Professor LoPucki argued that four of the problems 
addressed by Chapter 11 are as follows: liquidity, so that assets are not disposed of at bargain prices; 
communication and coordination among all interested parties; relief from contract provisions that 
depress the value of the estate; and oversight of the shifts in control that accompany insolvency. See 
LynnM. LoPucki, Strange Visions in a Strange World: A Reply to Professors Bradley and Rosenzweig, 
91 MICH. L. REV. 79, 100-06 (1992). I believe, however, that these goals are included within the gen-
eral policies and considerations that I have identified. Professor Warren's first goal, enhancing the 
value of the failing debtor, is included in my policy of debtor rehabilitation because Chapter 11 pre-
sumes that a rehabilitated debtor is worth more than one in liquidation, but nonetheless mandates liqui-
dation over rehabilitation when the rehabilitated debtor would be worth less. Compare Christopher W. 
Frost, Bankruptcy Redistributive Policies and the Limits of the Judicial Process, 74 N.C. L. REV. 75, 
78 (1995) ("Chapter 11 is premised on the notion that keeping the assets together will result in an 
increase in value over that obtainable in a liquidation."), with 11 U.S.C. § 1129(a)(7)(ii) (1994) 
(providing that a plan of reorganization may be confirmed only if creditors receive at least the value 
that they would receive if the debtor were liquidated instead). Her second goal is included in my policy 
of equality of distribution, her third goal is included in my goal of minimizing externalities, see infra 
section III(B)(1), and her fourth goal is neutral to my analysis. Indeed, Professor Warren acknow-
ledged that her list of policy goals is deliberately flexible, stating that "[a]nother reader might divide 
the list more finely from four items to six or eight or recombine them to two or three." Warren, 
supra, at 340. Professor LoPucki's first and third problems are addressed by my condition that an 
enforceable prebankruptcy contract be one that is unlikely to result in a secondary material impact, see 
infra text accompanying note 230, and his second and fourth problems are neutral to my analysis. In 
any event, those that may disagree with my choice of bankruptcy policies still could find this Article 
useful by substituting their policies for the policies I discuss. See supra note 35. 
169. H.R. REP. No. 95-595, at 340, reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5963, 6297. 
170. See DAVID G. EpSTEIN ET AL., BANKRUPTCY § 3-1, at 60 (1993) (recognizing that the stay 
fixes state-law relationships and priorities among creditors, but provides for orderly application of fed-
eral bankruptcy priorities). 
171. H.R. REP. NO. 95-595, at 340, reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5963, 6297, quoted with 
approval in EpSfEIN ET AL., supra note 170, § 3-1, at 61. 
172. EpSfEIN ET AL., supra note 170, § 3-1, at 61. 
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policy of equality of distribution. Finally, the stay "channel[s] all actions 
and proceedings against the debtor into the bankruptcy court . . . [thereby] 
reduc[ing] the time, trouble, and costs of bankruptcy administration," 173 
reflecting the policy of economical administration of the bankruptcy estate. 
The same policies that underlie the Code, therefore, also underlie the 
automatic stay. 174 
Before analyzing whether prebankruptcy contracting would impair any 
of these policies,175 I will finish constructing the framework for analysis 
by examining whether contract law should place any additional restrictions 
on a person's freedom to contractually override statutory provisions. 
2. What Additional Restrictions Should Contract Law Place on a 
Person's Freedom to Contractually Override a Statutory Scheme?-Because 
contract law presumes that parties will not consensually enter into a con-
tract unless each party perceives a net benefit,176 courts enforce contracts 
absent good reason not to do so. Violating the policies underlying a statute 
would constitute such a reason.177 To that extent, contract law is consis-
tent with, and would be analyzed the same as, federal case law. 178 
The presumption of contract enforceability also is rebuttable if the 
contract harms contracting parties or impinges on the rights of 
173. [d. § 3·6, at 69. 
174. See Farm Credit, ACA v. Polk, 160 B.R. 870, 874 (M.D. Fla. 1993) (stating that the 
"purposes of the automatic stay" are "to protect the debtor's assets, provide temporary relief from 
creditors and promote equality of distribution among the creditors by forestalling a race to the 
courthouse"); ROBERT L. JORDAN & WILLIAM D. WARREN, BANKRUPTCY 303 (4th ed. 1995) 
(justifying the automatic stay as "a fundamental protection for both debtors (safeguard against 
dismembering the bankrupt's estate) and creditors (insuring ratable distribution)"). 
175. See infra section III(B)(2). 
176. In describing normative economic analysis, Professor Trebilcock notes: 
[The] predilection [of neo·classical economists] for private ordering over collective 
decision-making is based on a simple (perhaps simple-minded) premise: if two parties are 
to be observed entering into a voluntary private exchange, the presumption must be that 
both feel the exchange is likely to make them better off, otheIWise they would not have 
entered into it. 
TREBILCOCK, supra note 18, at 7. 
177. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 178(1) (1981) (stating that a "promise or 
other term of an agreement is unenforceable on grounds of public policy if legislation provides that it 
is unenforceable or the interest in its enforcement is clearly outweighed in the circumstances by a public 
policy against the enforcement of such terms"). Other reasons include lack of capacity, mutual 
mistake, frustration, impossibility, fraud, misrepresentation, and the limitation on liquidated damages. 
These reasons need not be discussed in this Article because they no more would be likely to arise in 
the context of prebankruptcy contracting than in any other contracting context. Moreover, the analysis 
of these issues, if they did arise in connection with a prebankruptcy contract, would be no different than 
in any other context. 
178. See supra subsection III(A)(1)(a) (describing cases stating that contracts thwarting policies 
underlying a federal statute should not be enforced); see also infra section III(B)(2) (analyzing whether 
prebankruptcy contracting would impair bankruptcy policies). 
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noncontracting parties. The doctrine that protects the contracting parties 
is called "paternalism." 179 The infringement of rights of noncontracting 
parties is referred to as an "externality. "180 Rules that may not be 
contractually modified are referred to as mandatory rules. 181 Rules that 
may be contractually modified are called default rules. l82 In the context 
of bankruptcy then, the specific issue is whether paternalistic concerns or 
externalities warrant the use of mandatory bankruptcy rules. 183 
a. Paternalistic concerns.-Paternalistic concerns are expressed 
in contract law defenses based on unconscionabilityl84 and can be 
observed in defenses based on duress or information asymmetry. 
Information asymmetry, in the context of this Article, means that one party 
179. See Anthony T. Kronman, Paternalism and the Law of Contracts, 92 YALE L.J. 763, 763-64 
(1983) ("In general, any legal rule that prohibits an action on the ground that it would be contrary to 
the actor's own welfare is paternalistic. "). 
180. See, e.g., Ayres & Gertner, supra note 71, at 88; Guido Calabresi & A. Douglas Melamed, 
Property Rules, Liability Rules, and Inalienability: One View of the Cathedral, 85 HARV. L. REv. 
1089, 1111 (1972); Kronman, supra note 179, at 763; see also Cass R. Sunstein, Legal Inteiference 
with Private Preferences, 53 U. CHI. L. REV. 1129, 1130 (1986) ("It may generally be agreed that if 
actions that gratify private preferences produce 'harm to others,' governmental intervention is 
appropriate. "). The economic definition of externalities means "the indirect effect of a consumption 
activity or a production activity on the consumption set of a consumer, the utility function of a 
consumer, or the production function of a producer." 2 THE NEW PALGRAVE: A DICfIONARY OF 
ECONOMICS 263, 263-65 (John Eatwell et al. eds., 1987). Legal commentators, however, usually 
define externalities as harm (or costs) to third parties. See, e.g., TREBILCOCK, supra note 18, at 58; 
Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, The Corporate Contract, 89 COLUM. L. REv. 1416, 1436-
41 (1989); Richard A. Epstein, Surrogacy: The Case for Full Contractual Enforcement, 81 VA. L. REV. 
2305,2325-26 (1995); Richard A. Posner, Blackmail, Privacy, and Freedom of Contract, 141 U. PA. 
L. REv. 1817, 1818-19 (1993). Third parties theoretically may even include the public at large. 
Furthermore, under the broad economic and legal definitions, an externality can occur even if the third 
party has no right or power to stop the harm. I later show, however, that only legally recognized third 
parties, meaning holders of claims against and holders of interests in the debtor, should be considered 
in the case of prebankruptcy contracting. See infra notes 244-47 and accompanying text. 
181. See Rasmussen, Debtor's Choice, supra note 5, at 61. Mandatory rules sometimes are 
referred to as immutable. See Ayres & Gertner, supra note 71, at 87 ("The legal rules of contracts 
and corporations can be divided into two distinct classes. . .. [T]he smaller, but important, class 
consists of 'immutable' rules that parties cannot change by contractual agreement.") (citations omitted). 
Ayres and Gertner offered the U.C.C. duty to act in good faith, see U.C.C. § 1-203 (1995), as an 
example of an immutable, or mandatory, rule. See Ayres & Gertner, supra note 71, at 87. 
182. See Ayres & Gertner, supra note 71, at 87 ("The larger class consists of 'default' rules that 
parties can contract around by prior agreement."). Ayres and Gertner offered the U.C.C. warranty 
of merchantability, see U.C.C. § 2-314, which parties may waive by agreement, as an example of a 
default rule. See Ayres & Gertner, supra note 71, at 87. 
183. See Ayres & Gertner, supra note 71, at 88; Rasmussen, Debtor's Choice, supra note 5, at 
63 (both noting the agreement among theorists that mandatory rules are justifiable if society wants to 
protect either parties to the contract (paternalism) or third parties (externalities». 
184. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACfS § 208 cmt. a, cmt. b, iIIus. 3 (1981); E. 
ALLAN FARNSWORTH, CONTRACfS § 4.28, 332-34 (2d ed. 1990) (both illuminating paternalism at the 
root of the doctrine of unconscionability). 
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to a contract has significantly greater information than the other party about 
the subject of the contract. Information asymmetry by itself should not 
provide a basis for restricting the type of prebankruptcy contracting 
discussed in this Article. l85 The parties to a prebankruptcy contract are 
the debtor and one or more of its creditors. In a waiver contract, although 
both the contracting creditor and the debtor would be waiving their 
rights,l86 paternalistic concerns would normally focus on a creditor taking 
advantage of a debtor and not the other way around. Asymmetric informa-
tion therefore would be troublesome only if creditors have more informa-
tion about the debtor than the debtor itself has. 
Such asymmetry appears unlikely, however. The debtor should know 
at least as much as, if not more than, the creditor about its own ability to 
succeed. uri Two cautions, though, should be observed. First, a 
distinction must be made between the amount of information the debtor 
possesses and the debtor's appreciation of that information. Sometimes a 
troubled debtor-desperate to avoid bankruptcy and overconfident of its 
ability to succeed-may know more than the creditor about its prospects, 
but may be unable to judge the information in an objective context and 
therefore may overestimate the likelihood of success. 188 A financially 
robust debtor also may not always appreciate the significance of a boiler-
plate prebankruptcy contract provision included in its loan agreement. 189 
Second, creditors usually are repeat players in the bankruptcy game and 
may have better information about the consequences of bankruptcy. 
Although these cautions would be mitigated by the experience level of the 
debtor's bankruptcy counsel,l90 their existence may help to explain the 
185. Infonnation asymmetry is not itself a contract defense. An infonnation asymmetry, however, 
may undennine some prerequisite to enforceability-for example, by casting doubt on whether there 
is meaningful consent. See, e.g., UNIF. PREMARITAL AGREEMENT Acr § 6, 9B U.L.A. 376 (1987) 
(rendering unenforceable antenuptial contracts in which one prospective spouse does not disclose her 
assets to the other). By doing so, it provides a nonnative rationale to justify limiting freedom of 
contract. My point, though, is that the very existence of infonnation asymmetry is unlikely in the 
context of the type of prebankruptcy contracting discussed in this Anicle. 
186. Creditors would be waiving their rights and remedies in default, whereas debtors would be 
waiving cenain of their rights in bankruptcy. 
187. See Bogan, supra note 5, at 1123 ("Workouts are games of asymmetric infonnation: 
Borrowers have a far greater sense of whether they are capable of successfully reorganizing than does 
the lender. "); if. supra text accompanying note 95, (describing Tracht's view of waivers as a signaling 
device in the presence of infonnation asymmetry). Recall that I limit the analysis to sophisticated con-
tracting parties represented by bankruptcy counsel. See supra text accompanying note 26. 
188. There are two relevant types of infonnation: the likelihood of rehabilitation and the conse-
quences of the prebankruptcy contract (or waiver). The debtor may overestimate the likelihood of 
rehabilitation and underestimate the consequences of the waiver. 
189. See infra subpan IV(B). To mitigate this concern and a related concern over agency costs, 
I later suggest that a debtor should not enter most prebankruptcy contracts prior to default. See infra 
subpan IV(B). 
190. Practical criteria should detennine whether a prebankruptcy contract has been negotiated by 
the debtor's "bankruptcy counsel." Law finns that specialize in bankruptcy work are well known and 
bankruptcy lawyers themselves are affiliated with a number of professional organizations, such as the 
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coolness of some courts and commentators to waiver contracts-particularly 
those that appear in original loan agreements for which the debtor has not 
engaged bankruptcy counsel and may not appreciate the gravity of its 
concession. 
Information asymmetry also should not provide a conceptual basis for 
restricting procedure contracts. Because both the debtor and its creditors 
would be agreeing to optional procedures, both may be waiving their 
rights. Asymmetric information would be troublesome if creditors have 
more information about the debtor than the debtor itself or vice versa. 
That appears unlikely for the reasons discussed above. Asymmetric infor-
mation also would be troublesome, however, if one side has more informa-
tion about the bankruptcy process. As discussed above, creditors may have 
more information about the process because they likely are repeat players 
in the bankruptcy game: an institutional creditor especially will have seen 
numerous debtors go bankrupt. Nonetheless, a sophisticated debtor that is 
advised about the process by experienced bankruptcy counsel should over-
come what would otherwise be a serious information asymmetry. 191 
The paternalistic defense of unconscionability is based on the premise 
that there may be certain extreme situations when, as a matter of equity, 
a contracting party must be protected against his own weakness. l92 Dr. 
Faustus's contract with the Devil may well be unconscionable under that 
standard. 193 Is a prebankruptcy contract an unconscionable, or Faustian, 
American Bankruptcy Institute, the National Bankruptcy Conference, and the American College of 
Bankruptcy. The American Board of Bankruptcy Certification also certifies bankruptcy law specialists. 
My proposal that prebankruptcy contracts be unenforceable unless the contracting parties are 
represented by bankruptcy counsel takes into account the insistence by some sophisticated parties 
negotiating with consumers that the consumers be represented by counsel. Cj. Bankruptcy Code, 11 
U.S.C. § 524(c), (d) (1994) (providing that individual debtors that agree to reaffirm discharged debts 
either must be represented by counselor they must seek court approval of the agreement). 
191. Cj. Hany DeAngelo et aI., Accounting Choice in Troubled Companies, 17 J. ACCOUNTING 
& ECON. 113, 116 (1994) (presenting evidence that distressed firms use their superior information to 
influence the perceptions of creditors, thereby improving the firm's terms in debt renegotiations). 
192. See Donald P. Amavas, Unconscionability Under UCC § 2-302: How It Applies to 
Commercial and Government Contracts, 12 UCC L.J. 48, 49 (1979) (noting that the U.C.C. has its 
origins in equitable concepts and holds the premise "that there are certain extreme situations where a 
contracting party must be protected against himself. "). 
193. Law and economics purists, however, may question even that: 
And even if the court holds the contract unenforceable, it may require the party who 
broke the contract to make restitution to the other party of the value of the latter's 
performance. But how could Faustus have restored Mephistophilis the value (with 
interest!) of the goods and services that Mephistophilis had provided over the twenty-four 
years that the pact was in force? Penance would be of no benefit to Mephistophilis-quite 
the opposite. Of course, despite these nice legal points, no court would enforce a pact 
with the devil, in any circumstances; and it would detract from Faustus's grandeur-and 
blasphemy-if he were legally bound to the contract with Mephistophilis. All that my 
[Posner's] analysis suggests is that it was not unjust in a legal sense to hold Faustus to his 
bargain. 
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bargain that should not be enforced as a matter of contract law? The 
following analysis shows that when the contracting parties are sophisticated 
and represented by bankruptcy counsel,194 unconscionability is unlikely. 
Tracht concluded that prebankruptcy contracts are not per se uncon-
scionable because in many cases it is rational for debtors to enter into 
them. 195 I agree with his conclusion but for different reasons. The 
purpose of the unconscionability doctrine is to prevent unfair surprise or 
oppression. 196 Courts have used the doctrine primarily to rescue from 
hard bargains those that are grossly disadvantaged in their dealings with 
more sophisticated parties. l97 It therefore is questionable whether the 
doctrine should apply to contracts between sophisticated parties that are 
represented by bankruptcy counsel. 
Furthermore, in almost all cases in which courts have found 
unconscionability, there have been elements of both procedural198 and 
substantivel99 unfairness. Neither procedural unfairness nor substantive 
unfairness alone is generally sufficient to render a contract 
unconscionable.200 Unconscionability therefore is rare in commercial 
RICHARD A. POSNER, LAW AND LITERATURE: A MISUNDERSfooD RELATION 101 n.45 (1988) 
(emphasis in original) (citation omitted). Posner appears to be saying that as a technical legal matter 
he would hold Faust to this type of bargain, although no coun would enforce a contract-any contract-
in favor of the devil. 
194. RecaIl that this Anicle is limited to business bankruptcies and assumes that the contracting 
panies are sophisticated and represented by bankruptcy counsel. See supra text accompanying note 26. 
I also will assume the prebankruptcy contracts are not adhesion contracts. 
195. Tracht argued that it could not be the case that "no informed and rational borrower would 
agree to waive" its bankruptcy rights. Tracht, supra note 5, at 34344. Tracht's approach compons 
with the oft-quoted definition that characterizes an unconscionable contract as one which "'no man in 
his senses and not under delusion would make, on the one hand, and as no honest and fair man would 
accept on the other.'" Hume v. United States, 132 U.S. 406, 411 (1889) (quoting Earl of Chesterfield 
v. Janssen, 28 Eng. Rep. 125, 155 (Ch. 1750». 
196. See, e.g., Doctor's Assocs. v. Stuan, 85 F.3d 975,980 (2d Cir. 1996); David L. Threlkeld 
& Co. v. MetaIlgeseIlschaft Ltd. (London), 923 F.2d 245, 249 (2d Cir. 1991); Pierson v. Dean, 
Witter, Reynolds, Inc., 742 F.2d 334, 339 (7th Cir. 1984); U.C.C. § 2-302 (1995) official cmt. 1 
("This section is intended to make it possible for couns to police explicitly against the contracts or 
clauses they find to be unconscionable. . . . The principle is one of the prevention of oppression and 
unfair surprise. "). 
197. See Jane P. MaIlor, Unconscionability in Contracts Between Merchants, 40 SW. L.J. 1065, 
1066 (1986). 
198. Procedural unfairness refers to the circumstances surrounding the formation of an agreement, 
such as unequal bargaining power or unfair surprise. SeeJones Distrib. Co. v. White Conso\. Indus., 
943 F. Supp. 1445,1460 (N.D. Iowa 1996); Anhur AIIen Leff, Unconscionability and the Code-The 
Emperor's New Clause, 115 U. PA. L. REV. 485, 488 (1967) (introducing the distinction between 
procedural and substantive unconscionability). 
199. Substantive unfairness refers to the content of an agreement, such as overly harsh or one-
sided contract terms or unreasonable and unexpected aIlocation of risk. See Jones Distrib. Co., 943 
F. Supp. at 1460; Leff, supra note 198, at 488. 
200. See, e.g., Smith, Bucklin & Assocs. v. Sonntag, 83 F.3d 476, 480 (D.C. Cir. 1996) (holding 
that an adhesion contract is not per se unenforceable and that other factors must be present in order for 
the contract to be deemed unconscionable). Substantive unfairness alone has been sufficient to find 
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settings because parties are deemed to possess equal bargaining power, 
rendering procedural fairness unlikely. 201 The law presumes that busi-
ness people are fully competent to enter into contracts and obligate 
themselves to perform in any manner they wish: "[T]here is a presumption 
of conscionability when the contract is between businessmen in a 
commercial setting. "202 
Some nonetheless may argue that a troubled debtor often may be under 
duress to choose between entering into a prebankruptcy contract and filing 
for bankruptcy, and therefore its choice should not be enforced. The 
defense of duress generally requires that a party's assent be "induced by 
an improper threat . .. that leaves the victim no reasonable 
alternative. "203 A threat may be improper if "what is threatened is a 
crime or a tort ... [or] a criminal prosecution."204 These forms of 
duress are not relevant here. There is, however, a form of duress that 
focuses on economic threats. 
Economic duress possibly may render a prebankruptcy contract 
voidable. Although mere "hard bargaining" or the threat to exercise a 
legal right would not constitute economic duress,205 an improper threat 
unconscionability in only a handful of cases, all involving consumer credit contracts. See Craig 
Horowitz, Comment, Reviving the Law of Substantive Unconscionability: Applying the Implied 
Covenant of Good Faith and Fair Dealing to Excessively Priced Consumer Credit Contracts, 33 UCLA 
L. REV. 940, 946-47 (1986) (observing that the only cases in which the courts have invalidated 
contracts based on substantive unconscionability alone involved "flagrantly excessive purchase prices 
in consumer credit contractsn). Thus, contracts bargained at arm's length by sophisticated parties with 
equal information should not be invalidated merely because they tum out to be disadvantageous to one 
of the parties ex post. 
201. See, e.g., Consolidated Data Terminals v. Applied Digital Data Sys., Inc., 708 F.2d 385, 
392 n.6 (9th Cir. 1983); U.S. Fibres, Inc. v. Proctor & Schwartz, Inc., 509 F.2d 1043, 1048 (6th Cir. 
1975); Salt River Project Agric. Improvement & Power Dist. v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 694 P.2d 
198,204 (Ariz. 1984); Chemtrol Adhesives, Inc. v. American Mfrs. Mut. Ins. Co., 537 N.E.2d 624, 
639 (Ohio 1989). 
202. American Dredging Co. v. Plaza Petroleum Inc., 799 F. Supp. 1335,1339 (E.D.N.Y. 1992), 
vacated in pan, 845 F. Supp. 91 (E.D.N .Y. 1993); accord WXON-TV, Inc. v. A.C. Nielsen Co., 740 
F. Supp. 1261, 1264 (E.D. Mich.) ("[C]ourts have no authority to rewrite the terms of a contract 
because they might feel that it was an unwise agreement for a party to have entered into. n), 
reconsidered, 742 F. Supp. 418 (E.D. Mich. 1990). As an effective defense, unconscionability is parti-
cularly rare when the parties are large corporations. In these instances, procedural unfairness is highly 
unlikely as both parties will benefit from extensive contracting experience, advice of counsel, and the 
availability of alternatives, which enable a party to bargain for balanced terms. Furthermore, contracts 
will invariably result from extensive negotiations. Courts quite naturally have been reluctant to apply 
the unconscionability doctrine in these instances. Judge Posner, for instance, has commented that "the 
defense of unconscionability was not invented to protect multi-billion dollar corporations against 
mistakes committed by their employees. n Northrop Corp. v. Litronic Indus., 29 F.3d 1173, 1180 (7th 
Cir. 1994) (noting that the unconscionability doctrine "has rarely succeeded outside the area of 
consumer contractsn). 
203. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 175(1) (1981). 
204. Id. § 176(a), (b). 
205. See R.S. & v. Co. v. Atlas Van Lines, Inc., 917 F.2d 348,352 (7th Cir. 1990) (observing 
that "it is not a breach of contract to threaten to do something you have a perfect right to don); Bogart, 
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to use civil process could constitute duress if the debtor has no reasonable 
alternative.206 In the context of prebankruptcy contracting, the debtor 
arguably would have a reasonable alternative: refuse to enter into the 
contract2°7 and, if necessary, file for protection under the Code. 
Irrespective, however, of whether a court always would agree that this 
constitutes a reasonable alternative, I will assume that, in the business 
context of this Article, most creditors desiring prebankruptcy contracts will 
make no threats that exceed their legally appropriate rights and 
remedies.208 Thus, when the debtor is represented by bankruptcy 
counsel, paternalistic concerns appear insufficient to justify the Code as a 
set of mandatory rules. 
b. Externalities.-Externalities are potentially more troublesome 
than paternalistic concerns; the parties to a prebankruptcy contract may not 
care whether third parties are affected. The debtor's only interest may be 
in getting a default waived, and the contracting creditor's only interest may 
be in getting paid. Thus, nonconsenting creditors could be harmed. 
Indeed, courts that have refused to enforce prebankruptcy contracts have 
focused on the potential harm to creditors.209 Externalities therefore must 
be taken into account in any analysis of prebankruptcy contracting. But the 
mere existence of externalities should not defeat contract enforcement. 
supra note 5, at 1160-61 (arguing that a successful claim of economic duress will be difficult for a 
debtor because "courts typically refuse to find 'duress' if ... [an] agreement simply result[s] from 
'hard bargainingO' [or] a lender's threat to exercise a legal right under a contract"). 
206. See REsrATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS §§ 176(1)(c), 175 cmt. b (1981). 
207. See id. § 175 cmt. b (noting that even when the threat of commencing a civil action to 
enforce a claim to money may be improper, "it does not usually amount to duress because the victim 
can assen his rights in the threatened action, and this is ordinarily a reasonable alternative to 
succumbing to the threat"). Put simply, the debtor's choice in prebankruptcy contracting is not 
between a rock and a hard place, but between a rock and a soft place (bankruptcy rehabilitation). 
208. The threat, therefore, would not be deemed improper. See id. ("A threat is improper if ... 
what is threatened is the use of civil process and the threat is made in bad faith .... ") (emphasis 
added). Similarly, courts are unlikely to find that the debtor had entered into a prebankruptcy contract 
as a result of undue influence, which is "unfair persuasion of a party who is under the domination of 
the person exercising the persuasion or who by vinue of the relation between them is justified in 
assuming that that person will not act in a manner inconsistent with his welfare." Id. § 177(1). 
Findings of undue influence generally require a special relationship between the panies such that one 
party is "peculiarly susceptible to persuasion by the other." FARNSWORTH, supra note 183, § 4.20, 
at 284. The relationship between a debtor and its creditor, however, is unlikely to satisfy this require-
ment of domination or a special relationship. See, e.g., Umbaugh Pole Bldg. Co. v. Scott, 390 N .E.2d 
320,323 (Ohio 1979) (refusing to find a special relationship even when the creditor provided financial 
and business counseling to the debtor). Creditors, for example, generally are under no fiduciary 
obligation to their debtors. See, e.g., Zimmerman v. Central Penn Nat'l Bank (In re Ludwig Honold 
Mfg. Co.), 46 B.R. 125, 128 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1985); Anaconda-Ericsson, Inc. v. Hessen (In re 
Teltronics Servs., Inc.), 29 B.R. 139, 169 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 1983), ajJ'd, 46 B.R. 426 (E.D.N.Y. 
1984), ajJ'd, 762 F.2d 185 (2d Cir. 1985); Umhraugh Pole, 390 N.E.2d at 323. 
209. See supra notes 48-65 and accompanying text. 
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Many contracts create externalities, yet they are enforced. When examin-
ing externalities, I therefore focus on understanding which externalities 
should defeat contract enforcement and under what circumstances. 2\0 
A complete identification has now been made of the concerns that 
could restrict prebankruptcy contracting between sophisticated business 
parties: externalities and significant impairments of policies underlying the 
Code.211 This framework provides a basis for the following analysis. 
B. What Are the Limits of Freedom to Contract About Bankruptcy? 
Under my framework, a court may refuse to enforce a prebankruptcy 
contract that creates troublesome externalities or that significantly impairs 
the policies underlying the Code. I start the analysis with externalities. 
1. Externalities . -Procedure contracts would, under existing law, 
likely not cause externalities because all creditors must agree to the 
contract, and no rational creditor would agree to be harmed.212 In 
contrast, waiver contracts more realistically could cause externalities 
because the only creditor that must agree to the contract is the one that 
reaps its benefit. That creditor likely prefers a waiver that allows it more 
easily to recover its claim than other creditors can recover their claims. 
Nevertheless, some types of waiver contracts may be unlikely to cause 
externalities. A prebankruptcy contract that waives the automatic stay for 
an individual creditor secured by financial assets213 will not necessarily 
affect other creditors. Under commercial law, the secured party's right to 
the collateral already has priority over claims of other creditors by virtue 
of the security interest, whether or not the stay is waived.214 Once the 
secured party has been paid its claim from the collateral proceeds, the 
210. See infra section III(B)(l). Ultimately, I show that only externalities which adversely affect 
classes of persons-as opposed to externalities that randomly affect individual class members-should 
justify the imposition of mandatory bankruptcy rules. 
211. I exclude paternalistic concerns, in accordance with the foregoing discussion. See supra text 
accompanying note 208. 
212. But if. infra subpart IV(D) (discussing possible supermajority voting procedures). 
213. Financial assets are assets, such as accounts receivable or amounts due under loans, that by 
their terms reduce to cash within a finite period of time. See Schwarcz, Alchemy, sllpra note 9, at 135 
n.7. The United Nations Commission on International Trade Law recently noted that "in developed 
countries the bulk of corporate wealth is locked up in receivables.» Memorandum from the United 
Nations Commission on International Trade Law, Summary ofUNCITRAL's Work on Assignment in 
Receivables Financing (Summer 1997) (on file with the Texas Law Review). 
214. See U.C.C. §§ 9-301(1)(a), 9-312(5) (1995) (establishing the general rule that the rights of 
a person that has a perfected security interest in specific collateral are superior to the rights of other 
creditors with respect to collateral). I will show that, at least when foreclosure causes no secondary 
impact, waiving the automatic stay does not impair equality of distribution. The existence of collateral, 
however, does affect equality of distribution by giving a creditor a higher priority in bankruptcy. See 
infra note 329 (referring to the secured credit controversy). 
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debtor (and therefore nonconsenting creditors by virtue of their claims) is 
entitled to any remaining collateral value.2lS For example, consider a 
debtor owing a one-thousand-dollar loan secured by receivables valued at 
twelve hundred dollars. If foreclosure yields close to twelve hundred 
dollars, one thousand dollars would be applied to repay the secured credi-
tor and the debtor would receive the two-hundred-dollar surplus. The 
debtor's value would go down by one thousand dollars but its debt also 
would shrink by one thousand dollars. Therefore, nonconsenting creditors 
should receive the same distribution they would have received had the stay 
not been waived.216 
In the previous example, I assumed that foreclosure on the receivables 
would yield their value or at least an amount not materially less than that 
value. That value, of course, may well be less than face value: because the 
obligors on the receivables may not be creditworthy or because of the 
debtor's poor financial condition, the receivables may be delinquent or 
defaulted.217 Provided the inherent value of the receivables, no matter 
how low, is realized, there is no reduction of the amount available to 
distribute to creditors.2ls Furthermore, any deterioration of collateral 
value that occurs when a debtor becomes bankrupt is irrelevant to my 
analysis because that deterioration would occur in the absence of 
foreclosure. The analysis needs only focus on whether the foreclosure, in 
and of itself, will materially affect the asset value. The assumption that 
foreclosure will not materially affect asset value should be reasonable for 
financial assets that are relatively easy to value.219 
215. See U .c.c. §§ 9-502(2), 9-504(2) (requiring secured parties to "account to the debtor for any 
surplus" collateral value once the secured party's claim is paid). Of equal importance, every aspect 
of the foreclosure "including the method, manner, time, place and terms must be commercially 
reasonable." [d. § 9-504(3). Therefore, the foreclosure sale cannot be manipulated to destroy surplus 
value. 
216. Cj. Pantaleo et aI., supra note 10, at 186 (concluding that the distribution to unsecured 
creditors will be similar whether the debtor sells an asset or uses the asset as collateral to borrow 
money). It is, nonetheless, possible that the waiver might send a negative signal to the other creditors, 
perhaps reducing the amount of credit they are willing to extend to the debtor. See supra text accom-
panying note 102. Such a reduction in credit, if it occurs, could reduce the debtor's value. 
217. See, e.g., LYNN M. LOPUCKI & ELIZABETH WARREN, SECURED CREDIT: A SYSTEMS 
ApPROACH 63-64 (2d ed. 1998) (observing that accounts receivable may become uncollectible if, among 
other reasons, dealers decide to withhold payment to protect themselves against a troubled 
manufacturer's future failure to provide service or honor warranties). 
218. Thus, if the receivables are home mongage loans having an aggregate face amount of 
$1,000,000 but not expected to yield more than a present value of $600,000, foreclosure on those 
receivables that yields $600,000 would not constitute a reduction of the amount available to distribute 
to creditors. With receivables consisting of secured loans, one must, of course, distinguish between 
foreclosure on the collateral underlying the loans-such as foreclosure on the homes-and foreclosure 
on the receivables themselves-Le., the loans. A foreclosure on the underlying collateral, if any, would 
occur independently from a foreclosure on the receivables. 
219. Financial assets consisting of trade receivables or amounts due under loans or leases would 
be relatively easy to value when their face amount is known and the obligor's credit can be analyzed. 
554 Texas Law Review [Vol. 77:515 
Nonfinancial assets that are frequently bought and sold220 also should 
be relatively easy to value. A reduction of the amount available to 
distribute to creditors, however, still could occur when the foreclosure 
price for these assets turns out to be less than their market price. Allowing 
foreclosure, then, diminishes net value. Considerable evidence, for 
example, indicates that prepetition foreclosure prices tend to be lower-
sometimes considerably lower-than market prices.221 I do not believe, 
however, that postpetition foreclosure prices would necessarily be lower 
than market prices. Unlike a prepetition foreclosure sale, when the 
collateral is sold to the highest bidder irrespective of price,222 bankruptcy 
courts can exercise their equitable powers223 to try to achieve a market 
price.224 
Financial assets consisting oflicenses, management contracts, or franchise fees, however, would be dif-
ficult to value because their worth would be adversely affected by the debtor's bankruptcy. See 
Schwarcz, Alchemy, supra note 9, at 151 n.60. 
220. Such as real estate or, sometimes, inventory. 
221. The Supreme Court has observed in a mortgage foreclosure context that real property subject 
to a foreclosure sale may be worth less than it would be worth absent foreclosure. See BFP v. 
Resolution Trust Corp., 511 U.S. 531, 539 (1994); if. LOPUCKI & WARREN, supra note 217, at III 
("Based on what we do know, our judgment is that [the] Article 9 [foreclosure] sale procedure, on the 
average, yields prices considerably lower than the market value of the collateral sold. H); Philip 
Schuchman, Profit on Default: An Archival Study of Automobile Repossession and Resale, 22 STAN. 
L. REv. 20, 31 (1969) (reporting the results of a study of automobile repossession which found that 
the average price ofa repossessed automobile at a U.C.C. sale was only 51 % of the car's retail value). 
If the practical universe of assets-for which a postpetition foreclosure is unlikely to result in a reduc-
tion of the amount available to distribute to creditors-were small, then the social benefits of prebank-
ruptcy contracting would be minimal, and a bright-line rule prohibiting prebankruptcy contracting may 
well be justified. 
222. The U .C.C. governs the foreclosure sale process if the collateral is personalty or fixtures, 
see U.C.C. § 9-504 (1995), whereas state mortgage foreclosure laws control if the collateral is nonfix-
ture realty; both are laws that generally attempt to "strike a fair balance between the interest of the 
foreclosing creditor in being able to realize on collateral quickly and cheaply and the rights of the 
defaulting debtor in having a fair disposition of the property." ROBERT L. JORDAN & WILLIAM D. 
WARREN, SECURED TRANSACTIONS IN PERSONAL PROPERTY 266 (4th ed. 1997). Under § 9-504, for 
example, the only standard is that the sale be "commercially reasonable." U.C.C. § 9-504(3). That 
standard, however, largely governs procedure, see, e.g., Leasing Servo Corp. v. Diamond Timber, 
Inc., 559 F. Supp. 972, 979 (S.D.N.Y.) (noting that "[c)ommercial reasonableness ofa sale depends 
on the procedures employed in the sale, not on the proceeds it generates"), ajJ'd, 729 F.2d 1442 (2d 
Cir. 1983), and does not ensure value maximization. See U.C.C. § 9-507(2) ("The fact that a better 
price could have been obtained by a [foreclosure] sale at a different time or in a different method from 
that selected by the secured party is not of itself sufficient to establish that the sale was not made in a 
commercially reasonable manner. H); BARKLEY CLARK, THE LAW OF SECURED TRANSACTIONS UNDER 
THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE 4-131 to 4-137 (2d ed. 1988) (discussing cases that uphold low-
price foreclosure sales provided the sales procedure appears reasonable). 
223. See Bankruptcy Code, 11 U.S.C. § I05(a) (1994) (permitting a bankruptcy judge to "issue 
any order, process, or judgment that is necessary or appropriate to carry out the provisions" of Title 
11). 
224. Unlike the prepetition foreclosure process in which the need to consider the secured creditor's 
desire for expedience limits the standard to one of commercial reasonableness, see supra note 222, in 
bankruptcy the court can maximize the value of the debtor's estate by trying to obtain market-value 
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Finally, a reduction of the amount available for distribution to credi-
tors could occur when the foreclosure deprives the debtor of operating 
equipment or other assets that are essential to running the debtor's 
business.22S For example, assume that the collateral in the previous 
hypothetical is now a customized widget-making machine, valued at twelve 
hundred dollars, and that the debtor would be unable to manufacture wid-
gets after the foreclosure.226 Even if the foreclosure would yield the full 
twelve-hundred-dollar market price227-one thousand dollars to repay the 
secured creditor and a two-hundred-dollar surplus to the debtor-the 
debtor's value would likely drop considerably because, without the widget-
making machine, the debtor no longer would be a viable business.228 
The debtor would lose value as a going concern.229 
foreclosure prices. See, e.g., JAMES J. WHITE & RAYMOND T. NIMMER, CASES AND MATERIALS ON 
BANKRUPTCY 51 (3d ed. 1996) (stating a bankruptcy goal of "reduc[ing] the net loss"); David Gray 
Carlson, The Rotten Foundations of Securitization, 39 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1055, 1055 (1998) ("A 
bankruptcy trustee is supposed to maximize debtor assets for the benefit of unsecured creditors. "). The 
coun could do this in various ways. For example, a prepetition foreclosure often yields a low price 
because "it may be difficult or impossible for prospective purchasers to evaluate [collateral in the 
debtor's possession], thereby depressing the resale price." LYNN M. LoPuCKI Ef AL., COMMERCIAL 
TRANSACflONS: A SYSfEMS APPROACH 634 (1998). A bankruptcy coun, however, could ensure 
availability of the collateral for inspection by prospective buyers, thereby increasing the likelihood of 
achieving a market price. See LoPuCKI & WARREN, supra note 217, at 110, 110-11 (stating that 
despite the lower-than-market average price produced by foreclosure sales, "a good deal of property 
is sold following UCC repossessions to third parties who are paying something that approximates 
market value"). In appropriate cases, the coun could even restrain the sale until a market price is 
achieved. 
Some commentators have advocated that the prepetition foreclosure procedure under commercial 
law should be made more debtor-sensitive. See, e.g., Donald J. Rapson, Repurchase (oj Collateral?) 
Agreements and the Larger Issue of Deficiency Actions: What Does Section 9-504(5) Mean?, 29 IDAHO 
L. REv. 649, 687 (1992-1993) (proposing that the foreclosure procedure under U.C.C. § 9-504 be 
amended to ensure that the collateral is sold at ntarket value). 
225. Of course, any harm would be mitigated if the operating assets were easily replaceable and 
the debtor had funds to purchase such substitute operating assets. These are questions of fact that could 
be resolved on a case-by-case basis. 
226. I am assuming here that similar machines would not be readily available on the market for 
the debtor to purchase as a replacement or that, if similar machines were readily available, the debtor 
would not have the financial wherewithal to purchase a replacement. 
227. This scenario may be inaccurate. See supra notes 221-23 and accompanying text. 
228. Assuming, of course, that the widget machine is essential to operating the business. 
229. Professor Tracht argues, however, that there is "no reason to believe that waivers will 
generally lead to the gratuitous destruction of value through foreclosure of operating machinery or 
similar collateral." Letter from Marshall E. Tracht to Steven L. Schwarcz 3 (July 22, 1997) (on file 
with the Texas Law Review). His rationale is that the "creditor generally cannot just remove the 
machine, but must foreclose. And at the foreclosure sale, the debtor may buy the machine-and will 
do so, if it is worth more to the business than to other bidders ... and the funds are available." Id. 
at 2. Because the "foreclosure sale scenario provides a final protection for the [debtor] that compels 
the creditor to negotiate rather than hold out," the situations in which the amount available to distribute 
to creditors is reduced "should be relatively uncommon." Id. at 3. When the debtor has the funds to 
bid, I agree with Professor Tracht's argument. 
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I will refer to any prebankruptcy contract that materially reduces the 
amount available for distribution to creditors as having a secondary mate-
rial impact.23o At least from the standpoint of externalities,231 
apparently parties should be allowed to make prebankruptcy contracts that 
do not-but should not necessarily be allowed to make prebankruptcy con-
tracts that do-result in secondary material impacts. 232 This conclusion 
arguably comports with the rationale of existing case law that courts should 
uphold stay-waiver contracts when the harm to nonconsenting creditors is 
immaterial. 233 The conclusion even is consistent with Professor 
Schwartz'S characterization of the automatic stay as a structural rule.234 
Nonetheless, the conclusion is somewhat unsatisfying235 for two reasons: 
it does not address whether parties can rely on a particular prebankruptcy 
contract that later results in a secondary material impact even though, 
viewed at the time that contract was entered into, such an impact was 
unlikely;236 nor does it address when parties should be able to rely on' a 
230. In a foreclosure, reduction of the debtor's net value is a simple way of measuring impinge-
ment on the rights of third parties. But an impingement may occur even if the debtor's net value 
remains constant. For example, if a debtor has only $1,000 in cash and 10 creditors each owed $100, 
the debtor's investing its cash in a double-or-nothing gamble will not, ex ante, change its net worth, 
but will devalue the claims by 50% because creditors do not share in the debtor's profits. Also, if a 
prebankruptcy contract only affects a small portion of the debtor's assets, its effect on the debtor's 
overall value may be immaterial. Still, if prebankruptcy contracts were enforceable, then many such 
contracts collectively could have a material impact. Therefore, in evaluating whether a particular pre-
bankruptcy contract is likely to cause a secondary material impact, the contract should be viewed as 
if the assets it affects constitute all of the debtor's assets. 
231. I later discuss the limitations imposed on prebankruptcy contracting by bankruptcy policies. 
See infra section III(B)(2). For example, even foreclosure on financial assets may be troublesome when 
it deprives the debtor of essential working capital. See infra text accompanying notes 355-56. 
232. For an insolvent debtor, a secondary material impact would necessarily affect the creditors 
adversely because no excess net value of the debtor exists to cushion the impact. Most debtors in bank-
ruptcy are insolvent. See In re Johnson v. Winston, 189 B.R. 744, 747 (Bankr. N.D. Iowa 1995) 
(noting that a debtor need not be insolvent to file for bankruptcy, but that most Chapter 7 filers are 
insolvent); In re Valdes v. Hecht's, 188 B.R. 533,536 (Bankr. D. Md. 1995) (observing that most 
Chapter 7 bankruptcy filers are insolvent to some degree). Some, however, may be solvent, see 
Bankruptcy Code, 11 U.S.C. § 301 (1994) (permitting voluntary bankruptcy filings without a require-
ment of insolvency), in which case a secondary material impact would cause externalities only if it 
depleted the cushion of excess value, thereby reducing the payments to nonconsenting creditors. 
233. See, e.g., In re Club Tower L.P., 138 B.R. 307, 310-12 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. 1991) (holding 
that a waiver of the automatic stay was enforceable and did not violate public policy because the debtor 
had "only a few unsecured creditors" with "de minimis claims"). 
234. In reaching that characterization, Professor Schwartz reasoned: "If the collateral is worth 
more to the firm than to the market, preventing foreclosure would maximize the ex post value of the 
estate." Schwartz, Contract Theory Approach, supra note 5, at 1839. To the extent that my require-
ment of no secondary material impact limits foreclosure to situations in which the collateral is not worth 
more to the firm than to the market, my approach is consistent with that of Professor Schwartz. 
235. Although I later propose an approach that theoretically is more satisfying, I also raise the pos-
sibility that a bright-line test ultimately may be the best practical resolution. See infra text accom-
panying notes 323-30. 
236. By "unlikely," I mean not likely to occur, or improbable. In quantifying this term, I later 
consider an event to be unlikely if its probability is significantly less than 25 %. See infra text accom-
panying note 284. 
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prebankruptcy contract that is likely to result in a secondary material 
impact.137 
I next answer these questions by addressing the more general question: 
when should courts enforce contracts that create externalities?138 I show 
that the law recognizes only a limited universe of persons as affected by 
externalities. Furthermore, only material externalities should be used as 
a justification to limit contracting. I then use an economic efficiency 
argument to show from the standpoint of externalities that prebankruptcy 
contracts, or indeed any contract, that cause externalities should be 
enforceable unless their net effect on one or more classes of nonconsenting 
persons is adverse.139 In the case of prebankruptcy contracting, the 
relevant class of nonconsenting persons would be the debtor'snonconsent-
ing unsecured creditors. Finally, I use an expected value analysis to show 
that parties should be able to rely on only prebankruptcy contracts in two 
circumstances: when the contracts ex post do not cause secondary material 
impacts; and when the contracts ex ante are unlikely to cause secondary 
material impacts, irrespective of the ex post consequences. Only those 
types of prebankruptcy contracts would not adversely affect nonconsenting 
creditors as a class.24O 
a. What constitutes an externality that should defeat enforcement 
of a contract?-Stated in pristine form, the proposition that courts should 
not enforce contracts that create externalities cannot be correct because 
most contracts adversely affect at least some third parties.241 The more 
interesting question is not whether a contract adversely affects third parties, 
but whether it adversely affects third parties in a way that the law deems 
intolerable. Unfortunately, "[d]etermining which of these impacts 
237. Without the ability to rely on the contract, rational persons might be unwilling to give the 
debtor value in exchange for the contract, and prebankruptcy contracts would have limited practical 
application. The justification for finding practical applications of waiver contracts derives from the 
potential of waiver contracts to encourage out-of-court settlements, thereby enhancing the bankruptcy 
policies of debtor rehabilitation and economical administration of the bankruptcy estate. Cf. supra note 
47 and accompanying text. 
238. My analysis, of course, will be further limited by restrictions imposed by bankruptcy policy. 
See infra section III(B)(2). 
239. In other words, contracts should be enforced if each class of affected persons benefits overall 
(or at least is not hanned) even though some of those individual persons may be hanned. But contracts 
that hann a class of affected persons overall should not be enforced. See infra text accompanying notes 
266, 309-11. 
240. I later show that this same measure of reliance should be justifiable from the standpoint of 
bankruptcy policy. See infra section III(B)(2). 
241. See TREBILCOCK, supra note 18, at 20 ("[Flew transactions have no tangible or intangible 
effects on third parties. "); Guido Calabresi, The Pointlessness of Pareto: Carrying Coase Funher, 100 
YALE L.J. 1211, 1217 (1991) (arguing that all economic transactions result in someone at least perceiv-
ing the result to be worse). For example, contracts that create collateral are enforced even though they 
have the effect of subordinating unsecured creditors. 
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[externalities], if negative, are to count in constraining the ability of parties 
to contract with each other poses major conceptual problems. "242 An 
answer to this question requires a determination of the universe of third 
parties that should be recognized by law as potentially being affected by 
externalities. In the context of contractually seeking to override a statutory 
scheme, that universe may be limited.243 
Bankruptcy law, the statutory scheme on which this Article focuses, 
does not recognize that all injured persons have recourse under the 
Code.244 The Code generally affords rights only to holders of claims 
(i.e., creditors) and interests (i.e., equityholders).245 Whether or not 
affected third parties have recourse under other laws-such as employees 
that want to keep their jobs with the bankrupt company-they have no right 
to be recognized under bankruptcy law unless they have a claim or interest 
within the meaning of the Code.246 Whether or not those other persons 
242. TREBILOCK, supra note 18, at 20. 
243. Of course, there is no legally recognized externality if a person on whom costs are imposed 
has no right to avoid the costs. See JEFFREY L. HARRISON, LAW AND ECONOMICS 42 (1995). 
244. Bankruptcy may affect a broad range of interests, including "employees who will lose jobs, 
taxing authorities that will lose [a source of tax revenue], suppliers that will lose customers, nearby 
property owners who will lose beneficial neighbors, and current customers" that will lose established 
suppliers. Warren, supra note 168, at 355. Although these diverse interests obtain no standing to be 
heard or to support or to oppose proposals in a bankruptcy case, id., Professor Warren asserted that 
the policy underlying the Code "takes into account the distributional impact of a business failure on 
parties ... who have no formal legal rights." Id. at 354-55. The Code accomplishes this "through 
provisions that forestall liquidation to permit the business to remain in operation and to reorganize, 
instead of being shut down by a few anxious creditors." Id. at 356. 
245. See Bankruptcy Code, 11 U.S.C. § 501(a) (1994) (allowing only creditors or indenture trus-
tees to file claims and only equity security holders to file interests); id. § 726(a) (listing the order of 
distribution of estate property: first, to holders of claims; next, to holders of interests; and finally, any 
residual to the debtor); id. § 1129(a) (taking only holders of claims and interests into account explicitly 
when confirming a plan of reorganization). It is not unprecedented for law to take into account only 
certain affected parties. For example, directors that manage a corporation are obligated to corporate 
shareholders, but are not generally obligated to the corporation's employees that may be equally 
affected by the directors' actions. See Pepper v. Litton, 308 U.S. 295, 306-07 (1939) (stating that the 
fiduciary duty placed on directors is designed to protect creditors and stockholders). 
246. That does not, however, mean that bankruptcy judges must wholly ignore that bankruptcy 
involves financial distress. Although the Code characterizes claims and interests as the only 
entitlements, it selectively mandates consideration of public policy concerns in limited situations. See, 
e.g., 11 U .S.C. § 1123(a)(7) (requiring a plan of reorganization to "contain only provisions that are 
consistent with the interests of creditors and equity security holders and with public policy with respect 
to the manner of selection of any officer, director, or trustee under the plan") (emphasis added). 
Procedural rules provide that "a labor union or employees' association ... shall have the right to be 
heard on the economic soundness of a plan affecting the interests of the [debtor's] employees," FED. 
R. BANKR. P. 2018(d), and that a bankruptcy court has discretion to "permit any interested entity to 
intervene," id. 2018(a). Furthermore, bankruptcy courts selectively have taken public interests into 
account, as in the Eastern Airlines bankruptcy litigation in which the court allowed the debtor to spend 
over $600 million in an unsuccessful attempt to keep the airline in business despite "vociferous" objec-
tions by creditors. See Robert K. Rasmussen, The Efficiency o!Chapter 11,8 BANKR. DEV. J. 319, 
320,319-20 (1991) (citing Seth Lubove, A Bankrupt's Best Friend, FORBES, Apr. 1, 1991, at 99,99). 
At one stage of the litigation, when considering whether to appoint a trustee, the court observed that 
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should be recognized under bankruptcy law is an important issue, but not 
the focus of this Article.247 
Once the groups of legally recognized third parties-in the case of 
bankruptcy, holders of claims and holders of interests-are determined, the 
next step is to define the threshold level at which an adverse effect will be 
legally recognized. It appears obvious that externalities that are immaterial 
should not be recognized. For example, in noting that all transactions by 
a business negatively affect its competitors, the purchase of a car increases 
pollution, and the sale of a rare good deprives others of items they may 
otherwise have obtained, Trebilcock concluded that "[i]f all these, and 
similar externalities, should count in prohibiting the exchange process or 
in justifying constraints upon it, freedom of contract would largely be at 
an end. "248 Litigation over those externalities also would impose an unac-
ceptable burden on the judicial system. 249 
"the flying public's interest must at all times be taken into account." In re Ionosphere Clubs, Inc., 113 
B.R. 164, 168 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1990). 
247. For an excellent recent discussion of this issue, see Schwartz, Contract Theory Approach, 
supra note 5, at 1818, 1814-19 (arguing that bankruptcy law should protect only parties with current 
claims because protecting community interests with bankruptcy law allows "the wrong set of finus" 
to survive). Limited recognition of claims is consistent with the model of bankruptcy as a "creditors' 
bargain" in which bankruptcy is a response to the problem of collecting claims; therefore only persons 
with distributive claims against the debtor's assets should be recognized. See JACKSON, supra note 159, 
at 58-60; Baird & Jackson, supra note 32, at 100-01, 103; Thomas H. Jackson & Robert E. Scott, On 
the Nature of Bankruptcy: An Essay on Bankruptcy Sharing and the Creditors' Bargain, 75 VA. L. 
REV. 155, 177-78 (1989). But see Karen Gross, Taking Community Interests into Account in 
Bankruptcy: An Essay, 72 WASH. U. L.Q. 1031, 1031 (1994) (arguing that bankruptcy law should 
address the range of social problems that result from both personal and business failures); Donald R. 
Korobkin, Contractarianism and the Normative Foundations of Bankruptcy Law, 71 TEXAS L. REv. 
541, 554-58 (1993) (arguing that bankruptcy is a more general response to the problem of financial 
distress and that limiting recognition "denies representation to the vital interests of managers, 
employees, and their dependents, as well as the community at large"); Donald R. Korobkin, 
Rehabilitating Values: A Jurisprudence of Bankruptcy, 91 COLUM. L. REV. 717, 762, 732-61 (1991) 
(characterizing bankruptcy law as a more general "response to the problem of financial distress-not 
only as an economic, but as a moral, political, personal, and social problem"); Elizabeth Warren, 
Bankruptcy Policy, 54 U. CHI. L. REv. 775, 788 (1987)(arguing that bankruptcy law already indirectly 
considers the interests of employees, communities, and other business dependents). Fora constitutional 
perspective on this controversy, see Thomas E. Plank, The Constitutional Limits of Bankruptcy, 63 
TENN. L. REv. 487, 491-94, 559-64 (1996) (arguing that bankruptcy law may not give special benefits 
to third parties holding neither claims nor interests). 
248. TREBILCOCK, supra note 18, at 58. 
249. Curiously, though, the issue of materiality does not appear to be explicitly addressed-
merely assumed-in most of the scholarly literature. For example, in commenting on Professor Jeffrey 
Gordon's argument that opting out of standard corporate charter provisions creates an externality 
because parties using the standard provision would have fewer precedents to rely on, Professor Lucian 
Bebchuk observed that "the positive externalities created by standardization seem to be much larger 
with respect to the features of many technical products-such as VCRs or certain types of 
communication and computer systems-and still their magnitude does not appear sufficiently substantial 
to warrant mandatory intervention in these products' features." Lucian Arye Bebchuk, The Debate on 
Contractual Freedom in Corporate Law, 89 COLUM. L. REV. 1395, 1405 n.46 (1989). Professor 
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A materiality threshold explains the intuition of focusing on whether 
a prebankruptcy contract results in a secondary material impact, as opposed 
to any mere impact. Materiality, however, is only a necessary-not a 
sufficient-condition for determining whether externalities should defeat 
enforcement of a contract. Measuring sufficiency requires a tool to judge 
the quantitative impact of the externalities.250 I propose using economic 
efficiency. Economic efficiency, of course, is not an uncontroversial goal 
for resolving social issues.251 I therefore also go beyond the traditional 
tests of efficiency to show that, in the context of the externalities that I 
argue should not defeat enforcement of a prebankruptcy contract, even 
third parties that potentially are harmed by those externalities should 
nonetheless want the contract to be enforceable.252 
b. Economic efficiency . -To conclude that something is efficient, 
one must agree on the standard by which to measure efficiency. The law 
and economics literature generally defines efficiency as meaning either 
Pareto or Kaldor-Hicks efficiency. Pareto efficiency means, in the context 
of a prebankruptcy contract, that the contract would make the beneficiary 
of the contract and presumably the debtor better off but no other creditors 
worse off.253 A prebankruptcy contract therefore would be Pareto 
efficient only if it had no negative impact on nonconsenting creditors. 
That, however, raises the same practical dilemma that started my inquiry: 
parties to a prebankruptcy contract would not be able to rely on the 
contract's enforceability.254 
That dilemma ostensibly is solved because economists generally accept 
Kaldor-Hicks, not Pareto, as the operating standard of efficiency: Because 
"[t]he conditions for Pareto superiority are almost never satisfied in the 
real world, . . . the operating definition of efficiency in economics must 
Bebchuk also observed that "[i]f significant externalities can be shown to exist, then the case for 
[mandatory] intervention can be established in a relatively noncontroversial way." Id. at 1405. 
250. A general metric would consider the finite chance that a debtor will go bankrupt and that a 
bankruptcy foreclosure in accordance with the prebankruptcy contract then inadvertently results in a 
secondary material impact that transfers value from nonconsenting creditors. 
251. But see Schwartz, Contract Theory Approach, supra note 5, at 1809 (asserting that 
"mandatory bankruptcy rules are justifiable only if they increase ex post efficiency"). 
252. See the discussion of the test of class Pareto efficiency infra notes 264-69 and accompanying 
text. 
253. See Jules L. Coleman, Efficiency, Utility and Wealth Maximization, 8 HOFSfRA L. REV. 509, 
512-13 (1980); Thomas J. Miceli & Kathleen Segerson, Defining Efficient Care: The Role of Income 
Distribution, 24 J. LEGAL STUD. 189, 192-93 (1995). Although technically the test for Pareto effici-
ency is whether it makes any other persons, as opposed to merely any other creditors, worse off, for 
purposes of analysis I assume that only creditors could potentially be made worse off in a legally 
cognizable manner. 
254. Recall that even when a secondary material impact appears at the time of contracting to be 
unlikely, creditors nonetheless could be prejudiced in individual cases. 
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not be Pareto superiority. When an economist says that [something] is 
efficient, nine times out of ten he means Kaldor-Hicks efficient. "255 
Kaldor-Hicks efficiency means, in the context of a prebankruptcy contract, 
that the aggregate benefit to the debtor and the contracting creditor exceeds 
any net harm to the nonconsenting creditors.256 The debtor and the con-
tracting creditor clearly expect a benefit; otherwise, they would not have 
freely entered into the contract. Call the debtor's benefit X and the 
contracting creditor's benefit Y. 
In applying Kaldor-Hicks to the question raised earlier-whether 
parties should be able to rely on a prebankruptcy contract that ex ante is 
unlikely to cause a secondary material impact257-the analysis needs only 
to focus on contracts that are likely to result in nonmaterial impacts. 258 
If the amount of the impact is designated Z, a prebankruptcy contract 
would be Kaldor-Hicks efficient when the sum of X + Yequals or exceeds 
Z. 259 Because parties usually will not incur the transaction costs of 
contracting unless they expect material gains, the sum of X + Y would be 
expected to be material. That sum therefore would exceed Z for most pre-
bankruptcy contracts belonging to the limited universe of prebankruptcy 
contracts on which I focus, in which Z is likely to be nonmaterial. Most 
prebankruptcy contracts belonging to that limited universe therefore would 
be Kaldor-Hicks efficient. 
But what would be the effect of the relatively small percentage of 
those prebankruptcy contracts that do result in a secondary material impact? 
For those contracts, Z would be material, and X + Y could be less than Z. 
That does not, however, mean that Kaldor-Hicks efficiency is 
indeterminate. Mathematically, if an event has a greater probability of 
causing gain than loss, and if the magnitude of the gain and the loss 
255. RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW § 1.2, at 14-15 (5th ed. 1998). 
256. See id. § 1.2, at 13-14. By "net hann," I mean the hann to the debtor's nonconsenting 
creditors minus any benefit to them. See id. § 1.2, at 14. A transaction is Kaldor-Hicks efficient even 
if the "winners" (i.e., the debtor and the contracting creditor) do not compensate the "losers" (i.e., the 
nonconsenting creditors). See id. 
257. See supra text accompanying note 236. 
258. I later show that only prebankruptcy contracts that are unlikely to, or that do not, result in 
a secondary material impact would be class Pareto efficient. See infra text accompanying notes 306-11. 
I therefore conclude that only those prebankruptcy contracts should be deemed to be enforceable from 
the standpoint of externalities. 
259. Judge Posner gave this analysis: 
In the less austere concept of efficiency used in this book-called the Kaldor-Hicks 
concept of efficiency, or wealth maximization-if A values the wood carving at $5 and 
B at $12, so that at any price betwwen $5 and $12 the transaction creates a total benefit 
of $7 (at a price of $10, for example, A considers himself $5 better off and B considers 
himself $2 better off), then it is an efficient transaction, provided that the harm (if any) 
done to third parties (minus any benefit to them) does not exceed $7. . .. The winners 
[A and B] could compensate the losers [the third parties], whether or not they actually do. 
POSNER, supra note 255, § 1.2, at 14 (emphasis added). 
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generally would be equal, a statistically large number of such events is 
likely to result in a net gain. Given the focus on prebankruptcy contracts 
for which secondary material impacts are ex ante unlikely, the number of 
situations in which X + Y turns out to equal or exceed Z would be 
expected to be significantly greater than the number of situations in which 
X + Y turns out to be less than Z. Because Z is expected to be immaterial, 
there also is no reason to believe-even though Z itself sometimes could be 
material-that Z would be large enough when material to cause the sum of 
all Zs to exceed the sum of all the Xs and Ys. Thus, in aggregate, the sum 
of all X + Ys would be expected to exceed the sum of all Zs' It therefore 
is reasonable to presume, at least in the absence of empirical evidence to 
the contrary, that prebankruptcy contracting that ex ante is unlikely to 
result in a secondary material impact would be Kaldor-Hicks efficient.260 
Even though such prebankruptcy contracting would appear to be 
Kaldor-Hicks efficient, I am uncomfortable with using Kaldor-Hicks alone 
to judge the efficiency of prebankruptcy contracting. My uneasiness stems 
from the apparent unfairness of justifying prebankruptcy contracting by 
comparing whether the gains to the beneficiary of the contract and to the 
debtor, which voluntarily contract, exceed the detriment to nonconsenting 
creditors.261 I would have less concern if nonconsenting creditors in 
some transactions acted as secured creditors, or even debtors, in other 
transactions, but that is not generally the case.262 Other commentators 
are similarly uneasy: 
260. Some may argue that Kaldor-Hicks efficiency should be measured ex post, with reference to 
the outcome of a particular transaction, and not ex ante as I have proposed. When the outcome of an 
exchange is uncertain or risky, however, economists measure the efficiency of the exchange ex ante. 
See, e.g., MARK SEIDENFELD, MICROECONOMIC PREDICATES TO LAW AND ECONOMICS 55 (1996). 
The logic is that one cannot use the actual costs and benefits because they are unknown ex ante. 
Because the outcome of any given prebankruptcy contract is uncertain, the general efficiency of such 
contracts must also be measured ex ante. Nonetheless, when there is a risk of different outcomes, 
economists may factor into the expected outcome a risk premium representing the price one would pay 
to eliminate the risk. See E.l. MISHAN, COST-BENEFIT ANALYSIS 363-65 (3d ed. 1982); Milton 
Friedman & L.l. Savage, The Utility Analysis a/Choices Involving Risk, 561. POL. ECON. 279, 289-90 
(1948) (arguing that risk-averse consumers will pay to insure against the risk of actuarially fair 
gambles). The risk premium in the case of pre bankruptcy contracting would appear to be small-and 
therefore would not materially change the analysis-because I have assumed that the expected impact 
on creditors that do not benefit from the prebankruptcy contract would be nonmaterial. 
261. Recall that, under Kaldor-Hicks efficiency, the winners (i.e., the debtor and the contracting 
creditor) need not compensate the losers (i.e., the nonconsenting cleditors). See supra note 256. 
262. In my experience, unsecured creditors rarely act as debtors and only infrequently act as 
secured creditors. And involuntary creditors, such as tort victims, almost never act as debtors or 
creditors in situations in which prebankruptcy contracting would occur. A potential justification for 
Kaldor-Hicks efficiency-that nonconsenting persons in some deals would be consenting persons in 
other deals-does not appear to apply; rather, there is systematic discrimination against nonconsenting 
creditors. 
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In terms of Kaldor-Hicks efficiency, the welfare implications of the 
exchange would entail balancing the costs to third parties [i. e. , 
nonconsenting creditors] against the gains to the immediate parties to 
the exchange. While the individual autonomy of the parties to the 
exchange may be enhanced by permitting them to exercise their 
autonomy in this way, that of third parties may well be violated by 
external impacts of the exchange. 263 
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To mitigate this uneasiness, I propose focusing the analysis on balancing 
the costs to nonconsenting creditors against the gains to those same panies. 
In other words, I analyze whether the net effect of prebankruptcy contrac-
ting is to harm nonconsenting creditors. 
I perform this analysis by using a methodology, which I have else-
where called "class Pareto efficiency,"264 that applies Pareto efficiency 
not to affected individuals but to affected classes. A transaction would be 
class Pareto efficient if it is Pareto efficient when viewing each separate 
class of affected persons as a single collective person.265 Class Pareto 
efficiency therefore exists whenever, for every affected class, the overall 
gains to an individual class exceed the losses to that class even if some 
members of the class individually are harmed.266 Dean Anthony 
Kronman has articulated, in another context, a normative basis for such an 
approach: 
[U]nlike a court, a legislature must evaluate the effects of proposed 
rules on classes of persons rather than on particular, identifiable 
individuals. For these reasons, a strictly individualistic interpretation 
of paretianism [i. e., strict Pareto efficiency] is likely to make the 
principle unworkable in all but a few cases. 267 
263. TREBILCOCK, supra note 18, at 58. In a general contracting context, Trebilcock states: "The 
problem of third-party effects from exchange relationships is pervasive and not aberrational. Almost 
every transaction one can conceive of is likely to impose costs on third parties." [d. 
264. Steven L. Schwarcz, The Easy Case for the Priority of Secured Claims in Bankruptcy, 47 
DUKE L.J. 425, 481-82 (1997) (defining "class Pareto efficiency"). 
265. See id. 
266. See id. Class Pareto efficiency could be described equally well as Kaldor-Hicks efficiency 
within each class of persons affected by a transaction. See id. at 482 n.254. Within the class of 
unsecured creditors, the justification for Kaldor-Hicks efficiency-that nonconsenting persons in some 
deals would be consenting persons in other deals-would apply because even unsecured creditors that 
are harmed in some cases of pre bankruptcy contracting would be benefited in other cases. 
Aitematively, class Pareto efficiency could be described as the ex ante application of Pareto efficiency, 
without regard for ex post consequences. See id. (suggesting that some might regard ex ante Pareto 
efficiency as counterintuitive because one normally thinks of Pareto efficiency as meaning no person 
will be harmed); if. infra text accompanying note 269 (explaining that all creditors ex ante would want 
a class Pareto efficient contract to be enforced even if some creditors, ex post, are harmed). 
267. Kronman, supra note Ill, at 487 (arguing that, "[a]lthough the matter is by no means free 
from difficulty, one reasonable approach is to interpret paretianism as requiring only that the welfare 
of most people who are taken advantage of in a particular way be increased by the kind of advantage-
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Furthermore, the normative argument for freedom of contract-voluntary 
assent on the part of all parties268-also justifies a standard of class Pareto 
efficiency: all creditors ex ante would want a class Pareto efficient contract 
to be enforced even if some creditors, ex post, are harmed.269 
I next apply this approach to the question under analysis: whether 
parties should be able to rely on prebankruptcy contracts that ex ante are 
unlikely to cause secondary material impacts. I illustrate my analysis with 
the example of a prebankruptcy contract to waive the automatic stay. 
Nonconsenting creditors would suffer when foreclosure results in an unanti-
cipated secondary material impact. On the other hand, stay-waiver con-
tracts may create offsetting benefits for those creditors if, in return for 
waiving the automatic stay, the debtor demands something of value from 
the contracting creditor. I later argue that the debtor often will receive 
value in the form of a liquidity advance or relief from default,270 thereby 
benefiting the debtor by reducing the likelihood of its subsequent 
bankruptcy. Although no empirical data are available on' how increased 
liquidity will reduce the likelihood of bankruptcy,271 recent scholarship 
taking in question" (emphasis in original». A difference between Dean Kronman's approach and mine 
is that he applies the approach to disputes between parties to a contract, id. at 486-87 (applying the 
approach to a fraudulent sale of a watch), whereas I would apply the approach only to externalities, out 
of concern that applying it to the contracting parties would appear to undercut the consensual nature 
of their contract. See also TREBILCOCK, supra note 18, at 83 (commenting that Kronman's approach 
"inverts" the line of reasoning that consensus between parties only exists if a transaction enhances their 
joint welfare). 
268. See TREBILCOCK, supra note 18, at 7 (insisting that the neoclassical economists' predilection 
for voluntary private exchange and ordering is based on the simple premise that neither party would 
have entered into the exchange unless they each believed they would be better off). Although noncon-
senting creditors do not have the opportunity to assent, my point is that they would assent if given the 
choice ex ante. Hypothetical voluntary assent also provides a separate economic justification. In purely 
voluntary exchanges, economic efficiency is measured by examining whether the net effect of the 
exchange on all parties is positive. But in purely involuntary transactions, such as crimes or accidents, 
some scholars measure efficiency by examining "whether, if a voluntary transaction had been feasible, 
it would have occurred." POSNER, supra note 255, § 1.2, at 16. Because a prebankruptcy contracting 
transaction is voluntary for the debtor and the contracting creditor but involuntary for nonconsenting 
creditors, efficiency of the involuntary portion of the transaction should be measured by examining 
whether nonconsenting creditors, if given a choice, would have consented to the transaction. 
269. Even though actual creditors are risk averse, this statement need not be qualified to offset 
creditor risk aversion against the benefits that creditors expect to receive if the contract were enforced. 
Risk aversion is most applicable when a person is comparing very different risk profiles; for example, 
comparing a relatively sure thing against a small chance of obtaining a large gain. With prebankruptcy 
contracting, there is no sure thing. The alternative to entering into the prebankruptcy contract may be 
bankruptcy. 
270. For example, a creditor might extend a new loan to the debtor, modify the debtor's loan 
covenants to make them less restrictive, or waive a default. I will refer collectively to these and similar 
means of providing relief to a debtor as "liquidity." 
271. That may be a subject for future empirical study. See generally PHILIP S. SCHERER, 
STARTING OVER, A GUIDE TO TURNAROUND MANAGEMENT (1989) (arguing that the availability of 
capital is important to achieving a successful turnaround); Michael J. Herbert, The Trustee Versus the 
Trade Creditor: A Critique of Section 547(c) (1), (2), & (4) of the Bankruptcy Code, 17 U. RICH. L. 
REv. 667, 673 (1983) ("The seller who advances credit increases the chances of the buyer's survival 
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analyzing liquidity provided by secured lending, a type of prebankruptcy 
contract,272 suggests the reduction is apt to be significant.273 By 
comparing the expected value of nonconsenting creditors' claims with and 
without a prebankruptcy contract, I next argue that a reduction in the 
likelihood of bankruptcy is likely to benefit those creditors in excess of any 
harm, and that a significant reduction will greatly benefit those creditors. 
c. Expected value analysis.-In order to calculate the expected 
value of a claim against a debtor that has a likelihood of bankruptcy, the 
value of the claim in bankruptcy must be multiplied by the chance of 
bankruptcy, the value of the claim absent bankruptcy must be multiplied by 
the chance of the debtor's avoiding bankruptcy, and the results must be 
added.274 My model assumes that the debtor has one secured creditor 
who seeks a prebankruptcy contract waiving the automatic stay and that all 
of the debtor's nonconsenting creditors are unsecured. I treat these 
nonconsenting creditors as a single class because holders of all prepetition 
unsecured claims-irrespective of whether those claims arise out of loans 
or breaches of contract or tort-generally have the same priority,275 and 
therefore usually are treated alike,276 in bankruptcy.2n 
I examine this model under what I believe is a representative range of 
values for the variables, starting with conservative values. 278 Because I 
later propose that prebankruptcy contracts generally be restricted under my 
model to contracts entered into in default situations,279 I assume that the 
much more than the seller who does not. This, in turn, increases the chance that all creditors will be 
paid."). 
272. See infra notes 325-30 and accompanying text (analyzing secured lending as a type of 
prebankruptcy contract and distinguishing secured lending from waiver and procedure contracts). 
273. See Schwarcz, supra note 264, at 443-49 (arguing that illiquidity is a leading cause of bank-
ruptcies and explaining that by creating liquidity, secured lending significantly decreases the probability 
of default and thereby increases the expected value of unsecured claims). 
274. See BRUDNEY & BRATTON, supra note 7, at 55-56; POSNER, supra note 255, § 15.1, at 471 
& n.l (both illustrating the expected value computation). 
275. See Bankruptcy Code, 11 U.S.C. § 726(a)(2), (b) (1994) (providing that general unsecured 
creditors-whether voluntary or involuntary-get paid on a pro-rata basis). 
276. See, e.g., In re Bloomingdale Partners, 170 B.R. 984, 998 (Bankr. N.D. III. 1994) (holding 
that, for purposes of classification of claims under 11 U.S.C. § 1122, a tort-based claim is substantially 
similar to a contract-based claim because "[t]hey are all unsecured claims with the same bankruptcy 
priority"). 
277. Therefore, even if we treated involuntary tort creditors as a separate class for purposes of 
the class Pareto efficiency analysis, their class would receive the same pro-rata recovery as all other 
unsecured creditors. 
278. I have selected these values based on the best available empirical evidence. Furthermore, 
I later show that the starting variables can be materially changed and still produce a higher expected 
value in the case of pre bankruptcy contracting. See infra notes 304,310-11 and accompanying text 
(describing the effect of modifying one variable at a time and then modifying several variables 
simultaneously). 
279. I propose that, with limited exceptions not relevant here, only debtors in default be permitted 
to enter into prebankruptcy contracts. See infra subpart IV(B). 
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likelihood of bankruptcy absent the liquidity provided by the prebankruptcy 
contract is fifty percent, a figure that derives from a study of the incentives 
of financially distressed firms to restructure their debt privately rather than 
through formal bankruptcy.28O I also assume that the liquidity resulting 
from a prebankruptcy contract would reduce the likelihood of bankruptcy 
by only ten percentage points, to forty percent.281 Although the amount 
of this reduction lacks an empirical basis,282 I later show that my overall 
conclusions obtain even if the likelihood of bankruptcy is reduced by only 
seven percentage points.283 Also, even though my example assumes that 
a secondary material impact is considered unlikely at the time of 
contracting, I conservatively use in the calculations a twenty-five percent 
chance of such an impact inadvertently occurring.284 I also assume a 
simple debtor-creditor model, which I later vary,285 in which the debtor 
has eighteen hundred dollars of assets, the secured creditor's claim of one 
thousand dollars is secured by all the assets, and the unsecured creditors' 
claims are one thousand dollars. The debtor is therefore slightly insolvent, 
a reasonable assumption for a company in default. 286 
280. See Stuart c. Gilson et aI., Troubled Debt Restructurings: An Empirical Study of Private 
Reorganization of Firms in Default, 27 J. FIN. ECON. 315, 326 (1990) (finding in a sample of 169 
financially distressed companies that 89, or 52.7%, were unable to restructure their debt outside 
bankruptcy). Furthermore, I found that my overall conclusions are relatively insensitive to variations 
in the 50% figure. See infra note 304 and accompanying text. 
281. This estimate of the reduction in the likelihood of bankruptcy derives from consultation. See 
Telephone Interview with Peter V. Pantaleo, Bankruptcy Partner at O'Melveny & Myers, L.L.P. (Nov. 
4, 1997) (explaining that this reduction, based solely on prebankruptcy contracting, is a conservative 
estimate). 
282. Empirical evidence for the reduction in the likelihood of bankruptcy does not exist because 
prebankruptcy contracting is rare, particularly for public companies for which data would be available. 
Nonetheless, a 10 percentage point reduction appears reasonable, indeed conservative, given that I later 
show that a rational debtor would be reluctant to enter into a prebankruptcy contract, even assuming 
a creditor is thereby willing to provide liquidity, unless the liquidity would render its chance of bank-
ruptcy unlikely. See infra text accompanying notes 385-91. 
283. See infra notes 303-04 and accompanying text. 
284. See supra note 236 (defining the term "unlikely" as meaning not likely to occur, or 
improbable). My assumption is especially conservative given that the bankruptcy foreclosure procedure 
is likely to be much more debtor-sensitive than prepetition foreclosure under commercial law. See 
supra notes 223-24 and accompanying text (arguing that bankruptcy courts can exercise their equitable 
powers to try to achieve a market price for collateral). 
285. To ensure that the overall result does not depend on a particular fact pattern, I computed 
expected values by varying the debtor's assets and liabilities, but otherwise assumed that its likelihood 
of bankruptcy is reduced by 8 percentage points. The results consistently show that the prebankruptcy 
contract increases the expected value of the unsecured claims. For assets of $2000, secured claims of 
$1000, and unsecured claims of $1500, the expected value is $11.11 higher for a prebankruptcy 
contract. For assets of $1600, secured claims of $1000, and unsecured claims of $1500, the expected 
value is $76.89 higher for a prebankruptcy contract. And for assets of$2000, secured claims of $1500, 
and unsecured claims of $1000, the expected value is $81.11 higher for a prebankruptcy contract. 
286. If we assumed a solvent debtor, the expected value of the unsecured claims might be higher, 
absent a prebankruptcy contract. Those creditors likely would be paid most of their claims in the bank-
ruptcy reorganization anyway, whereas they would lose part of the value of their claims in the unlikely 
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I further assume that the foreclosure value of the assets if a secondary 
material impact occurs is only half of their value, W leaving nothing to 
pay the unsecured creditors,288 but that the bankruptcy nonforeclosure 
value of the assets is only two hundred dollars less than market value (that 
is, almost ninety percent of their value). 289 These assumptions reflect 
that the assets may have greater value in a bankruptcy reorganization than 
in an ordinary foreclosure when a secondary material impact occurs. Still, 
the value of the assets in a bankruptcy is assumed to be less than their 
market value because some reorganizations fail and the debtor ends up 
being liquidated,290 in which case the assets may not realize their market 
value.291 And bankruptcy reorganization costs, which must be paid out 
of asset value before unsecured creditors are paid, further reduce asset 
value.292 I believe my assumption of approximately ninety percent of 
value is conservative.293 To be consistent, I also assume that any assets 
event of a secondary material impact caused by the foreclosure. In the author's experience, however, 
the overwhelming majority of companies in a serious default were insolvent. 
287. An average foreclosure value of assets of 50 % appears reasonable. See TIMOTHY W. KOCH, 
BANK MANAGEMENT 647 (3d ed. 1995) (stating that banks making loans secured by receivables gen-
erally assume 50% to 80% foreclosure values, and that banks making loans secured by raw materials 
generally assume 40% to 60% foreclosure values); Steven Wechsler, Through the Looking Glass: 
Foreclosure by Sale as De Facto Strict Foreclosure-An Empirical Study of Mongage Foreclosure and 
Subsequent Resale, 70 CORNELLL. REv. 850, 865-66, 899-900 (1985) (reporting a study of118 mort-
gage foreclosures in Onondaga County, New York in which the average loss of value in foreclosure 
was 54.3 %, calculated on the mortgage balance due at foreclosure and the foreclosure sale price, both 
reported in Appendix A of the article). But see Texas Default Study Confirms Loan-Loss Assumptions, 
STANDARD & POOR'S STRUCTURED FINANCE, Feb. 1993, at 7, (finding in an empirical study of mort-
gage foreclosures in Texas during the early 1980s that the average loss of value in foreclosure was less 
than 40%). I later show, however, that even reducing the foreclosure value dramatically, see, e.g., 
Ronald J. Mann, Strategy & Force in the Liquidation of Secured Debt, 95 MICH. L. REv. 159,221-22 
(1997) (suggesting that in some instances the lenders' proceeds on the resale of property may represent 
losses greater than 75 % of the original loan), is unlikely to affect my ultimate conclusion for three 
reasons: first, the increase in expected value resulting from liquidity would more than offset the loss 
caused by a lower foreclosure value; second, the lower foreclosure value would apply only in the case 
of a secondary material impact, which under my model is unlikely; third, and most important, my 
model's 50% foreclosure value already wipes out the surplus payable to unsecured creditors. 
Therefore, those creditors could not be further impaired by a lower foreclosure value. 
288. The reduction in value also theoretically could harm the secured creditor, but the secured 
creditor is a party to the prebankruptcy contract and therefore is not the subject of externalities. 
289. Thus, of the $1800 of assets, only $1600 (88.9%) of asset value will remain at the end of 
the bankruptcy case to pay claims. 
290. See WHITE & NIMMER, supra note 224, at 664 ("It is not uncommon for a corporate debtor 
who has filed initially in Chapter 11 to convert to Chapter 7 for liquidation. "). 
291. See MARK S. SCARBERRY ET AL., BUSINESS REORGANIZATION IN BANKRUPTCY: CASES AND 
MATERIALS 760 (1996) ("The liquidation value will, in most cases, be much less than going concern 
values. For example, inventory in the garment industry is often worth no more than one third of its 
cost in situations where the business is liquidated. "). 
292. See Bankruptcy Code, 11 U.S.C. § 507(a) (1994) (requiring the payment of bankruptcy 
administrative claims prior to unsecured claims). 
293. See, e.g., Edward 1. Altman, A Funher Empirical Investigation of the Bankruptcy Cost 
Question, 39 J. FIN. 1067, 1087 (1984)(showing, in a study of26 firms filing for bankruptcy, that the 
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remaining after foreclosure will reduce to approximately ninety percent of 
their value during the bankruptcy case.294 For example, a foreclosure 
occurring at the beginning of the bankruptcy case that does not result in a 
secondary material impact will yield $800 of surplus value at that time, but 
that surplus value will not be applied to payment of other claims until the 
end of the case, at which time its value will have reduced to approximately 
ninety percent of the surplus value, or $711.11.295 Part of the value 
gained from prebankruptcy contracting therefore derives from permitting 
foreclosure on the collateral at the outset of the bankruptcy case, thereby 
avoiding its loss of value during the case.296 Although this may appear 
counterintuitive at first, there is an intuitive explanation. Because I limit 
enforceable prebankruptcy contracts to those situations in which the fore-
closure is unlikely to result in a secondary material impact, the debtor does 
not value the collateral more highly than the market does.297 The buyer 
in the foreclosure sale may well have a more valuable use for the collateral 
than the debtor has.298 
average costs of bankruptcy were between 11 % and 17% of the finn's value and that "in many cases 
they exceeded 20% of the value of the finn measured just prior to bankruptcy"); Lynn M. LoPucki, 
VinualJudgment Proofing: A Rejoinder, 107 YALE L.J. 1413, 1424-25 (1998)(" [nhe costs of Chapter 
11, direct and indirect, are high. For large public corporations, they are probably in excess of 10% 
of the value of the company."). For the purposes of my computations, Altman's data significantly 
understates the costs by failing to take into account any reduction of asset values in liquidation, but 
overstates the costs to the extent that indirect costs of bankruptcy , such as "the opportunity costs of lost 
managerial energies," Altman, supra, at 1070-71, do not reduce asset values. I separately calculated 
that, holding all other variables constant, only bankruptcy nonforeclosure values exceeding approxi-
mately 91 % would lead to a higher expected value in the absence of prebankruptcy contracting. See 
infra note 304 and accompanying text (describing the effect of modifying one variable at a time and 
then modifying several variables simultaneously). 
294. I use the same rate of reduction, to approximately 90% of value, because an asset's value 
would appear to reduce in direct proportion to its value at the outset of the bankruptcy case. That 
certainly would be the effect of selling assets in a liquidation sale. Empirical evidence suggests that 
bankruptcy costs, which must be subtracted from asset value, see supra note 292 and accompanying 
text, also are proportional to asset value. See Altman, supra note 293, at 1077 (concluding that the 
average ratio of direct bankruptcy costs to finn value is "fairly stable"). 
295. At the beginning of the case, the surplus derives from the $1800 asset value minus the $1000 
secured claim. At the end of the case, the amount available to satisfy the unsecured claims derives 
from $800 times the ratio of $1600 to $1800, i.e., the amount of surplus at the beginning of the case 
times the constant percentage of decline. 
296. One might expect that secured creditors could achieve this same end by lifting the stay under 
11 U.S.C. § 362(d). However, this is frequently not the case: 
There has been a tendency in certain cases to take an extremely mechanical view of stay 
litigation and to preclude a party who is subject to the automatic stay from seeking relief. 
This creates an anomalous situation where a party is subject to the automatic stay but is 
unable to seek relief even if damages result from its continuance. 
2 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY 1 362.07 (Lawrence P. King et at. eds., 15th ed. 1996). 
297. If the debtor did value the collateral more highly than the market, the foreclosure value could 
be materially less than the value of the collateral to the debtor, resulting in a secondary material impact. 
298. Foreclosure at the outset of the case also could increase the value of the nonconsenting 
creditors' claims by eliminating postpetition interest that an oversecured creditor may receive. See 11 
U.S.C. § 506(b). 
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Ignoring interest costs and assuming that the bankrupt debtor is 
insolvent,299 the following equations apply:3°O 
EV2-(a-o)[tf(F-S)+(1-tfh'(V-s)] +[1-(a-o)] U 
where 
EV1 is the expected value of unsecured claims absent the 
prebankruptcy contract, 
EV2 is the expected value of unsecured claims with the prebankruptcy 
contract, 
a is the likelihood of bankruptcy absent a prebankruptcy contract, 
o is the reduction in the likelihood of bankruptcy from a 
prebankruptcy contract, 
V is the value of the collateral at the outset of the bankruptcy case, 
S is the amount of the secured claim, 
U is the amount of the unsecured claims, 
'Y is the percentage of original value to which assets deteriorate during 
bankruptcy, 
tf is the chance of a secondary material impact occurring, and 
F is the foreclosure value of the collateral if a secondary material 
impact occurS.301 
Using the foregoing values in these equations yields a higher expected 
value of the unsecured claims if prebankruptcy contracting is allowed. For 
example, if a prebankruptcy contract reduces the likelihood of bankruptcy 
299. See supra note 286. On the other hand, I assume that the unsecured creditors ultimately will 
be paid in full if the debtor is able to avoid bankruptcy. Alternatively, I could have assumed that even 
if the debtor is able to avoid bankruptcy, the unsecured creditors will be paid less than their full claims. 
I separately computed that, holding all other variables constant, the average amount recovered by 
unsecured creditors on their claims, even though bankruptcy is avoided, would have to drop below 87 % 
in order for prebankruptcy contracting to lead to a lower expected value. That large an average loss 
does not seem likely when bankruptcy is averted. 
300. These equations are algebraic expressions of the following equalities: The expected value of 
the unsecured claims absent the prebankruptcy contract is equal to the likelihood of bankruptcy absent 
the contract x [nonforeclosure asset value in bankruptcy-amount of the secured claim] + the likelihood 
of avoiding bankruptcy absent the contract x amount of unsecured claim (assumes payment in full by 
avoiding bankruptcy); Expected value of unsecured claims with the prebankruptcy contract is equal to 
the likelihood of bankruptcy with the liquidity resulting from the contract x [{chance of an unanticipated 
secondary material impact occurring x value of the unsecured claims if a secondary material impact 
occurs} + {Chance that an unanticipated secondary material impact will not occur x (asset value 
assuming no secondary material impact-amount of the secured claim)}] + the likelihood of avoiding 
bankruptcy with liquidity resulting from the contract x amount of unsecured claim (assumes payment 
in full by avoiding bankruptcy). 
301. I assume, of course, that 1'V - s, 1'(V - S), and F - S cannot be less than zero. 
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by 10 percentage points, the expected value of unsecured claims would 
equal $800 absent prebankruptcy contracting but $813.33 with prebank-
ruptcy contracting. 
I acknowledge that critics could argue that this result depends on the 
particular numbers chosen, and therefore I interpret its significance 
cautiously.302 Nonetheless, the result remains valid even for smaller 
reductions in the likelihood of bankruptcy. 303 Furthermore, I have tested 
the sensitivity of the equation to changes in other starting variables. The 
results show that prebankruptcy contracting is likely to lead to a higher 
expected value of unsecured claims even if those variables are significantly 
changed from the empirically derived numbers used in this Article. 304 
If, on the other hand, it is assumed that the liquidity provided by the 
prebankruptcy contract reduces the likelihood of bankruptcy by more than 
ten percentage points-a reasonable assumption given that a rational debtor 
would be reluctant to enter into a prebankruptcy contract, even assuming 
a creditor is thereby willing to provide liquidity, unless the liquidity would 
302. See infra text accompanying notes 312-30 (describing the limitations of my quantitative 
analysis). 
303. The likelihood of bankruptcy can decline by almost 7 percentage points, rather than the 10 
percentage points illustrated in the text, before the expected value of the unsecured claims without the 
prebankruptcy contract exceeds the value with the contract. At a 7 percentage point reduction, the 
value without the contract remains $800, but the value with the contract falls to $799.33. 
304. With the able help of Henry ("Hank") B. Michael and Rita Y.S. Pang, I first modified one 
starting variable at a time while holding the others constant (single variate manipulation) in order to 
determine the degree to which the values or probabilities may be varied and still result in a higher 
expected value of unsecured claims. Next, with the help of a personal computer spreadsheet and 
special software (Microsoft Excel and Crystal Ball), we modified several variables simultaneously 
(multivariate manipulation). This permitted us, for instance, to examine the effect of simultaneously 
varying both the likelihood of bankruptcy and the likelihood of a secondary material impact. 
For example, by holding all of the variables constant except for the reduction in the likelihood 
of bankruptcy , we found that prebankruptcy contracting is advantageous under my example to the extent 
it reduces the likelihood of bankruptcy by over 7 percentage points. Irrespective of how we varied the 
foreclosure value of the assets, we found that the expected value of unsecured claims with the prebank-
ruptcy contract will be higher. (Because the equation conservatively assumes that unsecured creditors 
will receive nothing if a secondary material impact occurs, a lower foreclosure value only hurts the 
secured creditor.) We then varied only the bankruptcy nonforeclosure value of the assets and found 
that the expected value of unsecured claims with the prebankruptcy contract will be higher unless that 
foreclosure value exceeded approximately 91 % offull value. We also considered the situation in which 
the unsecured creditors are not paid in full following a pre bankruptcy contract even though bankruptcy 
is avoided. The amount recovered by unsecured creditors would have to drop below approximately 
87 % of their total claims in order for prebankruptcy contracting to lead to a lower expected value. In 
the multivariate manipulations, we first varied both the likelihood of bankruptcy and the chance of a 
secondary material impact. We then chose different values for the assets as well as for the amount of 
the secured and unsecured claims. Finally, we chose different values for the assets as well as for the 
amount of the secured and unsecured claims and also assumed that pre bankruptcy contracting would 
reduce the likelihood of bankruptcy by 8 percentage points. In all scenarios, the expected value of the 
unsecured claims was higher with, than without, the prebankruptcy contract over a broad range of 
values for the variables. The computations and results are on file with the Texas Law Review. 
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render its chance of bankruptcy unlikely305-the increase in expected 
value is even more dramatic. For example, a 15 percentage point 
reduction in the debtor's likelihood of bankruptcy yields an expected value 
of unsecured claims equal to $800 absent prebankruptcy contracting but 
$836.67 with prebankruptcy contracting. 
Prebankruptcy contracting therefore appears generally to be class 
Pareto efficient when a secondary material impact, viewed ex ante, is 
unlikely. Such contracting not only would make the classes of the contract 
beneficiaries and debtors better off, but it also would make noncontracting 
creditors, including involuntary creditors,306 better off as a class.301 
Accordingly, even those creditors, viewing the contract ex ante, would 
want it to be enforceable.308 
In contrast, prebankruptcy contracts that are likely to result in 
secondary material impacts are not class Pareto efficient.309 Using the 
same equations but varying only the likelihood of a secondary material 
impact, I found that the harm from the externalities created by prebank-
ruptcy contracting would begin to outweigh the benefit from increased 
liquidity when the likelihood of a secondary material impact exceeds 
approximately thirty percent.310 Thus, prebankruptcy contracting no 
longer would be class Pareto efficient when the likelihood of a secondary 
material impact exceeds approximately thirty percent.311 Accordingly, 
parties should not be able to rely, ex ante, on those contracts. 
305. See infra text accompanying notes 385-91. 
306. My analysis covers involuntary creditors because the priority of such creditors' claims would 
be pari passu with the priority of all other unsecured creditor claims. 
307. The class at least would not be worse off. 
308. One reviewer of this Article asked whether actual agreement of the unsecured creditors should 
be required for prebankruptcy contracting. At least for waiver contracts, obtaining such agreement 
would be impractical. One would have to identify every unsecured creditor, adequately disclose the 
prebankruptcy contracting transaction and its consequences, and arrange a vote. A debtor in default 
may be unwilling or unable, however, to wait until that has been accomplished. Trade creditors, for 
example, may have suspended credit, and institutional creditors may have cross-default provisions with 
grace periods that are expiring. Even the cost of soliciting and arranging the vote may be prohibitive, 
particularly when the solicitation must comply with securities laws. Also, future creditors presumably 
would have to be made aware of the contract's existence before they extend credit, an impractical task 
for involuntary creditors such as tort creditors. Furthermore, requiring actual agreement of unsecured 
creditors would encourage rent-seeking behavior by holdouts. On the other hand, this type of ex ante 
voting, subject to supermajority voting standards similar to those in § 1126(c) of the Code, is precisely 
what I am proposing for procedure contracts. See infra subpart IV(D). 
309. Indeed, I show that unless a prebankruptcy contract is unlikely to result in a secondary 
material impact, it would not be class Pareto efficient. 
310. If 30% represents the chance of an unanticipated secondary material impact occurring, the 
expected value of unsecured claims equals $800 absent prebankruptcy contracting but only $799.11 with 
prebankruptcy contracting. 
311. If, for example, the likelihood of a secondary material impact were 35 %, the expected value 
of unsecured claims equals $800 absent but only $784.89 with prebankruptcy contracting. For this 
reason, I have proposed that only prebankruptcy contracts that are unlikely to result in secondary 
material impacts should be deemed, ex ante, to be enforceable. 
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d. Limitations of my quantitative analysis.-AIDJ quantitative 
analysis is no better than its assumptions, and the assumptions of this 
Article rely on only a limited amount of empirical data. An empirical test 
may be possible, however.3I2 Security agreements are a type of prebank-
ruptcy contract presently recognized by law.313 Therefore, price changes 
of unsecured corporate bonds brought about by investor reaction to 
announcements of security agreements might reflect the reaction of 
nonconsenting unsecured creditors to prebankruptcy contracting generally. 
With the help of a research assistant,314 I measured such price changes 
during this decade and found an average increase in unsecured bond prices 
of 0.2 % within the 24-hour period and 0.3 % within the week after the 
announcement.31S Although their statistical significance has not been 
tested, these results tentatively suggest that unsecured bondholders may 
favor security agreements and, by implication, prebankruptcy 
contracting.316 
312. Game theory teaches that in a continuing series of repeated games, the losers will try to 
figure out a way to protect themselves against being exposed to constantly losing positions. See, e.g., 
GRAHAM ROMP, GAME THEORY: INTRODUcnON AND ApPLICATIONS 29 (1997). Therefore, a possible 
test of my argument that the expected value of nonconsenting creditor claims would not (as a class) be 
impaired is to observe whether creditors will refuse to make loans unless debtors agree not to enter into 
future waiver contracts. But even that test may not be dispositive. See Schwarcz, supra note 264, at 
449-52 (arguing that the widespread existence of "negative pledge" covenants, which restrict debtors 
from entering into future collateral contracts, is not indicative of the inefficiency of secured credit). 
313. See infra notes 325-30 and accompanying text. 
314. Duke law student Adam Chodos assisted in the project. 
315. These data are adjusted for the effect of general corporate bond market performance. Our 
general methodology was to locate every announcement, published since January 1, 1990 in the Wall 
Street Journal or other major U.S. newspapers, of companies having entered into security agreements. 
Chodos then excluded any announcements that included other factors (such as profits or losses) that 
might affect bond prices and then determined the relevant public bond prices during each day of the 
week before and after each remaining announcement. The results are on file with the Texas Law 
Review. 
316. I recognize, however, that this empirical test is imperfect for various reasons. Bond price 
data are generally available only at month end-not daily or weekly. Some companies did not even 
have bonds outstanding during the relevant period. Therefore, Chodos was able to locate data for only 
16 announcements. As a result, the sample may not be statistically meaningful. Also, security agree-
ments may not be a sufficiently representative form of pre bankruptcy contract, and public bondholders 
may not be representative of nonconsenting creditors because only larger companies tend to publicly 
issue bonds. Furthermore, the data includes announcements of security agreements given for new 
money loans as well as security agreements given only for waivers of defaults. The new money data 
showed an average increase in unsecured bond prices of 0.3 % within the 24-hour period and 0.6% 
within the week after the announcement; but the non-new money data showed an average increase in 
unsecured bond prices of only 0.1 % within the 24-hourperiod and an average decrease of 0.1 % within 
the week after the announcement. Cf Schwarcz, supra note 264, at 434-35 (discussing for debt 
analysis the need to distinguish new money security interests from those securing antecedent debt). 
Ultimately, therefore, I rely on the intuitive plausibility of the foregoing arguments as to class Pareto 
efficiency: that the freedom to engage in prebankruptcy contracting, subject to the limits imposed in 
this Article, will benefit creditors if the liquidity it creates reduces the probability of bankruptcy suffi-
ciently to outweigh the decreased recovery by such creditors should bankruptcy occur; and that 
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Another limitation may result from the small difference between 
expected values with and without prebankruptcy contracting.317 One may 
ask whether marginal numbers should drive policy if we know that a 
default rule will result in individual harm in some cases.318 One response 
is that many transactions, each with a small increase in expected value, will 
result in a significant increase in aggregate expected value. More 
significantly, the question raises the larger issue of the extent to which 
economic efficiency should be relied on for policy analysis. That issue has 
been much debated in other contexts.319 
A further limitation is that a jurisprudence based on factual inquiry, 
as opposed to a bright-line test, would increase the cost of transactions.320 
To ensure class Pareto efficiency, it would be necessary to decide, for each 
prebankruptcy contract, whether a secondary material impact is ex ante 
unlikely. This theoretically could be done at minimal cost; for example, 
the debtor and the beneficiary of the contract, acting in good faith and 
performing appropriate due diligence,321 could decide prior to entering 
into the contract whether or not a secondary material impact is 
unlikely.322 In actuality, however, allowing the contracting parties to 
restricting prebankruptcy contracting will harm creditors if the restriction reduces liquidity and hence 
increases the probability of bankruptcy sufficiently to outweigh the potentially higher recovery by 
creditors should bankruptcy occur. 
317. The largest differential in the numbers previously referred to was an $836.67 expected value 
with prebankruptcy contracting versus an $800 expected value without, and some examples had much 
lower savings. See supra text accompanying note 306. 
318. Because individual parties could be harmed by prebankruptcy contracting, one could even 
argue that the law should not implement a rule that allows such harm without a greater level of proof 
that unsecured creditors will benefit as a class. That argument is blunted, however, by the observation 
that, even under a mandatory regime, some parties will benefit and others will be harmed. See supra 
note 69 and accompanying text. 
319. See, e.g., POSNER, supra note 255, §§ 2.2, 2.3, at 26-31 (comparing arguments for and 
against the use of economic efficiency as a basis for rulemaking). 
320. Transaction costs also could occur if parties are confused by a bankruptcy regime comprised 
of partly mandatory and partly default rules. I find that less troublesome because most legal regimes 
combine mandatory and default rules. 
321. In addition to other appropriate due diligence, the beneficiary may want to interview the 
debtor's officers about the effect of the prebankruptcy contract. A simple representation and warranty 
by the debtor that the contract will have no secondary impact would not appear to be sufficient. 
322. This result would be consistent, for example, with fraudulent conveyance law, which incor-
porates a "savings clause" that limits the bankrupt debtor's right to avoid transfers when the transferee 
has acted in good faith at the time of the transfer. See Bankruptcy Code, 11 U.S.C. § 548(c) (1994). 
Although not a precise parallel, this result also would be consistent with a principle of contract law: 
the adequacy of consideration is determined at the time the parties execute the contract because any 
other rule would impose substantial uncertainty as to the enforceability of a contract. Compare In re 
Chomakos, 69 F.3d 769,770 (6th Cir. 1995), Cooper v. Ashley Communications, Inc. (In re Morris 
Communications NC, Inc.), 914 F.2d 458, 466 (4th Cir. 1990) (both noting that the date fordetermin-
ing reasonable equivalence in bankruptcy cases is the date of the transfer or exchange), and 4 COLLIER 
ON BANKRUPTCY, supra note 296, 1548.116, with Crail v. Blakely, 505 P.2d 1027,1034 (Cal. 1973), 
Wilson v. Strange, 219 S.E.2d 88, 94 (Ga. 1975), and Russell v. lim Russell Supply, Inc., 558 N.E.2d 
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make the determination might prove more costly, particularly if litigation 
ensues. Because any transaction costs would have to be offset against 
prebankruptcy contracting's benefits, and the difference between expected 
values with and without prebankruptcy contracting was not large, signifi-
cant transaction costs could well outweigh the benefits of prebankruptcy 
contracting. 
One could minimize transaction costs by creating a bright-line test: for 
example, all prebankruptcy contracts, whether or not class Pareto efficient, 
should be enforceable; or all should be unenforceable.323 But a bright-
line test would impose other costs: under the first test, transaction costs 
would be replaced by increased externalities; and under the second test, 
transaction costs would be replaced by higher bankruptcy administration 
costs because fewer out-of-court settlements would occur.324 
It thus is interesting to observe that a form of prebankruptcy contrac-
ting already exists under the Code and that Congress has chosen the first 
bright-line test by which to apply it. A troubled debtor and one or more 
of its creditors are permitted to enter into a contract, called a security 
agreement,325 whereby the debtor secures the creditor's antecedent 
debt. 326 Although it is possible to distinguish agreements securing 
antecedent debt from other forms of prebankruptcy contracting, the distinc-
tions are not necessarily compelling. One might attempt to distinguish 
them on historical grounds, but a distinction based on the accident of 
historical usage is not conclusive. Another possible distinction is that, 
115, 120 (Ill. App. Ct. 1990) (all stating that the adequacy of consideration for a contract must be 
determined at the time of entering into the contract). 
323. A possible compromise between these bright-line tests would enforce only prebankruptcy con-
tracts that do not, ex post, result in a secondary material impact. I actually started with such an 
approach but concluded that it was somewhat unsatisfying because parties could not rely on a particular 
prebankruptcy contract that later results in a secondary material impact even though, viewed at the time 
that contract was entered into, such an impact was unlikely. Without the ability to rely on enforcement 
of the contract, rational persons might be unwilling to give the debtor value in exchange for the 
contract, and prebankruptcy contracting would have limited practical application. See supra note 237 
and accompanying text. 
324. See supra text accompanying notes 166-67 (describing how prebankruptcy contracting can 
reduce the costs of bankruptcy administration by encouraging out-of-court settlements). 
325. Article 9 of the Uniform Commercial Code, generally adopted as law in all states, see JAMES 
J. WHITE & ROBERT S. SUMMERS, UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 21-1, at 714 (4th ed. 1995), 
empowers debtors to enter into security agreements in order to secure payment or performance of their 
obligations. See U.C.C. § 9-201 (1998) ("Except as otherwise provided by this Act a security 
agreement is effective according to its terms between the parties, against purchasers of the collateral 
and against creditors. "). 
326. See U.C.C. § 1-201(44)(b) ("[AJ person gives 'value' for rights ifhe acquires them ... as 
security for ••. a pre-existing claim. "). I purposely focus on agreements securing antecedent debt, 
as opposed to agreements securing new money loans. The debtor's consideration therefore would not 
be new money but, as with prebankruptcy contracts generally, more typically it would consist of a 
waiver of default. Cf Richmond Leasing Co. v. Capital Bank, N.A., 762 F.2d 1303, 1307 n.2 (5th 
Cir. 1985). 
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unlike waiver agreements, security agreements create property rights in the 
form of security interests; nonetheless, I later argue that property and 
contract rights are merely part of an overall bundle of rights. 327 Yet 
another distinction is that security interests are perfected by providing 
actual or constructive notice to other creditors, but the same could be done 
for prebankruptcy contracts.328 Furthermore, like a prebankruptcy 
contract, a security agreement creates externalities: the secured creditor 
would be paid prior to the debtor's nonconsenting creditors;329 yet secur-
ity agreements are generally enforceable in bankruptcy. 330 By analogy, 
then, one could argue that the existence under the Code of a bright-line test 
favoring these security agreements justifies a bright-line test favoring 
prebankruptcy contracting generally. Because my analysis is normative, 
however, I am not making that argument. I am only suggesting that if a 
bright-line test were desirable, there is precedent for it. 
Subject to those limitations, the analysis has suggested that prebank-
ruptcy contracts that do not or that ex ante are unlikely to result in a 
secondary material impact should be enforceable from the standpoint of 
327. See infra note 338 and accompanying text. 
328. This distinction, however, does not seem to have normative significance. A filing system 
would be completely irrelevant for involuntary creditors. Filing also would not provide notice to pre-
existing creditors; indeed, those creditors, being aware of the possibility of pre bankruptcy contracting, 
would not need specific notice in order to price their credit. Adopting a filing system, however, would 
impose transaction costs. See supra note 93 (citing anicles discussing possible filing systems). 
329. Security agreements, which are entered into between a debtor and one or more creditors prior 
to bankruptcy, give the secured creditors priority to repayment out of designated assets in the event the 
debtor later goes bankrupt. See Bankruptcy Code, 11 U.S.C. § 506(a) (1994); U.C.C. §§ 9-
301(1)(a)(b), 9-312(5) (together establishing the basic priority of secured creditors over unsecured 
creditors and the technical first-in-time principle generally governing priority among secured creditors); 
EpSfEIN ET AL., supra note 170, § 7-10, at 461 (suggesting that the priority of a security interest was 
so obvious that a literal statement of the principle in the Code was thought unnecessary). The 
normative analysis for enforcing security agreements would appear to be the same as that for enforcing 
prebankruptcy contracts: whether the benefits outweigh the harm to unsecured creditors as a class. 
Compare Schwarcz, supra note 264, at 481, 480-83 (arguing that the normative justification for new 
money secured credit is its "class Pareto efficiency"), with Lucian Arye Bebchuk & Jesse M. Fried, 
The Uneasy Case for the Priority of Secured Claims in Bankruptcy, 105 YALE L.J. 857, 863-65 (1996) 
(questioning the legitimacy of security agreements because they create externalities). 
330. A bankruptcy trustee can avoid a security interest in two important situations relevant here. 
First, if the debtor becomes subject to bankruptcy within 90 days following the transfer of the security 
interest, the interest may be avoidable as a preference. See 11 U.S.C. § 547(b) (delineating the tech-
nical requirements for a trustee to avoid a security interest as a "preference," including the requirement 
that the "transfer" generally be made "on or within 90 days before the date of the filing of the 
petition"). Second, if the debtor grants the security interest with specific intent to "hinder, delay, or 
defraud" creditors, the trustee can avoid it. See id. § 548(a)(1) (providing that transfers of collateral 
made with such intent are avoidable as fraudulent conveyances). I later discuss these provisions in the 
context of the parallel between prebankruptcy contracts and contracts to secure antecedent debt. See 
infra text accompanying notes 331-45 (discussing that parallel under the bankruptcy policy of equality 
of distribution and noting that prebankruptcy contracts would be subject to preference law); infra text 
accompanying notes 360-69 (discussing that parallel under the bankruptcy policy of debtor 
rehabilitation). 
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contract externalities. I next examine whether those prebankruptcy con-
tracts also should be enforceable from the standpoint of bankruptcy 
policies. 
2. Bankruptcy Policies.-I start the analysis of bankruptcy policies by 
examining the policy of equality of distribution. Thereafter I examine the 
policies of debtor rehabilitation and economical administration of the 
bankruptcy estate. 
a. Equality of distribution.-Procedure contracts under existing 
law are unlikely to cause externalities because all creditors must agree to 
the contract, and no rational creditor would agree to be harmed. 331 For 
the same reason, the proposed procedure contracts also are unlikely to 
violate the policy of equality of distribution. 332 Waiver contracts, on the 
other hand, which are entered into precisely to favor the contracting 
creditor, are more likely to violate that policy. My analysis of equality of 
distribution therefore focuses on waiver contracts. 
The analysis proceeds in two steps. I first show that rights created by 
a state-law contract should be enforced in bankruptcy unless a federal inter-
est requires a different result. I then argue that the federal interest of 
equality of distribution should not require a different result, provided that 
secondary material impacts are unlikely. 
The enforceability in bankruptcy of state-law rights has been addressed 
by the Supreme Court. In Butner v. United States, 333 a unanimous Court 
adopted a view, already held by the Second, Fourth, Sixth, Eighth, and 
Ninth Circuits,334 that property rights are determined by state law and 
that the involvement of an interested party in a bankruptcy proceeding has 
no effect on these rights: 
Property interests are created and defined by state law. Unless 
some federal interest requires a different result, there is no reason 
why such interests should be analyzed differently simply because an 
interested party is involved in a bankruptcy proceeding. Uniform 
treatment of property interests by both state and federal courts within 
a [s]tate serves to reduce uncertainty, to discourage forum shopping, 
and to prevent a [debtor] from receiving "a windfall merely by 
reason of the happenstance of bankruptcy." The justifications for 
331. Thus, a rational unsecured creditor would not voluntarily subordinate the priority of her claim 
which, absent contractual subordination, would share equally and ratably with other unsecured claims. 
See supra note 275 and accompanying text. 
332. Cf infra subpart IV(D) (discussing whether procedure contracts based on supermajority 
voting would violate the policy of equality of distribution). 
333. 440 U.S. 48 (1979). 
334. [d. at 51-52. 
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application of state law are not limited to ownership interests; they 
apply with equal force to security interests . . . .335 
577 
Although there are no cases directly on point, the Court's logic appears to 
apply not only to property rights but also to state law contract rights.336 
Uniform treatment of contracts likewise would reduce uncertainty and 
would prevent a debtor from receiving a windfall merely by filing bank-
ruptcy to impair rights under those contracts.337 Furthermore, property 
is merely a bundle of rights, and it would be inconsistent to treat unbun-
dled rights, such as contract rights, differently from bundled rights for 
purposes of this analysis.338 
According to Butner, however, even state property rights can be over-
ridden by a federal interest. Although the Court did not define what 
constitutes such a federal interest, the Code's policy of equality of 
distribution surely should qualify. Thus, a prebankruptcy contract that is 
likely to result in a secondary material impact impairing equality of 
distribution may not be protected under Butner. But what about a prebank-
ruptcy contract that is unlikely to result in such an impact? Although the 
absence of authority prevents a dispositive answer, my efficiency analysis 
has shown that enforcing those contracts would economically benefit, 
335. Id. at 55 (quoting Lewis v. Manufacturers Nat'l Bank, 364 U.S. 603, 609 (1961» (citation 
omined). 
336. In several cases, though, courts have deferred to state contract law in determining whether 
a contract was executory under § 365 of the Code. See, e.g., In re Columbia Gas Sys. Inc., 50 F.3d 
233,241 (3d Cir. 1995) (deferring to state law in determining whether a class action settlement was 
a contract and, if so, whether it was executory); In re Streets & Beard Farm Partnership, 882 F .2d 233, 
241 (7th Cir. 1989) (looking to state law to determine whether the remaining obligations on an install-
ment contract were significant enough to render the contract executory). 
337. The Code permits a trustee in bankruptcy to terminate executory contracts, leaving the con-
tract counterparties as general unsecured creditors with prepetition claims for contract breach. See 
Bankruptcy Code, 11 U.S.C. § 365(a), (g) (1994). For a concise discussion of the treatment of 
executory contracts under the Code, see Jesse M. Fried, Executory Contracts and Peiformance 
Decisions in Bankruptcy, 46 DUKE L.J. 517,573 (1996). See generally Vern Countryman, Executory 
Contracts in Bankruptcy, Pan I, 57 MINN. L. REv. 439 (1973); Vern Countryman, Executory 
Contracts in Bankruptcy, Pan II, 58 MINN. L. REv. 479 (1974); Westbrook, supra note 59. 
Presumably, a well-drafted prebankruptcy contract would not be executory. 
338. On the other hand, bankruptcy law tends to recognize property rights, but it often impinges 
on contract rights. Compare 11 U.S.C. § 506(a) (governing security interests), with id. § 365 
(governing executory interests). That counterargument would not be compelling, however, because the 
distinction between property and contract increasingly is being questioned by scholars. See, e.g., 
MargaretHoward, Equipment Lessors and Secured Panies in Bankruptcy: All Argument/or Coherence, 
48 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 253, 298 (1991) (remarking upon "the blurring of any distinction between 
contract and property rights" for constitutional and bankruptcy purposes); Michael W. McConnell, 
Contract Rights and Propeny Rights: A Case Study in the Relationship Between Individual Iibenies and 
Constitutional Structure, 76 CAL. L. REV. 267,271,274 (1988) (arguing that the Contracts Clause and 
the Takings Clause should be interpreted with more flexible concepts of contracts and property because 
the founding fathers considered contract rights to be a subset of property rights rather than an entirely 
distinct class of rights); Leonard Kreynin, Note, Breach 0/ Contract as a Due Process Violation: Can 
the Constitution be a Font o/Contract Law?, 90 COLUM. L. REV. 1098, 1109 (1990) ("There are no 
significant functional differences between the property and contract interests of creditors. H). 
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overall, the very class of creditors that the policy of equality of distribution 
is intended to protect-unsecured creditors. This economic benefit arises 
because prebankruptcy contracting provides a debtor with liquidity and 
encourages out-of-court settlements, in effect enhancing the federal interests 
of debtor rehabilitation and economical administration of the bankruptcy 
process. The enhancement of these federal interests to some extent offsets 
any detraction of the federal interest in equality of distribution that 
prebankruptcy contracting may cause. Indeed, the net effect of prebank-
ruptcy contracting339 on unsecured creditors as a class already has been 
shown to be economically beneficial in general. 340 The balance of federal 
interests thus appears to weigh in favor of prebankruptcy contracting. 
Even if a court were to disagree with this balancing, it is far from 
clear under Butner that the federal interest in equality of distribution 
requires a different result than enforcing prebankruptcy contracts. The 
dominant expression of equality of distribution under bankruptcy law is 
found in Section 547(b),341 the Code's preference provision. 
Prebankruptcy contracts would be subject to that provision just as would 
anything else affected by preference law.342 Thus, a waiver contract 
could be avoided as a preference if it were made within 90 days of the 
debtor's bankruptcy. 343 Because the enforcement of prebankruptcy 
contracts, subject to preference law, would not impair the federal interest 
in equality of distribution as articulated in the Code, there should be no 
reason for the federal interest in equality of distribution to require a 
different result than enforcement. 
For still another reason, prebankruptS}' contracts should be enforced, 
notwithstanding their potential impact on equality of distribution. As 
339. Assuming such contracting is unlikely to result in a secondary material impact. 
340. See supra subsection III(B)(l)(c). 
341. See 11 U.S.C. § 547(b); Barash v. Public Fin. Corp., 658 F.2d 504,508 (7th Cir. 1981)(" A 
principal goal of the preference provisions is the assurance of equal distribution among creditors. "); 
H.R. REP. No. 95-595, at 178 (1977) ("[T]he preference provisions facilitate the prime bankruptcy 
policy of equality of distribution among creditors of the debtor. "), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 
5963, 6138-39. 
342. In other words, I propose that an otherwise enforceable prebankruptcy contract would still 
be fully subject to preference law. 
343. The preference provision covers transfers of the debtor's interests in property. See 11 U.S.C. 
§ 547(b). The debtor's waiver of the stay would appear to constirute a transfer of an interest of the 
debtor in property-property being a bundle of rights within the meaning of that subsection. The Code 
could be amended, in any event, to clarify that waiver contracts are subject to preference law. 
Exceptions to preference law apply if the debtor receives "new value" consisting of "money or 
money's worth in goods, services, or new credit." ld. § 547(a)(2), (c)(l), (c)(3)-(4). Even though a 
prebankruptcy contract itself should constirute "value" under fraudulent conveyance law. it would not 
constirute "new value" under preference law's more limited definition. Compare id. § 548(d)(2)(A), 
with id. § 547(a)(2) (both defining the concept of value applicable to the panicular section). 
Furthermore, any attempt to waive the preference provision of § 547(b) itself would directly violate 
the policy of equality of distribution and therefore should be unenforceable. See Barash, 658 F.2d at 
508. 
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previously discussed, the Code already permits a form of prebankruptcy 
contract: agreements securing antecedent debt. 344 Even though such 
agreements impair equality of distribution by giving newly secured 
creditors priority over unsecured creditors, the rearrangement of priorities 
is deemed not to violate bankruptcy policy; indeed, it is regarded as "fair 
and equitable. ,,345 A fortiori, prebankruptcy contracts that are unlikely 
to result in secondary material impacts should be enforceable. 
For these reasons, I believe that prebankruptcy contracts that ex ante 
are unlikely to cause secondary material impacts ought to be enforceable, 
notwithstanding that in individual cases equality of distribution could be 
impaired. 
The analysis next shifts to the effect of prebankruptcy contracting on 
the debtor itself as I examine the bankruptcy policy of debtor rehabilitation. 
b. Debtor rehabilitation.-As noted earlier, prebankruptcy con-
tracting can enhance the policy of debtor rehabilitation.346 Now I 
consider the ways in which prebankruptcy contracting might impair that 
policy. 
Procedure contracts, which debtors themselves seek on their own ini-
tiative as alternatives to the bankruptcy process,347 would be unlikely to 
significantly impair that policy. A rational debtor would not seek to enter 
into a contract that impedes its rehabilitation. Indeed, the debtor's 
motivation may well be to increase the likelihood of its rehabilitation. 
Mistakes, of course, may occur: the debtor may not foresee or may miscal-
culate how an alternative procedure could affect its rehabilitation. The 
reorganization process under Chapter 11 of the Code, however, is likewise 
imperfect. Any bankruptcy rehabilitation procedure has inherent 
unpredictability.348 Logically, therefore, debtors wishing to enter into 
procedure contracts should have the flexibility to do so-at least from the 
standpoint of debtor rehabilitation-so long as such contracts do not 
manifestly impair their rehabilitation.349 
344. See supra text accompanying notes 325-30. 
345. See, e.g., 11 u.s.c. § 1129(b) (requiring a fair and equitable reorganization plan to protect 
the full value of a secured creditor's claim). 
346. See supra note 270 and accompanying text (observing that waiver contracts could encourage 
out-of-coun settlements and maximize a debtor's liquidity, thereby enhancing the bankruptcy policy of 
debtor rehabilitation). 
347. See supra text accompanying note 24. 
348. Any evaluation of whether procedure contracts generally would advance or impede debtor 
rehabilitation would require a comparison of the relative likelihood of rehabilitation under procedure 
contracting and under Chapter 11. But empirical data for that comparison do not presently exist 
because there are no outstanding procedure contracts from which data can be derived. 
349. This situation should be distinguished from the cases holding that debtors cannot be com-
pelled to waive their right to file for bankruptcy. See supra note 65 (citing cases). 
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Waiver contracts, in contrast, are not sought by debtors on their own 
initiative. Rather, they are sought by creditors that want the debtor to 
waive its bankruptcy protections, often without regard to the effect of the 
waiver on the debtor's ability to rehabilitate. 350 The analysis of the 
impact of waiver contracts on debtor rehabilitation therefore must take into 
account the effect of the contract both on the debtor's value and on its 
efforts to reorganize.351 
For the issue of value, the concept of secondary material impact again 
is useful. Foreclosure on easy-to-value financial assets, for example, may 
deprive the debtor of cash collections but would not materially impact the 
debtor's value. 352 But if the collateral were the customized widget 
machine, the impact on the debtor of a foreclosure would be as devastating 
to the debtor as it would be to nonconsenting creditors because, without the 
machine to operate, the debtor's business may be destroyed.353 
Therefore, as to value, the analysis is similar to that used for determining 
whether waiver contracts cause material externalities. 
The second issue, the effect of the waiver contract on the debtor's 
efforts to reorganize,354 is more difficult to analyze. The impact of the 
contract on rehabilitation depends on variables that will not be known until 
the bankruptcy itself. For example, foreclosure on financial assets may 
deprive a debtor of a source of reorganization financing, which could be 
troublesome if the debtor lacks other sources of financing. 355 The 
collateral also may be needed for an effective reorganization of the 
350. Institutional creditors such as banks and insurance companies typica1\y focus only on recovery 
of their claims. Trade creditors, on the other hand, may prefer the debtor to continue in business in 
order to continue the provision of goods and services. See supra note 82 and accompanying text. 
351. For example, the filing of multiple bankruptcies by a debtor may we1\ suggest that its rehabil-
itation potential is already de minimis. Cf In re Madison, 184 B.R. 686, 689 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1995) 
("[W]e reject the Debtor'S implicit assertion that the sixth filing eradicates any power of this court to 
examine her conduct in the course of the fifth filing."). 
352. See supra notes 213-16 and accompanying text. The discussion below shows that if, in 
individual cases, the debtor needs to use the cash co1\ections in order to preserve its value, it could do 
so after notice and a hearing by providing adequate protection, most likely in the form of substitute 
co1\ateral. See infra note 368 and accompanying text. 
353. Thus, waiving the automatic stay for a1\ creditors, not just for the creditor desiring the 
waiver, would be an imperfect solution. Even though it would enhance equality of distribution, it 
would impair debtor rehabilitation because creditors then may be able to foreclose on the operating 
assets. 
354. Reorganization means that the debtor will become a viable business entity and avoid being 
liquidated. 
355. See Pantaleo et aI., supra note 10, at 186 ("[T]he financial assets of a business are often a 
prime source of co1\ateral for debtor-in-possession financing."). But see infra note 368 and accom-
panying text (discussing that even if the automatic stay is waived, a debtor sti11 may be able to use the 
financial assets and cash collections thereof by providing the secured creditor with "adequate 
protection"). 
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debtor,356 a determination that may be difficult to make even at the outset 
of a bankruptcy case, much less before bankruptcy. 357 Therefore, it is 
harder to assess in advance the extent to which the policy of debtor 
rehabilitation will be affected by a particular waiver contract, suggesting 
that the enforceability of waiver contracts should be judged ex post. 
If the parties to a waiver contract could not determine its enforceabil-
ity until the debtor entered bankruptcy, however, creditors would be dis-
couraged from offering valuable consideration for the contract.358 That, 
in turn, would impair a debtor's ability to offer a waiver in exchange for 
financing or other valuable consideration, thereby making it more difficult 
for the debtor to reorganize outside of bankruptcy and impeding the very 
same policy of debtor rehabilitation.359 Finding an approach that pro-
motes debtor rehabilitation while allowing parties to rely on waiver 
contracts is therefore desirable. 
Interestingly, fraudulent conveyance law,360 the only provision of the 
Code that both promotes the policy of debtor rehabilitation and that might 
invalidate prebankruptcy contracting, already incorporates a "safe harbor" 
that allows parties to rely on prebankruptcy contracts.361 Contracts 
356. Cf. Bankruptcy Code, 11 U.S.C. § 362(d) (1994) (pennitting a bankruptcy court to grant 
relief from the automatic stay under various circumstances provided that the "property is not necessary 
to an effective reorganization" of the debtor). 
357. See Telephone Interview with Arthur Steinberg, supra note 102. 
358. Cf. supra text accompanying note 237 (arguing for the importance of an ex ante detennination 
of enforceability of prebankruptcy contracts). 
359. In addition to rehabilitation in bankruptcy, courts have held that rehabilitation outside ofbank-
ruptcy also promotes the bankruptcy policy of promoting debtor rehabilitation. See, e.g., United Sav. 
Ass'n v. Timbers of Inwood Forest Assocs. (In re Timbers of Inwood Forest Assocs.), 793 F.2d 1380, 
1405 (5th Cir. 1986), rev'd, 808 F.2d 363 (5th Cir. 1987) (en banc), ajJ'd, 484 U.S. 365 (1988); In 
re Jenkins Court Assocs. Ltd. Partnership, 181 B.R. 33, 37 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1995); In re Cheeks, 167 
B.R. 817, 818-19 (Bankr. D.S.C. 1994); In re Hudson Manor Partners, Ltd., No. 91-81065HR, 1991 
Bankr. LEXIS 2145, at *6 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. Dec. 31, 1991); In re Colonial Ford, Inc., 24 B.R. 1014~ 
1017-19 (Bankr. D. Utah 1982). Congress also recognized that it may be appropriate for a bankruptcy 
court to decline jurisdiction when parties have reached an adequate out-of-court settlement. See H.R. 
REP. No. 95-595, at 325 (1977) (providing the legislative history for 11 U.S.C. § 305, the Code's 
abstention provision), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5963, 6281-82. 
360. See 11 U .S.C. § 548 (pennitting the bankruptcy trustee to avoid transfers made or obligations 
incurred within a year prior to bankruptcy under certain circumstances). 
361. Some may question whether fraudulent conveyance law has a basis in the policy of debtor 
rehabilitation. After all, commentators often describe the purpose of fraudulent conveyance law as 
creditor protection. See, e.g., William W. Bratton, Jr., Corporate Debt Relationships: Legal Theory 
in a Time of Restructuring, 1989 DUKE L.J. 92, 102 n.27 ("This duty of creditor protection appears 
most notably in fraudulent conveyance law."); Barry L. Zaretsky, Fraudulent Transfer Law as the 
Arbiter of Unreasonable Risk, 46 S.C. L. REv. 1165, 1169 (1995) ("[W]hen the English courts held 
that a judgment creditor could disregard a fraudulent conveyance and levy execution on the property 
transferred, the fraudulent conveyance law became primarily one of creditor protection. "). However, 
creditor protection per se is not a fundamental Code policy. The closest policy is equality of distri-
bution to creditors. Does fraudulent conveyance law protect equality of distribution? The answer must 
be no. Fraudulent conveyance law is not concerned with equal distribution of the debtor's assets to 
creditors. See In re Roscar Steel Scrap & Metals Corp., 12 B.R. 629, 634 (S.D.N.Y. 1981) ("Unlike 
a preference, which is a violation of the rule of equal distribution among all creditors, a fraudulent 
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securing antecedent debt, a form of prebankruptcy contracting,362 are 
enforceable under fraudulent conveyance law so long as debtors receive 
value that, at the time of contracting, is seen to be reasonably equivalent 
to the value of the contract. 363 This promotes debtor rehabilitation by 
encouraging creditors to provide value that could help the debtor to 
reorganize. If that value is equivalent to what the debtor gives up, the net 
impact on debtor rehabilitation is deemed to be neutraL Logically, the 
same reasoning should apply to waiver contracts: they should be neutral 
from the standpoint of debtor rehabilitation if the debtor receives reason-
ably equivalent value.364 
Still, in individual cases a court might feel uneasy if the debtor's out-
of-court rehabilitation failed because the value, even though equivalent 
when given, was no longer available to the debtor to aid in its 
rehabilitation.365 That concern, however, is not a defense to creditor 
conveyance is a deceitful device through which the debtor seeks to secure an advantage for himself out 
of what in law should belong to his creditors and not to him. H). In fact, fraudulent conveyance law 
specifically permits unequal distribution by defining "value" to include the "satisfaction or securing of 
a present or antecedent debt of the debtor." 11 U .S.C. § 548(d)(2). Thus, if a debtor with assets of 
$1000 has three creditors, each with a claim of $1000, its payment in full of one of the creditors, 
leaving the other two creditors with no assets against which to assert a claim, does not violate fraud-
ulent conveyance law. See, e.g., Irving Trust Co. v. Chase Nat'l Bank, 65 F.2d 409, 410 (2d Cir. 
1933) (noting that the "securing or paying of an actual debt, in good faith, without any design injurious 
to creditors beyond that implied in giving the preference, was not deemed a fraudulent conveyance 
under the principles of the common law," but that the payment may constitute a voidable preference 
under 11 U .S.C. § 547, a separate section of the Code that does address equality of distribution). In 
contrast, it is easy to demonstrate that fraudulent conveyance law protects debtor rehabilitation. By 
limiting the right of a debtor to transfer assets (or incur obligations) without obtaining reasonably 
equivalent value as consideration, the law attempts to ensure that the debtor's net assets will be 
preserved. See, e.g., Bundles v. Baker (In re Bundles), 856 F.2d 815, 824 (7th Cir. 1988) ("[Tlhe 
purpose of section 548's avoiding powers [is] to preserve the assets of the estate."). Fraudulent 
conveyance law therefore protects both debtors and creditors. Indeed, debtor rehabilitation and creditor 
protection are mirror-image concepts because only creditors have substantive rights against an insolvent 
debtor. See, e.g., Rogers, supra note 30, at 975 ("Reorganization proceedings are designed to preserve 
[a debtor's] going concern surplus for the benefit of the enterprise's creditors and investors .... H). 
362. See supra text accompanying notes 325-30. 
363. Under fraudulent conveyance law, reasonably equivalent value is determined ex ante, at the 
time of the transfer or conveyance. See Cooper v. Ashley Communications, Inc. (In re Morris 
Communications NC, Inc.), 914 F.2d 458, 466 (4th Cir. 1990) (noting that the critical time is when 
the transfer is made). I assume, here, for explanatory purposes, that the transfer of collateral occurs 
when the contract is signed. 
364. An alternative way of thinking about this exists. Under fraudulent conveyance law, an insol-
vent debtor contemplating bankruptcy can grant a security interest in assets in exchange for a reason-
ably equivalent value. Such a transfer can be viewed as a prebankruptcy contract in which a debtor 
waives its right to avoid transfers made in contemplation of bankruptcy by accepting the value. 
Although the prebankruptcy contract analogy is not precise because the debtor's waiver is mandatory 
and not consensual, the policy argument still obtains. I later show that the interpretation of reasonably 
equivalent value under fraudulent conveyance law would provide an established body of law on the 
meaning of that term. See infra text accompanying notes 412-15. 
365. See, e.g., In re Jenkins Court Assocs. Ltd. Partnership, 181 B.R. 33, 37 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 
1995) (denying relief from the automatic stay and noting that, in a single-asset real estate case, enforce-
ment of the waiver would mean that the asset "passes from the bankruptcy estate through foreclosure" 
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reliance under fraudulent conveyance law-which largely ignores the 
debtor's subsequent misuse or loss of value366-perhaps because the fail-
ure of individual debtors is the necessary price of promoting debtor 
rehabilitation more generally.367 The dissipation of value, therefore, 
should not be a defense to creditor reliance on waiver contracts. 
In some circumstances, collateral may turn out to be essential to a 
debtor's ability to reorganize. For example, a debtor that waived the 
automatic stay prior to bankruptcy might find, if it has no liquidity, that 
unless it can use financial assets pledged as collateral, it will be forced to 
default on its payroll and close its doors. This concern can be addressed 
by distinguishing between waiver contracts that include a waiver of the 
right to use collateral and those that do not. A waiver of the automatic 
stay does not, by itself, prohibit the debtor from using the collateral. The 
Code still allows the debtor to use the collateral if it gives the secured 
creditor adequate protection, typically substitute collateral. 368 If the 
creditor bargains for a prebankruptcy waiver of the debtor's right to use 
collateral, that waiver would be analyzed separately from the stay waiver 
and, because of its potentially more severe impact on debtor rehabilitation, 
would be less likely to be enforced.369 
A question still remains of how, under an ex ante reasonably-
equivalent-value standard, one could value a waiver contract in order to 
determine if the debtor receives reasonably equivalent value. The problem 
is that a waiver, unlike an asset transferred by a debtor, is not a 
and the debtor "will have no realistic opportunity to attempt to fonnulate a repayment or reorganization 
plan"}. But see In re Club Tower L.P., 138 B.R. 307, 311-12 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. 1991) (enforcing a 
stay waiver in part because the debtor still retained most of the core bankruptcy rights, including an 
automatic stay as to other creditors, and therefore still had the opportunity to rehabilitate). 
366. See Schwarcz, supra note 264, at 440 (observing that fraudulent conveyance law generally 
protects a lender that gives reasonably equivalent value, and the only reason to monitor the debtor's 
use of proceeds would be to show that, in the case of potentially insolvent debtors, the lender is acting 
in good faith). If the debtor itself controls the use of the value, it should bear the burden of misuse. 
Even though creditors sometimes are able to impose covenants that monitor the debtor's use of 
proceeds, even that is imperfect because debtors can ignore the covenants or lose money in bona fide 
business operations. 
367. Cf. Kronman, supra note Ill, at 489 (arguing that a legislature must evaluate the effects of 
proposed rules on classes of persons rather than on particular, identifiable individuals). 
368. See Bankruptcy Code, 11 U .S.C. §§ 361(2}, 363(c}, (d) (1994). Adequate protection includes 
"an additional or replacement lien." Id. § 361(2}. Although use that is inconsistent with stay relief 
ordered by a court is prohibited, see id. § 363(d}, contractual stay relief would not appear to prohibit 
such use. Moreover, unless the debtor's right to use collateral also is waived, a waiver should not 
prohibit the use. To avoid any doubt, subsection (d) could be amended specifically to pennit such use. 
369. Waiver of the stay without waiving the debtor's right to use collateral would not defeat the 
purpose of the stay waiver because the debtor might not need to use the collateral in bankruptcy. 
Futhennore, even if the use would be necessary, the creditor's right to foreclose on the substitute collat-
eral would not be stayed because the waiver would operate with regard to the replacement lien. Cf. 
infra note 442 (discussing how rating agencies would view the difference between a waiver of the stay 
and a waiver of the debtor's right to use collateral). 
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commodity with a market price. I later address this valuation question in 
the context of applying the theory.370 
c. Economical administration of the bankruptcy process.-
Prebankruptcy contracts such as waivers, which are desired by a creditor 
to limit the debtor's bankruptcy protections, do not appear to affect the 
economical administration of the bankruptcy process. Furthermore, a 
debtor seeking alternatives to the bankruptcy process would enter into a 
procedure contract precisely because the debtor wishes to make the process 
more efficient. 371 Prebankruptcy contracting therefore would not be 
expected to impair the policy of economical administration of the bank-
ruptcy process. 
I next integrate my approach and the foregoing analysis into a thesis 
and then, in Part IV, apply the thesis to representative transactions in 
which prebankruptcy contracts are likely to arise. My thesis reflects a dual 
perspective: acting as a free marketer in inquiring, as a normative matter, 
whether prebankruptcy contracting can make the bankruptcy system more 
efficient; but also acting as a traditionalist in recognizing that political 
realities constrain the extent to which prebankruptcy contracting will be 
allowed to impinge on the Code's fundamental policies. Thus, the thesis 
is normative to the extent it views prebankruptcy contracting as a way of 
maximizing efficiency-redefining efficiency in this context by proposing 
that Kaldor-Hicks efficiency alone is insufficient, and that nonconsenting 
creditors be protected by imposing an additional standard of class Pareto 
efficiency. The thesis is traditionalist to the extent it inquires how the 
Code's policies would limit the scope of efficient prebankruptcy 
contracting.372 
C. Thesis 
1. Statement.-Provisions of the Code sometimes should be viewed 
as default-not mandatory-rules. A prebankruptcy contract that is 
unlikely to result in a secondary material impact neither offends the 
bankruptcy policy of equality of distribution nor creates an externality that 
370. See infra subpan IV(A). 
371. Cf Alan Schwanz, Bankruptcy Workouts and Debt Contracts, 36 J.L. & ECON. 595, 595 
(1993) ("A private workout. . . should Pareto dominate a legal bankruptcy [because] each party could 
receive the share of the insolvent firm it would expectto get in bankruptcy plus a ponion of the savings 
from avoiding the coun. H). 
372. My thesis thus contrasts with the approaches of Tracht, who would enforce most prebank-
ruptcy contracts, and Bogan, who would enforce none. See Tracht, supra note 5, at 348; Bogan, 
supra note 5, at 1264-66. The ex ante test renders the thesis predictable. Cf supra text accompanying 
notes 320-30 (comparing my ex ante test with a bright-line test). 
1999] Rethinking Freedom of Contract 585 
should be unenforceable under contract law.373 This determination can 
be made ex ante, at the time of contracting.374 
A risk still remains that the prebankruptcy contract could impair the 
debtor's ability to rehabilitate. A court could assess that risk by observing 
ex post whether or not the debtor's ability to reorganize in bankruptcy has, 
in fact, been impaired by the prebankruptcy contract. 375 If parties to a 
prebankruptcy contract cannot determine its enforceability until the debtor 
is in bankruptcy, however, creditors would be discouraged from offering 
valuable consideration for the contract, thereby making it more difficult for 
the debtor to reorganize outside of bankruptcy and impeding the policies 
of debtor rehabilitation and economical administration. Therefore, an ex 
ante solution to this problem is preferable. 376 I have proposed as a 
solution that prebankruptcy contracts be enforceable only if the debtor 
receives value that is reasonably equivalent to the value of the contract. 
This requirement would promote debtor rehabilitation by providing the 
debtor with value that could help it reorganize and by permitting enforce-
ability to be judged ex ante, at the time the prebankruptcy contract is 
formed. Therefore, a prebankruptcy contract for which the debtor receives 
reasonably equivalent value should be enforceable if, viewed ex ante, it is 
unlikely to result in a secondary material impact and does not manifestly 
impair a debtor's ability to be rehabilitated. 
As a corollary of this rule, however, if the debtor does not receive 
reasonably equivalent value, the policy of debtor rehabilitation may be 
implicated even if the prebankruptcy contract has no secondary material 
impact. Therefore, a bankruptcy court should be able to consider the 
enforceability of such contracts ex post and, as appropriate, enforce them 
or not based on whether the contract has impaired the debtor's ability to 
reorganize in bankruptcy. By the same token, if the prebankruptcy 
contract, at the time of contracting, is likely to (and later does) cause a 
secondary material impact, it may be unenforceable even if the debtor 
receives reasonably equivalent value. Of course, if the prebankruptcy 
contract is likely to (and does) cause a secondary material impact, and the 
debtor does not receive reasonably equivalent value, the contract clearly 
violates bankruptcy policies and should not be enforced. 
373. As a corollary, panies should be limited from contracting out of the preference provision of 
the Code, see 11 U.S.C. § 547, and other trustee-avoiding-powers that protect equality of distribution 
and other fundamental bankruptcy policies, see, e.g., id. §§ 544-546, 548, 553. 
374. See supra text accompanying notes 321-22 (describing how the debtor and the beneficiary 
of a prebankruptcy contract, acting in good faith and performing appropriate due diligence, could 
decide prior to entering into the contract whether or not a secondary material impact is unlikely). 
375. The Code delegates broad powers to couns. See 11 U.S.C. § 105(a) ("The court may issue 
any order, process, or judgment that is necessary or appropriate to carty out the provisions of [the 
Code]. "). If the delegation is insufficient, the Code could be amended specifically to authorize ex post 
review. 
376. See supra notes 235-40 and accompanying text. 
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2. Qualifications.-This Article analyzes, and therefore the thesis 
only is intended to apply to, prebankruptcy contracts that are either waiver 
contracts (which waive bankruptcy rights) or procedure contracts (which 
change bankruptcy procedures). The thesis would not necessarily apply to 
other conceivable prebankruptcy contracts, such as contracts that purport 
to grant administrative priority to prepetition unsecured claims or to claims 
for rejection of executory contracts.377 Those contracts neither waive the 
rights of a contracting party nor change procedures; rather, they purport 
to expand the application of substantive rights that arise solely by virtue of 
statutory authorization.378 To the extent that statutory rights affect 
noncontracting parties, parties to a contract should no more be able to 
expand those rights than to create them ab initio. 379 
In applying the thesis, a distinction must be made between what the 
law is and what the law, as a normative matter, should be.38O For 
example, the Code provides that ipso facto clauses, which purport to termi-
nate or modify a contract if bankruptcy occurs, are unenforceable.381 
Although that is the law, it should not necessarily be the law. That Code 
section arose from a belief that ipso facto clauses subvert bankruptcy 
policies.382 Ipso facto clauses contained in prebankruptcy contracts, 
however, would not subvert those policies if they were subject to the 
377. The Code provides that administrative priority claims have priority over unsecured claims. 
See 11 U.S.C. § 507(a). A claim for rejection of an executory contract is treated as a prepetition 
claim. See id . . §§ 365(g)(1), 502(g). 
378. My thesis, however, may well apply to prebankruptcy contracts that do not purpon to expand 
statutory rights, such as the ipso facto clauses discussed next in the text. 
379. It sometimes may be unclear whether a panicular prebankruptcy contract waives claims or 
expands statutory rights. A prebankruptcy contract that purports to allow postpetition interest on unse-
cured claims implicitly waives the debtor's right in bankruptcy not to pay postpetition interest on unse-
cured claims. See 11 U.S.C. § 506(b) (permitting postpetition interest to accrue only on oversecured 
claims). Under this interpretation, the waiver would be analyzed in accordance with this Article. 
Alternatively, the contract implicitly expands the application of the substantive bankruptcy right to 
receive postpetition interest. With this focus, the contract should not be enforced. 
380. See supra text accompanying note 30. 
381. For an executory contract (i.e., a contract in which substantial performance is due on both 
sides such that the breach by one patty would excuse performance by the other patty) the Code 
provides, with exceptions not relevant here, as follows: 
Notwithstanding a provision in [the] contract ... , an executory contract ... of the 
debtor may not be terminated or modified, and any right or obligation under such contract 
. . . may not be terminated or modified, at any time after the commencement of the 
[bankruptcy] case solely because of a provision [called an "ipso facto clause"] in such 
contract ... that is conditioned on-
..• the commencement of a [bankruptcy] case .... 
11 U.S.C. § 365(e)(1); see supra note 90 (discussing the Code's nonenforcement of ipso facto clauses 
in contracts). 
382. See Richmond Leasing Co. v. Capital Bank, 762 F.2d 1303, 1310 (5th Cir. 1985) (stating 
that § 365 "serves the purpose of making the debtor's rehabilitation more likely"). But see JACKSON, 
supra note 159, at 40-43 (arguing that the Code's justification for ipsofacto clauses is unsatisfactory). 
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limitations I have proposed for prebankruptcy contracting generally. As 
a normative matter, ipso facto clauses entered into after default for 
reasonably equivalent value that are unlikely to cause a secondary material 
impact should be enforceable. 383 
My analysis so far begs the question whether debtors that can obtain 
liquidity only through prebankruptcy contracting inevitably will fail, thus 
making efforts to delay the failure inefficient. J believe, however, that 
debtors receiving liquidity through prebankruptcy contracting will not 
inevitably fail. To understand why, assume that a debtor needs liquidity 
and cannot obtain it except through prebankruptcy contracting and that its 
alternative is to file for protection under Chapter 11 of the Code.384 
Debtors that are likely to go bankrupt have strong disincentives385 against 
entering into futile prebankruptcy contracts.386 By choosing to file for 
reorganization under Chapter 11 without risking a prebankruptcy contract, 
the debtor may have greater flexibility in negotiating, and therefore a 
higher likelihood of reaching, a plan of reorganization because a bankrupt 
debtor's assets that are the subject of the prebankruptcy contract are subject 
to foreclosure, possibly making it harder for the debtor to ultimately 
negotiate a successful plan of reorganization.387 Moreover, most business 
383. See Schwartz, Contract Theory Approach, supra note 5, at 1844-47 (arguing that ipso facto 
clauses should not be per se unenforceable); Yeon-Koo Che & Alan Schwartz, Section 365, Mandatory 
Bankruptcy Rules and Inefficient Continuance (June 5, 1997) (unpublished manuscript at 17-22, on file 
with the Texas Law Review) (asserting that the absence of ipso facto clauses enables insolvent debtors 
to continue unprofitable projects and allows them to exploit the courts' inability to accurately assess 
expectation damages to force solvent parties to stay in bad deals). 
384. See 11 U.S.C. §§ 1101-1174 (1994 & Supp. II 1996). For an introduction to Chapter 11 . 
reorganization, see Steven L. Schwarcz, Basics of Business Reorganization in Bankruptcy, J. COM. 
BANK LENDING, Nov. 1985, at 36, revised and updated in BANKRUPTCY: A SPECIAL COLLECfION 
FROM THE JOURNAL OF COMMERCIAL BANK LENDING 79 (1988) [hereinafter BANKRUPTCY: A SPECIAL 
COLLECfION]. 
385. Creditors that provide liquidity in the form of new money likewise would have strong 
disincentives against providing the liquidity. Creditors will not even want to make secured loans unless 
it helps an otherwise viable debtor avoid bankruptcy because the bankruptcy process has inherent imper-
fections that would impair the creditor's chance of repayment. Cf infra note 442 (discussing these 
imperfections in the context of rating agency ratings). For example, a secured creditor's collateral 
might be replaced by substitute collateral that the creditor values less, the creditor may be unable under 
fraudulent conveyance law to secure its debt by collateral of excessive value, and an oversecured cred-
itor is not always legally entitled to its full collateral cushion. For a complete discussion of these bank-
ruptcy imperfections, see Schwarcz, supra note 264, at 455-58. 
386. Although the negative reputational effects that a debtor incurs through a bankruptcy filing 
could support a possible counterargument, those reputational effects are getting smaller as larger and 
more well-known companies take advantage of Chapter 11 to reorganize. See infra note 396 and 
accompanying text. If the liquidity provided by the prebankruptcy contract would be futile anyway, 
those reputational effects would merely be delayed, not avoided. 
387. The inability to achieve a plan of reorganization may well lead to the debtor's liquidation. 
See 11 U.S.C. § 1112(b) (1994) (providing that "the court may convert a case under this chapter [11] 
to a case under chapter 7 . . . for cause, including . . . (2) inability to effectuate a plan" of 
reorganization); if. id. § 1123(b)(4) (permitting liquidation of a debtor pursuant to a Chapter 11 plan). 
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debtors are corporations,388 which are managed by their boards of 
directors.389 Directors generally owe their obligations to the 
corporation's shareholders.39O They therefore would have an obligation 
to choose the Chapter 11 reorganization over a futile prebankruptcy con-
tract because the reorganization maximizes the likelihood of shareholder 
recovery.391 
Agency costs392 should not distort the decision. In deciding whether 
to seek bankruptcy protection, a debtor's officers will want to keep their 
jobs and therefore will tend to decide in favor of choices that maximize 
their job security. If the debtor, even after obtaining liquidity, is still 
likely to go bankrupt, then the liquidity only delays the inevitable. 
Although delaying the inevitable sometimes can be valuable for managers 
that wish to retain their positions, the negative consequences of delay could 
outweigh the benefits of delay in the case of prebankruptcy contracting. 
On the other hand, officers and directors often stay in their jobs during a 
reorganization and might even continue as officers and directors of the 
company if the debtor is successfully reorganized.393 By maximizing job 
security, a Chapter 11 reorganization, not an ultimately futile prebank-
ruptcy contract, may be in the outright self-interest of management.394 
388. See Block-Leib, supra note 161, at 351 n.39. 
389. The following analysis assumes that, as a matter of the applicable state's corporation law, the 
prebankruptcy contract would be subject to approval by the company's board of directors. 
390. See Pepper v. Litton, 308 U.S. 295,306 (1939) (suggesting that a director is a fiduciary who 
must act in good faith and in a way inherently fair to the shareholders); if. Steven L. Schwarcz, 
Rethinking a Corporation's Obligations to Creditors, 17 CARDOZO L. REV. 647,674 (1996) (arguing 
that when a corporation becomes insolvent, creditors take on rights similar to those of shareholders, 
and therefore directors should owe an obligation to both). 
391. By entering into a futile prebankruptcy contract, a debtor would reduce its chance of a 
successful reorganization, yet shareholders tend to be paid more in a reorganization than in a 
liquidation. That is because shareholders only are entitled to the value, if any, that remains after 
creditor claims are paid in full in a liquidation. See 11 U.S.C. § 726(a) (specifying the order of dis-
tribution of the debtor's assets in a Chapter 7 liquidation). In a reorganization, however, creditors are 
motivated to share their recovery with shareholders in order to induce them to agree to a consensual 
plan. See Schwarcz, supra note 384, at 43 (proposing that "[t]he key to a successful plan of 
reorganization is that it be consenual"), revised and updated in BANKRUPTCY: A SPECIAL COLLECTION, 
supra note 384, at 86 (1988). 
392. The term "agency costs" refers to the inherent conflict of interest between the owners of a 
firm and its managers. See POSNER, supra note 255, § 14.1, at 428. Managers, for example, want 
job security and high income whether or not those goals benefit the firm. 
393. See Schwarcz, supra note 264, at 459-60 & nn.155-56 (explaining that the debtor's existing 
management may continue to manage the debtor during the course of its reorganization case and 
arguing that, although two srudies report that only a minority of incumbent corporate managers and 
directors remain in office following a corporate reorganization, even a less-than-50% chance of 
managers' retaining their jobs may be more attractive than the certainty oflosing their jobs if the debtor 
is liquidated). 
394. An exception may arise when insiders of privately held companies fear the possibility of divi-
dend or salary recaprure or that insider loans made to them may be enforced in a bankruptcy. In those 
siruations, insiders might agree to an inappropriate prebankruptcy contract merely to avoid, or delay, 
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In individual cases, however, managers hoping to avoid Chapter 11 
may unrealistically assess whether the liquidity provided by a prebank-
ruptcy contract will return the debtor to viability.395 Chapter 11, 
however, no longer bears its former stigma and increasingly is regarded as 
an innovative approach to solve troublesome financial problems.396 
Without empirical evidence, one therefore cannot assume that fear of 
Chapter 11 will cause unrealistic hopefulness to prevail over rationality in 
a relatively significant number of cases.397 
Finally, I assume that allowing prebankruptcy contracting under the 
limited circumstances contemplated in this Article would not make a 
debtor's managers more likely to engage in risky ventures for the benefit 
of shareholders. For example, managers might gamble the proceeds of a 
loan made possible by a prebankruptcy contract in order to maximize 
shareholder :value even though such a gamble would prejudice involuntary 
creditors.398 I have argued in another context, however, that corporate 
law should, and indeed under existing law already may, impose on 
scrutiny of a bankruptcy court. When prebankruptcy contracts are primarily motivated by such con-
flicts of interest, I would argue that the debtor is not acting in good faith and the contract therefore 
should not be enforced. See supra notes 321-22 and accompanying text (requiring that the parties to 
a prebankruptcy contract act in good faith). 
395. Commentators have observed, for example, that "[w]hen already in a situation that offers 
linle or no chance of gain, people take risks. They gamble on a chance of breaking even although if 
things go wrong, they may incur very large losses." KENNETH R. MACCRIMMON & DONALD A. 
WEHRUNG, TAKING RISKS: THE MANAGEMENT OF UNCERTAINTY 195 (1986), quoted in Susan Rose-
Ackennan, Risk Taking and Ruin: Bankruptcy and Investment Choice, 20 J. LEGAL STuD. 277, 294 
(1991) (noting that the prospect of bankruptcy liquidation, as opposed to reorganization, provides an 
example of a Iinle-to-no-gain situation). These observations appear to be based on prospect theory, 
which predicts that individuals who are perfonning above the success level that they seek to achieve 
(i.e., their "aspiration level") will prefer lower risk options and, conversely, that individuals who are 
perfonning below their aspiration level will prefer higher risk options. See Daniel Kahneman & Amos 
Tversky, Prospect Theory: An Analysis of Decision Under Risk, 47 ECONOMETRICA 263 (1979) 
(introducing prospect theory to accommodate empirical results that are inconsistent with the expected 
utility theory of decisions under risk); Amos Tversky & Daniel Kahneman, Advances in Prospect 
Theory: Cumulative Representation of Uncenainry, 5 J. RISK & UNCERTAINTY 297,297 (1992). 
396. Professors Warren and Westbrook have commented on the trend: "Bankruptcy has lost some 
of its once overwhelming association with failure .... The once disreputable 'bully boy' of bankruptcy 
[Chapter 11] is becoming the 'innovative approach' .... " ELIZABETH WARREN & JAY LAWRENCE 
WESTBROOK, THE LAW OF DEBTORS AND CREDITORS 830-31 (3d ed. 1996). Respectability, according 
to Warren and Westbrook, arose as a byproduct of the highly publicized, successful bankruptcy reor-
ganizations of TOYS "R" US, Texaco, LTV Steel, Wickes Lumber, Zales Jewelers, and Macy's 
Department Stores. See id. at 830. Chapter 11 offers finns the possibility of using "the powerful 
provisions of the Bankruptcy Code [to] solve serious legal problems." Id. at 83l. 
397. Even Rose-Ackennan acknowledges a trend toward rationality: "[1]he less painful Chapter 
11 is for managers, the more likely they are to select the overall value-maximizing project .... " 
Rose-Ackennan, supra note 395, at 303. 
398. See Schwarcz, supra note 390, at 674 (explaining that even though a double-or-nothing 
gamble by a corporation with assets of $100 and debt of $90 increases shareholder expected value, it 
cuts the expected value of creditor claims to $45 because "the debt doesn't share in the upside, and 
creditors have a fifty percent chance of losing everything"). 
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directors of a corporation a fiduciary duty to creditors as well as 
shareholders when a risky venture is reasonably expected to prejudice 
creditors.399 My assumption would be valid when that duty applies.400 
IV. Transactional Application of Prebankruptcy Contracting 
Having integrated my approach into a thesis, I now apply the thesis 
to representative transactions in which prebankruptcy contracts are likely 
to arise. 
A. Debt Vrbrkouts 
One should expect that waiver contracts are most likely to arise in debt 
workouts. In order to avoid bankruptcy, a debtor that has defaulted on its 
loan agreement tries to renegotiate with its lender the terms and conditions 
of the loan. Typically, the debtor seeks covenant relief (including waiver 
of existing defaults under the loan agreement), extension of the loan's 
maturities, and possibly additional credit. In return, the lender customarily 
seeks to secure its loan (if the loan is not already secured) and sometimes 
also seeks to have the debtor waive certain bankruptcy protections, such as 
the automatic stay. If the debtor grants such a waiver, should the state 
enforce it?401 
I have shown that a waiver should be enforceable when it is unlikely 
to cause a secondary material impact and the debtor receives reasonably 
equivalent value. A typical waiver of the automatic stay is unlikely to 
cause a secondary material impact with respect to some types of 
collateral. 402 But will the relief sought by the debtor constitute reason-
ably equivalent value for the waiver? 
399. See id. at 677-78 (arguing that "[d]irectors of an insolvent corporation, or of a corporation 
whose actions have a reasonable expectation of resulting in insolvency, have a fiduciary obligation to 
creditors as well as shareholders"). I need not assume that a debtor's managers avoid risky, bad faith 
transactions because I propose that only prebankruptcy contracts made in good faith be enforceable. 
See supra notes 321-22 and accompanying text. 
400. This assumption also is suppor:ted by my previous argument that debtors that are likely to go 
bankrupt have strong disincentives against entering into prebankruptcy contracts, and that a Chapter 
11 reorganization, not an ultimately futile prebankruptcy contract, may be in the outright self-interest 
of management. See supra notes 385-91 and accompanying text. Moreover, even though the existence 
of prebankruptcy contracting theoretically reduces, to some extent, the consequences of default, I 
believe that managers of the sophisticated debtors discussed in this Anicle will continue to want to 
avoid default, which has negative consequences irrespective of whether the default is later cured. A 
debtor in default may find, for example, that the default triggers defaults in its other credit agreements 
(so-called "cross defaults") and may dry up trade credit. A public debtor also will want to avoid 
having to announce its default under SEC disclosure requirements. I therefore assume that the deter-
minants of a prebankruptcy contracting decision will be exogenous. 
401. This question only needs to be answered in cases when the debtor, notwithstanding the 
workout, eventually goes bankrupt. A successful debt workout would avoid the debtor's bankruptcy. 
402. See supra notes 213-16 and accompanying text (discussing foreclosure on financial assets). 
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The question arises because a waiver contract has no obvious market 
in which it can be valued. That does not mean, however, that reasonably 
equivalent value fails as a standard in the context of waiver contracts. A 
solution exists that has both a normative justification and a precedent in 
existing fraudulent conveyance law. 
The essence of a contract is a "voluntary private exchange. ,,403 
Ordinarily, therefore, one would expect a debtor that chooses to enter into 
a waiver contract to value the quid pro quo it receives as equivalent or 
superior to what it gives up. A debtor in default, however, may be unable 
to make a truly voluntary choice. I already addressed this concern under 
contract law and concluded that, given the assumptions of this Article, 
contract law should enforce the debtor's choice.404 I now address this 
concern under the bankruptcy-law policy of debtor rehabilitation, which 
underlies the reasonably equivalent value requirement. 
From the standpoint of debtor rehabilitation, a debtor should be 
allowed to enter into a waiver contract, however imperfect that choice may 
be. As previously discussed, a debtor in a workout would enter into a 
waiver contract to obtain some form of liquidity; without liquidity, the 
debtor will have a higher risk of bankruptcy.405 The availability of 
liquidity therefore enhances the debtor's ability to rehabilitate itself outside 
of bankruptcy. Indeed, liquidity is uniquely valuable to a troubled debtor 
because, dollar for dollar, it may provide significantly more value to the 
debtor than an ordinary commercial exchange. For example, a loan that 
facilitates the debtor's rehabilitation would increase the debtor's value far 
more than the amount of the loan. Liquidity that allows the debtor to 
rehabilitate therefore is a great bargain for the debtor; and even if the 
debtor ultimately fails in its effort to rehabilitate, the mere opportunity to 
rehabilitate arguably should constitute value.406 Accordingly, the ques-
tion is not whether to curtail the availability of liquidity. Instead, the 
question is: Which person is best able to assess how the liquidity offered 
403. TREBILCOCK, supra note 18, at 7. 
404. See supra notes 205-08 and accompanying text (analyzing duress as a defense). 
405. See Schwarcz, supra note 264, at 442. Liquidity may be provided, for example, in the form 
of new money, a loosening of covenants, or a waiver of default. See supra text accompanying notes 
12-13. 
406. The mere opportunity to receive future economic benefits constitutes value under fraudulent 
conveyance law. See, e.g., In re Chomakos, 69 F.3d 769, 771 (6th Cir. 1995) (holding that a debtor 
who legally gambles at blackjack receives reasonably equivalent value in the form of the chance to win 
$3 for every $2 bet). The court reasoned that the opportunity "is not unlike futures contracts purchased 
on margin. The investor in futures may win big, or his position may be wiped out, but the contractual 
right to a payoff if the market happens to move the right way at the right time constitutes a value 
reasonably equivalent to the money at risk." Id.; accord In re R.M.L., Inc., 92 F.3d 139, 148 (3d 
Cir. 1996) (stating in dicta that an irrevocable payment for a loan commitment may constitute value 
even if the loan ultimately fails to be made). 
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is likely to affect the debtor's ability to rehabilitate?407 That person 
should decide whether the debtor should enter into the waiver contract in 
order to obtain the liquidity. That person, of course, is the debtor itself. 
I recognize that a troubled debtor may not always make rational 
choices. The debtor sometimes may be overly optimistic, for example, of 
its chances for rehabilitation.408 No other party, however, is better able 
than the debtor to make that choice ex ante. An alternative might be to 
allow the courts to make an ex post reassessment of the debtor's ex ante 
choice, but liquidity then may dry up because few liquidity providers 
would be willing to be second-guessed.409 I therefore propose that the 
debtor itself should be allowed to choose whether to enter into a prebank-
ruptcy waiver contract. On occasion that choice may be manifestly 
unreasonable. If, for example, no reasonable basis for the choice can be 
discerned, the parties may well be deemed to be acting in bad faith and the 
contract not enforced.410 Nonetheless, in order to encourage parties to 
provide liquidity, the debtor's choice to enter into a waiver contract should 
create a presumption that the debtor will receive reasonably equivalent 
value in return. The presumption should be rebuttable only by a showing 
that, at the time of contract formation, there was no reasonable basis to 
believe that the debtor's ability to be rehabilitated might be improved as a 
result of entering into the contract. 411 
This proposal has precedent not only in fraudulent conveyance law but 
also in the application of that law to agreements securing antecedent debt, 
which I have shown is a form of prebankruptcy contracting.412 Under 
Section 548(d)(2)(A) of the Code, which defines value for purposes of 
fraudulent conveyance law, a debtor that secures or pays an antecedent debt 
is deemed to receive reasonably equivalent value.413 At first glance, that 
407. I do not need to worry here about the effect of a failed waiver contract on third parties 
because I have already addressed that concern in the context of limiting secondary material impacts. 
408. The concern then may be that the enhancement to the debtor's ability to rehabilitate outside 
of bankruptcy could be outweighed by the harm to .the ability of those debtors that go bankrupt anyway 
to rehabilitate in Chapter 11. A general assumption of irrationality, however, should not be made in 
the absence of empirical evidence. See supra notes 395-97 and accompanying text. 
409. An ex post reassessment by a court might be analogous to the final cartoon in DAN HERALD, 
THE HAPPY HYPOCHONDRIAC 64 (1962), a humorous book I read many years back. After surviving 
numerous scares and living a long life, the poor hypochondriac ultimately succumbs, as do we all. On 
his gravestone was written the words, "See, I told you I was no hypocondriac." [d. A court making 
an ex post reassessment of a now bankrupt debtor's ex ante likelihood of rehabilitating would be 
tempted to reach mat same conclusion. 
410. Prebankruptcy contracts that are primarily motivated by conflicting interest would typify this 
category. See supra note 394. 
411. A creditor entering into a waiver contract therefore may wish to consider the due diligence 
that would be appropriate to show that such a rational basis exists. Appropriate due diligence might 
include, for example, discussions with the debtor itself about its reasons for entering into the contract. 
412. See supra text accompanying notes 325-30. 
413. See Bankruptcy Code, 11 U.S.C. § 548(d)(2)(A) (1994). 
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result seems illogicaL The debtor receives nothing tangible by securing or 
paying its debts; rather, it gives away tangible collateral or cash. History 
and policy, however, can explain this apparent inconsistency. Historically, 
fraudulent conveyance law was intended to prevent fraud, and securing or 
paying a legitimate debt is not fraudulent. 414 The rule may promote 
bankruptcy policy by allowing a troubled debtor the flexibility to secure or 
pay its debts in order to avoid default or reach an out-of-court settlement, 
thereby facilitating its rehabilitation. Thus, even under fraudulent 
conveyance law itself, the inability to verify the equivalence of values 
exchanged is irrelevant to the determination of reasonably equivalent value 
when the debtor secures antecedent debt, an action that may facilitate its 
rehabilitation. The treatment of reasonably equivalent value under fraud-
ulent conveyance law thus supports my proposal for allowing a debtor to 
choose whether to enter into a prebankruptcy waiver contract. The next 
subpart suggests, however, that the same conclusion may not apply to 
waivers made outside of a default context. 415 
B. Loan Agreements 
Should waiver contracts that are included in original loan agreements 
be enforced, assuming they would be enforceable if bargained for as part 
of a workout agreement? Unlike the workout situation, the debtor may not 
fully appreciate the significance of the waiver. At least one court already 
has expressed this concern.416 
In a sense, this scenario recalls the Faustian-bargain analogy. Dr. 
Faustus entered into his contract with the Devil twenty-four years before 
414. See, e.g.,In re Lakeside Community Hosp., Inc., 200B.R. 853, 857 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1996) 
(holding that the payment of a real estate tax debt, for which the debtor was liable to the purchaser of 
the property, was not a fraudulent conveyance). 
415. An interesting twist on waiver of the automatic stay in a workout occurs when the creditor 
bargaining for the waiver is unsecured or undersecured. An undersecured creditor's claim exceeds the 
value of the collateral; in such cases, the Code bifurcates the claim into a secured claim for the amount 
of the collateral's value and an unsecured claim for the balance. See 11 U .S.C. § 506(a). If the stay 
is waived as to the unsecured claim, the creditor would recover from the debtor's assets before non-
consenting creditors have been paid, effectively subordinating, and therefore having a material impact 
on, their claims. Stay waivers therefore should not be allowed as to unsecured claims. See In re 
Tristar Automotive Group, Inc., 141 B.R. 41,44 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. '1992); In re Sonnax Indus., 99 
B.R. 591, 595 (D. Vt. 1989), affd, 907 F.2d 1280 (2d Cir. 1990); In re Clark, 69 B.R. 885, 893 
(Bankr. E.D. Pa.), reconsidered, 71 B.R. 747 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1987) (each holding that unsecured 
creditors are not entitled to relief from the automatic stay except in extraordinary circumstances); see 
also In re FRG, Inc., 114 B.R. 75,78 (E.D. Pa.), rev'd on other grounds sub nom. FRG, Inc. v. 
Manley, 919 F.2d 850 (3d Cir. 1990) (assening that unsecured creditors would have to satisfy a higher 
burden than secured creditors in order to obtain relief from the stay). 
416. See In re Atrium High Point Ltd. Pannership, 189 B.R. 599, 607 (Bankr. M.D.N.C. 1995) 
(implying in dicta that a stay waiver "insened in the original loan documents" would be impermissible, 
but holding that the existing waiver, bargained for as pan of a later modification under which the 
debtor received significant benefits, was permissible). 
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the contract's troublesome consequences.417 Human beings discount the 
significance of future events, especially those far in the future. 418 For 
additional reasons, waiver contracts placed in original loan agreements may 
be discounted by the debtor even further. 419 Not only will the trouble-
some consequence (i.e., the waiver) occur in the future (at the time of the 
debtor's bankruptcy) but, unlike the inevitable time period facing Dr. 
Faustus, even the occurrence of the triggering event-bankruptcy-is uncer-
tain and, if the debtor is financially robust, unlikely.420 It is uncertain 
whether a healthy debtor at the time of the original loan agreement will 
adequately appreciate the significance of a waiver contract. 421 For this 
reason, a waiver contract included in an original loan agreement might not 
satisfy the standard of being "voluntary, knowing, and intelligently 
made. ,,422 
417. See MARLOWE, supra note 1, at sc. 19, II. 97-98; text accompanying notes 1-2. 
418. Cf. Michael H. Schill, An Economic Analysis ofMongagor Protection Laws, 77 VA. L. REV. 
489,528 n.129 (1991) (suggesting that borrowers that are successfully making mortgage payments tend 
to discount the possibility of defaulting on a loan at an unforeseen, future date). On the other hand, 
sophisticated counsel can help debtors assess such events more rationally. 
419. New York had a common-law rule that refused to enforce a provision in a loan agreement 
which charged compound interest-interest on defaulted overdue interest. See, e.g., Giventer v. 
Arnow, 333 N.E.2d 366, 368 (N.Y. 1975); Young v. Hill, 67 N.Y. 162, 165 (1876); Stewart v. 
Petree, 55 N.Y. 621, 623 (1874). The rule had the same rationale: debtors may not appreciate pro-
visions in loan agreements that take effect only upon default. Courts believed that debtors were 
unlikely to realize the rate at which compound interest could accumulate. See Giventer, 333 N.E.2d 
at 368; 72 NEW YORK JURISPRUDENCE 2D, Interest and Usury § 12 (1988). However, after a debtor 
defaulted in the payment of interest, courts would enforce agreements to pay compound interest. 
Debtors then would be more likely to be aware of the geometric rate of increase that results from com-
pounding interest. See, e.g., Newburger-Morris Co. v. Talcott, 114 N.E. 846, 847 (N.Y. 1916); 
Young, 67 N.Y. at 167. Although the New York legislature recently passed a statute to allow a loan 
agreement provision for compound interest, see N.Y. GEN. OBLIG. LAW § 5-527(1) (McKinney 1997), 
the motivation appeared to be pragmatic: the prohibition on compound interest "put New York at a 
commercial and financial disadvantage. . .. [K]nowledgeable lenders and borrowers who seek clear 
authority for their compound interest or interest-on-interest loans often take their business to other 
states." Memorandum of Legislative Representative of City of New York, 212th Legis. Sess. (N.Y. 
1989), reprinted in 1989 N.Y. Laws ch. 202, at 2108 (McKinney). 
420. But should high risk firms be permitted to agree to binding prebankruptcy waivers in their 
loan agreements? Although they are more likely to appreciate the bankruptcy risks, it may be difficult 
to draw a line between high and lower risk firms. Furthermore, high risk firms may be subject to the 
same agency cost concerns described below. See infra notes 424-25 and accompanying text. 
421. The operation of perceptual biases has been described as follows: 
Sometimes people's perceptual apparatuses do not work well. They underestimate the 
chance that certain risks (floods, earthquakes, failures of the products they buy) will come 
to pass and as a result may not choose rationally when confronted with choices about such 
risks .... When a person is confronted with a problem or risk for the first (or only) time 
in his life, the chance of error is greatest. 
Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 180, at 1416, 1434. 
422. D.H. Overmyer Co. v. Frick Co., 405 U.S. 174, 185 (1972). All contractual waivers must 
meet this standard. See supra notes 150-51 and accompanying text. The Overmyer Court itself stated 
that had the cognovit provision in question been included in "the initial contract" or been agreed to in 
advance of a default by the party executing such provision, the provision would not have been 
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I already have argued that this lack of appreciation can be mitigated 
by the experience level of the debtor's bankruptcy counse1.423 Agency 
costs, however, compound this lack of appreciation in a way that mere 
retention of bankruptcy counsel cannot solve. Managers of a healthy 
debtor-viewing bankruptcy as a remote event-have an economic incentive 
to undervalue the cost of prebankruptcy waivers and may actually perceive 
the waiver as relatively costless to them. That is because the waiver will 
not need to be disclosed at the time it is made,424 and the possibility of 
eventual disclosure will be discounted by the typical manager that expects 
to have moved on to other companies well before a bankruptcy occurs. 425 
To counteract this undervaluing, I suggest that, absent actual or incipient 
default426 at the time of contracting, waiver contracts generally should be 
unenforceable.427 
enforceable. Overmyer, 405 U.S. at 186. In this context, some might ask whether healthy debtors will 
appreciate the significance of entering into a security agreement, which after all is a type of prebank-
ruptcy contract. They should, because the granting of collateral is significant even to a financially 
healthy debtor, see Schwarcz, supra note 264, at 431, and may involve conscious and deliberate steps 
by the debtor-e.g., physically pledging the collateral or filing U.C.C. financing statements. 
423. See supra text accompanying notes 189-90 (arguing from the standpoint of paternalistic 
concerns). 
424. For a healthy company, the waiver could be viewed as immaterial and therefore not required 
to be disclosed in the notes to the financial statements or in other information about the company. See 
17 C.F.R. § 240.lOb-5 (1998) (requiring disclosure of material information only). 
425. The misalignment of incentives caused by routine turnover has received little academic 
attention, but I have wimessed many such situations, much to my chagrin as counsel to institutional 
clients. A survey of executive turnover trends indicates that turnover is significantly greater among 
firms that are facing bankruptcy. The chief executive officer resigned or was dismissed in the 12 
months prior to bankruptcy in 23 of the 49 companies that filed for Chapter 11 between July 1, 1996 
and June 30, 1997. Search of 1 STANDARD & POOR'S REGISTER OF CORPORATIONS, DIRECTORS, AND 
EXECUTIVES (1997) (supplementary search for chief executives); LEXIS, Bkrtcy Library, Bankruptcy 
Datasource-Bankruptcy Data Pages File (July 15, 1997) (search for records of firms filing for bank-
ruptcy and their chief executive officers); LEXIS, News Library, Curnws and Papers Files (July 15, 
1997) (search for news reports indicating either that the chief executive officer resigned or was dis-
missed within the 12 months preceding the bankruptcy filing or that he or she held the position more 
than a year prior to the filing) (summary results on file with the Texas Law Review). In contrast, 
executive turnover among nonbankrupt corporations is noticeably lower. Chief Executive magazine 
reported that in 1994 only 39 of the 238 chief executive officers included in its annual CEO compensa-
tion survey had changed companies. See Lori Grube, CEO's at Risk, CHIEF EXECUTIVE, Nov. 1995, 
at 42, 42. The article also noted a study conducted by scholars at Northwestern University's Kellogg 
School of Management which indicated that of 413 large corporations (taken from the Forbes and 
Fortune 500 indexes), only 54 had changed chief executive officers in 1992. See id. (referring to James 
D. Westphal & Edward J. Zajac, Who Shall Govern? CEO/Board Power, Demographic Similarity, and 
New Director Selection, ADMIN. SCI. Q., Mar. 1995, at 60, 60). 
426. By "incipient" default, I mean an event that, but for the giving of notice or the lapse of time, 
would constitute a default. 
427. But see infra subpart IV(C) (arguing that securitization transactions should be an exception 
to this general rule). Also, one could argue on a case-by-case basis that a debtor that undervalues a 
waiver contract does not receive reasonably equivalent value for it. However, it appears better to avoid 
the cost and uncertainty of litigating this issue for every bankrupt debtor's loan agreement that includes 
such a contract. This could become especially costly if waiver contracts became boilerplate provisions 
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Entering into a prebankruptcy contract at the original loan stage also 
may prematurely take away the contract beneficiary's incentive to give 
valuable liquidity. In the context of prebankruptcy contracts to give 
collateral in exchange for loans, I have argued elsewhere that debtors have 
economic incentives not to give the collateral until they need liquidity and 
have no other source of funds. 428 That is because secured borrowing has 
a cost, which I call theta «(), that reflects, among other things, the lost 
opportunity of having the pledged assets available to use as collateral if the 
debtor later faces a liquidity crisis.429 However, whereas the value of () 
is large for collateral, it may be somewhat smaller for other types of 
prebankruptcy contracts. One of ()'s components is the reputational 
COSt.430 That cost may be higher for collateral, which must be recorded 
as a matter of public record to be perfected,431 than for prebankruptcy 
contracts such as waivers of the automatic stay, which are not matters of 
public record.432 If () is smaller for waiver contracts, debtors may 
succumb more prematurely to creditor pressure to enter into waivers. 
Restricting waiver contracts to postdefault situations would ameliorate that 
pressure. 
of loan agreements. The court in In re Pease, 195 B.R. 431 (Bankr. D. Neb. 1996), for example, 
cautioned that upholding a waiver of the automatic stay "would encourage institutional lenders to adopt 
standardized waiver tenns in fonnalloan agreements." Id. at 435. For a view that waiver contracts 
are unlikely to become boilerplate provisions, see Bogart, supra note 5, at 1124 ("[L]enders' counsel 
continually exhort their colleagues not to overuse the waiver [of the automatic stay provision] (for 
example, by extracting the waiver at the initial loan stage rather than at workout). According to these 
attorneys, courts may view such behavior as overreaching and refuse to enforce the waiver in all 
situations. H); Bradford F. Englander, Developments Regarding the Enforceability of Pre-Bankruptcy 
Waivers of the Automatic Stay, 30 Bankr. Ct. Dec. (CRR) 5,6 (June 17, 1997) (suggesting that "gross 
overreaching in the use of a waiver can result in unfortunate consequences"). 
428. See Schwarcz, supra note 264, at 446-47. 
429. See id. at 447. 
430. Of course, the reputational cost of pre bankruptcy contracting, depending on the contract, may 
be greater than the reputational cost of secured debt. See discussion of the reputational cost of waiving 
the automatic stay supra notes 96-103 and accompanying text. 
431. See U.C.C. § 9-302 (1995). 
432. Whether prebankruptcy contracts should be recorded as a matter of public record is beyond 
the scope of this discussion. See supra note 93 (referring to arguments by Professors Tracht, 
Rasmussen, and Skeel regarding the filing of pre bankruptcy contracts); supra note 328 (examining the 
nonnative significance of such a filing system); if. Carl S. Bjerre, Secured Transactions Inside Out: 
Negative Pledge Covenants, Property and Perfection, 84 CORNELL L. REV. (forthcoming Jan. 1999) 
(addressing whether negative-pledge covenants should be recorded). Although a filing system alone 
cannot address the problem of a creditor extending credit prior to the execution and filing of a later-
made waiver, a creditor that wished to restrict its debtor from entering into future waiver contracts 
could request the debtor to make a "negative-waiver" covenant. See supra note 312 (suggesting that 
demands by creditors for negative-waiver covenants may indicate the presence of externalities caused 
by waivers). 
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C. Securitization Transactions 
One of prebankruptcy contracting's most important potential applica-
tions is to securitization. Described as "becoming one of the dominant 
means of capital formation in the United States, "433 securitization is a 
financial technique whereby a debtor transfers rights in receivables or other 
financial assets to a special purpose vehicle (SPV), which in tum issues 
securities to capital market investors and uses the proceeds of the issuance 
to pay for the financial assets.434 The investors buy the securities based 
on assessment of the value of the financial assets, without concern for the 
debtor's financial condition.435 Thus, companies that otherwise could not 
obtain financing now can do so; and even companies that otherwise could 
obtain financing now may be able to do so at lower cost.436 
The success of a securitization transaction depends on the rating that 
independent rating agencies, such as Standard & Poor's and Moody's, 
assign to the securities. A higher rating makes it more likely that investors 
can be found to buy the securities.437 To obtain a high rating, most 
debtors need to structure their sale of financial assets to the SPY in a way 
that will be respected in the event of the debtor's bankruptcy: the so-called 
"true sale. "438 A true sale, unfortunately, sometimes is difficult,439 and 
almost always very expensive,440 to achieve in a way that preserves the 
competing economic requirements of the debtor and the SPV.441 
433. Exclusion from the Definition of Investment Company for Structured Financings, Investment 
Company Act Release, 57 Fed. Reg. 56248, 56248 (1992). 
434. See Schwarcz, Alchemy, supra note 9, at 135-36. 
435. See id. at 136. 
436. See id. at 142, 146 (showing that securitization can be less expensive than alternative funding 
sources and, even if not less expensive, can provide valuable "off-balance sheet" funding). 
437. Inversely, a higher rating lowers the rate of return needed to attract those investors. See Hill, 
supra note 9, at 1071 (stating that higher-rated securities can be purchased by many entities that may 
be restricted from or simply fear purchasing investments below certain rating levels). 
438. "True sale" is a term bankruptcy courts use to describe an absolute transfer of assets that is 
cognizable under the Bankruptcy Code. See Steven L. Schwarcz, Protecting Rights, Prevellting 
Windfalls: A Modelfor Harmonizing State and Federal Laws on Floating Liens, 75 N.C. L. REv., 403, 
456 (1997) (defining true sale generally as "a sale of accounts or other intangibles that legally separates 
the future payment stream from the estate of the selling company" as defined in the Bankruptcy Code, 
11 U.S.C. § 541 (1994»; Committee on Bankr. and Corporate Reorganization of the Ass'n of the Bar 
of the City of New York, Structured Financing Techniques, 50 Bus. LAW. 527, 541-42 (1995) 
(explaining that a true sale is designed to "remov[e] the assets transferred from the transferor'S estate 
[to an SPV] under Section 541" of the Code). 
439. See Schwarcz, Alchemy, supra note 9, at 141-42 (describing the tension between achieving 
a true sale for bankruptcy purposes and making the transaction economically viable). 
440. See Pantaleo et a!., supra note 10, at 162 & n.8 (describing the two-tier structure necessary 
to accomplish a true sale and the sizeable expense associated with it). 
441. Can one simply specify in a prebankruptcy contract that a given transfer of assets constitutes 
a true sale? After all, property is a bundle of rights, and if all rights can be waived, why cannot two 
panies simply agree that their transaction will constitute a sale? I believe they cannot because owner-
ship rights are not merely what one calls ownership but rather a coun's characterization of the bundle 
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That difficulty and cost can be greatly minimized, however, by permit-
ting the debtor to enter into a prebankruptcy contract which waives any 
future application of the automatic stay against the SPY. Absent the stay, 
the debtor would not need to transfer its financial assets to the SPY as a 
true sale in a complex two-tier structure because the SPY could continue 
using the proceeds of the financial assets to pay investors even if the debtor 
goes bankrupt. The securities therefore could be rated close to the level 
of a true sale442 and the debtor would save significant transaction 
costS.443 Waiver contracts thus would make it easier and less costly for 
debtors to use securitization. 
of rights that one possesses. If, for example, a transferor of an asset is entitled to the residual value 
of the asset after the transferee gets its bargained economic return, courts say that the "ownership" of 
the asset belongs to the transferor irrespective of where the parties say that ownership lies. See id. at 
164-65, 172 n.45 (discussing the willingness of courts to recharacterize a sale if the economics of a 
transaction more closely resemble a loan). But see id. at 172 n.45 (raising the possibility of an expan-
sive theory of sale that would give more credence to how the parties characterize the transfer and less 
credence to the economic incidents of the bargain). 
442. From the standpoint of a true sale, rating agencies consider three issues in deciding whether 
to assign the highest" AAA" rating, assuming all other criteria (such as the quality of the financial 
assets) meet the standards of that rating. The first, and most important, issue is whether payment of 
collections to the SPV would be subject to the automatic stay in bankruptcy. If the stay is waived, that 
issue goes away. The second issue is whether the collateral is subject to substitution by the debtor. 
The significance of that issue turns on whether the debtor can offer substitute collateral and whether 
the debtor's right to use collateral under 11 U .S.C. § 363 has been waived. If it has been waived, that 
issue also goes away. (Waivers of the debtor's right to use collateral may be harder to justify because 
if that occurred then debtors could not use cash collections of financial assets for working capital needs, 
which might impair debtor rehabilitation. See supra text accompanying note 369). The third issue is 
whether the secured party is entitled to its entire collateral cushion. For example, a rating agency may 
have required a very high level of overcollateralization in order to ensure that the secured creditor will 
always be paid even if defaults on the underlying assets tum out to greatly exceed the historical default 
levels. See Telephone Interview with Petrina R. Dawson, Managing Director and Associate General 
Counsel, Standard & Poor's Ratings Services (July 31, 1997). Yet, an oversecured creditor is not 
always legally entitled to its full collateral cushion because a coun, in the exercise of its equitable 
powers under 11 U.S.C. § 105(a), may decide that some portion of that cushion is unnecessary to 
protect the creditor. See, e.g., In re T.H.B. Corp., 85 B.R. 192, 194-95 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1988) 
(holding that a debtor could use cash collateral without granting a substitute lien or making cash pay-
ments because the remaining collateral constituted a "sufficient 'cushion' of collateral value in excess 
of the debt," and "the [remaining] collateral value far exceed[ed] the debt"). Thus, a rating agency 
will be unable to assign a "AAA" true sale rating, but nonetheless may be able to get close to that 
rating depending on the facts of the particular case. See Telephone Interview with Petrina R. Dawson, 
supra. See also Solomon B. Samson & Gail!. Hessol, Ultimate Recovery itl Ratings: A Conceptual 
Framework, STANDARD & POOR'S CREDITWEEK, Nov. 6,1996, at 25, 25-26 (analyzing a new policy 
for enhancing a security's rating above the issuer's credit rating if virtually full recovery, although 
delayed, can be anticipated in the event of a default). These issues, of course, are related to the same 
bankruptcy imperfections previously encountered in the efficiency argument supra note 385. 
443. The debtor has a secondary benefit in structuring the transfer of financial assets to the SPY 
as a secured loan and not a true sale because, in a secured loan, the debtor is entitled to any surplus 
value in the financial assets once the SPV was repaid on its loan. See U.C.C. §§ 9-502(2), 9-504(2) 
(1995). 
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Because securitization transactions affect only a debtor's financial 
assets, waiver contracts rarely would be expected to result in a secondary 
material impact.444 The limitation that waiver contracts be entered into 
after default ,445 however, would greatly restrict the application of 
prebankruptcy contracting to securitization transactions, many of which are 
entered into absent default. 446 But there are reasons why this limitation 
should not apply to securitization transactions. 
I have argued that a healthy debtor may not appreciate the significance 
of a waiver contract because people discount the significance of future 
events, especially when the occurrence of the troublesome consequence 
(i.e., the waiver) is unlikely,447 and that this lack of appreciation is 
compounded by the problem of agency costs caused by systematic under-
valuation of waiver contracts by managers of healthy companies.448 
These concerns, however, are less likely to arise in securitization 
transactions. Whereas a prebankruptcy waiver merely would be one of the 
many terms of a loan agreement and perhaps be treated as "boilerplate," 
it would be at the core of the bankruptcy-remote structure of a securitiza-
tion and central to its disclosure. That is because the most critical goal of 
securitization is to ensure that the debtor's bankruptcy will not affect 
investors in the SPY's securities. Indeed, parties such as rating agencies 
that scrutinize the transaction start their analysis with the assumption that 
the debtor will go bankrupt.449 Thus, even a healthy debtor should 
appreciate the central significance of the waiver. Likewise, waiver 
contracts should not be systematically undervalued because their value is 
clear: they permit the debtor to engage in a securitization without incurring 
the significant transaction costs of a two-tier structure. Therefore the 
reasons for restricting waiver contracts to postdefault situations-
underappreciation and undervaluing-should not apply in securitization 
transactions. 
444. See supra notes 213-16 and accompanying text. 
445. See supra text accompanying notes 426-27. 
446. See Schwarcz, Alchemy, supra note 9, at 137 ("Even an originator [debtor) with an 
investment grade rating [on its securities) may derive benefit from securitization if the SPV can issue 
debt securities with a higher investment grade rating and, as a result, significantly decrease the 
originator's interest costs. "). A healthy debtor also can benefit by obtaining capital market debt fund-
ing without having to record a liability on its balance sheet. See id. at 142-43. 
447. Because its triggering event, bankruptcy of the debtor may not occur. 
448. See supra notes 424-25 and accompanying text (arguing that systematic undervaluing will 
occur because waiver contracts are not required to be disclosed and managers expect to move on to jobs 
at other companies well before a bankruptcy occurs). 
449. See, e.g., STANDARD & POOR'S STRUCTURED FINANCE RATINGS, ASSET-BACKED 
SECURITIES, CREDIT CARD CRITERIA (April 1996), at 10 ("Standard & Poor's worst-case scenario 
assumes the bankruptcy or insolvency of each transaction participant that is deemed not to be a 
bankruptcy-remote entity or that is rated lower than the transaction. "). 
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D. Contracting for Different Bankruptcy Procedures 
Professor Alan Schwartz has shown that procedure contracts can bene-
fit both debtors and creditors.45o And I have shown that when a debtor 
and all of its creditors agree to a procedure contract, there is little question 
that the contract should be enforced.451 But neither Professor Schwartz 
nor I have provided actual examples of procedure contracts. That is not 
surprising. Given the requirement of unanimity, procedure contracts are 
expected to be rare. Indeed, I have been unable to find any evidence of 
the existence of actual procedure contracts. 
That lack of evidence is consistent with Schwartz's observation that 
procedure contracts may not be feasible because of an apparent obstacle to 
the parties' ability to write bankruptcy contracts.452 The obstacle is that, 
as a matter of contract law, a contract cannot bind creditors that refuse to 
sign.453 Most debtors have multiple creditors, and it would be difficult 
for a debtor to persuade all its creditors to agree on an alternative 
process.454 This problem is compounded because many claims-such as 
future tort claims-do not even exist at the time the proposed procedure 
contract would be executed. 
Therefore, a procedure contract could work, as a practical matter, 
only if the law imposes a consensus mechanism that substitutes for 
unanimity. A similar mechanism actually exists under current bankruptcy 
law. Subsection 1126(b) of the Code provides as follows: "[A] holder of 
a claim or interest that has accepted or rejected the plan [of reorganization] 
before the commencement of the case under this title is deemed to have 
accepted or rejected such plan, as the case may be," if solicitation of such 
acceptance or rejection was in compliance with federal securities law.455 
450. See supra text accompanying notes 73-90. 
451. When there are no nonconsenting creditors, there is no concern with externalities or with the 
bankruptcy policy of equality of distribution. See supra text accompanying notes 108,347-49. Thus, 
Professor Schwartz was justified in focusing on maximizing the value of the estate ex post and ignoring 
distributional issues. Furthermore, procedure contracts should not impair the bankruptcy policy of 
debtor rehabilitation. See supra text accompanying notes 346-69. 
452. See Schwartz, Contracting About Bankruptcy, supra note 5, at 140. 
453. See supra note 83 and accompanying text; see also, e.g., Mark J. Roe, The Voting 
Prohibition in Bond Workouts, 97 YALEL.J. 232, 238 (1987) (noting that a bankrupt party and a single 
creditor cannot strike an effective deal because value will flow from the consenting creditor to holdout 
creditors that are not bound by the contract). 
454. As a debtor moves closer to bankruptcy, it may be especially difficult to achieve unanimity 
because creditors may be in conflict as to their ultimate strategies. See Roe, supra note 453, at 236-39 
(explaining that some bondholders may choose to hold out, creating a buoying-up effect that, in 
combination with the optimistic expectations of some creditors, the mistrust of managerial or stock-
holder representations by other creditors, and the desire for a greater portion of the gains of recapitali-
zation by still other creditors, can be fatal to a deal). 
455. Bankruptcy Code, 11 U.S.C. § 1126(b) (1994) (emphasis added). 
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The purpose of subsection (b) is to create an actual prebankruptcy 
consensus voting procedure that substitutes for unanimity. 456 Although 
the prebankruptcy vote of holders of claims and interests binds those 
individual holders, the magic is worked through subsections 1126(c) and 
(d) that, for purposes of accepting a plan of reorganization, bind all holders 
of claims and interests even though not all such holders have voted to 
accept the plan.457 In the case of claims, for example, all that is needed 
is that creditors "that hold at least two-thirds in amount and more than one-
half in number" of the claims have voted to accept the plan.458 The vote 
then binds all the creditors. 459 
This supermajority voting procedure forms the basis for "an 
important, though relatively infrequent, type of bankruptcy called a 
prepackaged bankruptcy, ... [a] type of proceeding [that] offers savings 
to debtors and creditors alike.,,460 The core element of a prepackaged 
bankruptcy is the debtor's ability to solicit creditor approval of a 
reorganization plan binding nonconsenting creditors prior to the filing of 
its bankruptcy case.461 Thus, the reorganization plan in a prepackaged 
bankruptcy is actually an enforceable prebankruptcy procedure contract, 
substituting statutory supermajority voting requirements for unanimity. 
The use of supermajority voting for procedure contracts, however, has 
practical and conceptual limits. Under current law, for example, debtors 
seeking confirmation of a prepackaged plan must satisfy certain disclosure 
requirements, which often means complying with the disclosure provisions 
of the federal securities laws. 462 Courts have rejected prepackaged plans 
when the time between disclosure and the voting deadline was too 
short.463 As a practical matter, prepackaged plans also can be difficult 
to implement when much of the debt is composed of trade or employee 
claims that fluctuate during the prepetition solicitation period.464 
456. See EpSTEIN ET AL., supra note 170, § 11-24, at 837. 
457. See 11 U.S.C. § 1126(c)·(d). 
458. Id. § 1126(c). 
459. See id. 
460. Robett K. Rasmussen & Randall S. Thomas, Delaware as a Forum for Insolvent 
Corporations: Precommitment, Investment Incentives and the Race to the Top 6 (Sept. 1988) 
(unpublished manuscript, on file with the Texas Law Review). 
461. See 7 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY, supra note 296, 1 1126.03[2]. 
462. See 11 U.S.C. § 1126(b). Debtors must follow the disclosure rules of "any applicable non-
bankruptcy law, rule or regulation, " or if there is no such law, rule or regulation, debtors must disclose 
"adequate information," id., as that term is defined, id. § 1125(a)(1). 
463. See In re Southland Corp., 124 B.R. 211, 227 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 1991)(invalidating the vote 
on a plan because a period of eight business days was an "unreasonably shott" period of time for 
creditors and preferred shareholders to consider the plan). 
464. See 7 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY, supra note 296, 1 1126.03[2][c]. Prepackaged plans also 
may not be feasible when the debtor has a large number of creditors that are not represented by a 
trustee or a committee. See id. 
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Furthermore, some prepackaged plans have given rise to litigation over the 
classification of claims for voting purposes and the identification of the 
holders of transferable debt instruments,46S issues that may become criti-
cal in the case of close votes. 
The same issues and concerns involved in prepackaged plans would 
obtain for procedure contracts. In addition, supermajority voting on a 
procedure contract also suffers the potential infirmity that no fixed point 
exists when all creditors will have had the opportunity to vote.466 Even 
after the contract is made, future claims may arise-and undoubtedly will 
in the case of an ongoing business. How should creditors holding those 
claims be treated if the claims arise in numbers that would potentially 
change the prior vote of the class or if the claims constitute a new class for 
which supermajority creditor consent has not yet been obtained?467 
Solutions might include, in the former case, requiring another vote of that 
class and, in the latter case, requiring a vote of the new class. 
Another issue will be the degree of court supervision. Prepackaged 
plans are pursued under the supervision of the bankruptcy court, and plan 
confirmation is subject to court approval. Approval may not be given 
unless the court finds that disclosure was adequate, other solicitation 
requirements were met, and the protections provided by the Code for non-
consenting creditors have been satisfied.468 Court supervision therefore 
gives a substantial measure of protection to nonconsenting creditors. It 
seems unlikely that Congress would apply supermajority voting to pro-
cedure contracts without subjecting any alternative procedure contemplated 
by the contract to bankruptcy court supervision. 
Perhaps the lesson of prepackaged bankruptcies is that the obstacles 
to procedure contracts are not in the concept but in the implementation. 
Further study of actual prepackaged bankruptcy plans therefore may be 
valuable. 
465. See In re Southland, 124 B.R. at 220-21 (analyzing whether the beneficial owners or the 
record owners were entitled to vote for the prepackaged plan). 
466. In prepackaged bankruptcies, the existing prepetition claims are fixed at the date of 
bankruptcy. Although claims may arise after bankruptcy, postpetition creditors generally are afforded 
special priority treatment in bankruptcy. See 11 U.S.C. §§ 503(b), 507(a)(1). 
467. Until then, the normative justification for binding newly arising creditors would appear to 
be that if representative members of a similarly situated class consent, distributional effects on other 
members of the class are likely to be small. That same logic would appear to justify ignoring potential 
distributional effects, such as externalities and nonequality of distribution, on existing nonconsenting 
creditors. The Code itself implicitly recognizes that logic under Section 1126 by imposing the results 
of supermajority voting on nonconsenting creditors. Cf. id. § 1126(c), (d). 
468. See id. § 1129(a) (stating that a coun may "confirm a plan only if all of the [specified] 
requirements are met"). These requirements include a "best interest" test: each nonconsenting creditor 
must receive at least as much as it would have received in a liquidation of the debtor under Chapter 
7 of the Code. See id. § 1129(a)(7)(A)(ii). 
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V. Conclusion 
A. General Results 
In rethinking the debate over prebankruptcy contracting, I started from 
the first principles underlying contract and bankruptcy law. I next 
answered the threshold question: What freedom should parties have to con-
tractually override a statutory scheme? I then derived a unifying theory 
that explains when provisions of the Bankruptcy Code should be viewed as 
default rules that parties may contract to change and when they should be 
viewed as mandatory rules that may not be contractually changed. My 
theory reflects the dual perspectives of inquiring how prebankruptcy 
contracting can maximize efficiency, but recognizing that the Code's 
policies may well limit the scope of otherwise efficient contracting. 
In examining whether harm to third persons, or "externalities," should 
limit prebankruptcy contracting, I showed that externalities should not 
render a prebankruptcy contract, or indeed any other contract, unenforce-
able if each class of affected persons benefits469 overall, even though 
some of those persons individually may turn out to be harmed. This result 
is consistent with the normative basis for legislation-evaluating the effects 
of proposed rules on classes of persons rather than on particular 
individuals. This result also is consistent with the normative argument for 
freedom of contract-voluntary assent on the part of all parties-because 
even creditors, including involuntary creditors, who in retrospect are 
harmed would have wanted those contracts, viewed ex ante, to be 
enforceable. 470 
My model therefore may be useful outside of the bankruptcy context 
in solving the more generic problem of determining which externalities are 
to count in constraining the freedom of parties to contract with each other. 
Furthermore, the model provides a key to understanding when parties 
should be allowed to contract about statutory schemes generally: one 
merely needs to substitute another statute's policies for Code's policies in 
my analysis. 
B. Specific Recommendation for Bankruptcy Law Reform 
Although my analysis has been largely normative, many of my 
conclusions are not necessarily inconsistent with existing law; therefore 
parties even now could choose to enter into the types of prebankruptcy 
contracts proposed. Nonetheless, parties often want greater assurance that 
their contracts comply with the law. The legal uncertainty is compounded 
469. Or at least is not hanned. 
470. My approach thus may be better adapted to a policy analysis of prebankruptcy contracting 
than that of traditional economic scholarship, which would detennine efficiency by offsetting the benefit 
to contracting parties against the hann to nonconsenting creditors. 
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by the recent proposal of the National Bankruptcy Review Commission to 
ban all forms of prebankruptcy contracting.471 The statutory text pro-
posed below would clearly establish that parties could enter into prebank-
ruptcy contracts in accordance with the approaches put forth in this 
Article.472 
New Section _: (a) Contracts entered into by a debtor prior to 
the filing of a petition under section 301, 302, or 303 of this title 
. . . that purport to amend, modify, or waive any of the provisions 
of this title other than sections . . . shall be enforceable by the 
parties thereto if, at the time of contracting, the contract does not 
manifestly impair the debtor's ability to be rehabilitated, the parties 
to the contract in good faith believe that the contract is unlikely to 
result in material injury to any other person, and either (x) the debtor 
had received, at the time of the making of the contract, reasonably 
equivalent value as consideration or (y) the debtor's ability to be 
rehabilitated is not materially impaired as a result of the contract. 
(b) For purposes of subsection (a), (i) value shall be defined by 
reference to section 548, provided that a debtor shall not be deemed 
to have received value for a contract if at the time of the making of 
such contract there was no reasonable basis to believe that the 
debtor's ability to be rehabilitated might be improved as a result of 
entering into the contract, and (li) a party shall be deemed to have 
acted in good faith only if that party has undertaken due diligence 
that is appropriate under the circumstances. 
(c) This section _ shall apply only to contracts entered into 
after defaUlt by business parties that are represented by counsel 
having expertise in federal bankruptcy law. The term "defaUlt" shall 
mean an actual default or an event which with the giving of notice or 
the passing of time, or both, would constitute an actual default. The 
condition that such contracts be entered into "after default" shall not 
apply to contracts entered into between the debtor and an issuer of 
securities if the securityholders' right to payment depends primarily 
on cash flow jromfinancial assets that are the subject of the contract. 
The significance of this Article, however, depends neither on the 
adoption of the foregoing statutory text nor the implementation of other 
schemes to permit prebankruptcy contracting. Rather, my broader purpose 
has been to use prebankruptcy contracting as a model for exploring the 
larger issue of freedom of contract in the face of externalities and statutory 
constraints. 
471. See NATIONAL BANKR. REVIEW COMM'N, supra note 8, at 21; supra note 117. 
472. My proposed statutory text only addresses waiver contracts. See supra subpart IV(D) 
(arguing that additional study of prepackaged bankruptcies is needed for a full understanding of super-
majority procedure contracts). 
